Search Results for epistemic norms

...Dorit Ganson [email protected] Simion Mona , Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2021 . xvi + 164 pp. © 2023 by Cornell University 2023 Crafted within a knowledge-first epistemological...

...Duncan Pritchard Sosa Ernest , Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What it Explains . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2021 . xii + 226 pp. © 2023 by Cornell University 2023 A new book by Ernest Sosa is always an event. In a philosophical age where...

...Jane Friedman Call the norms of inquiry zetetic norms. How are zetetic norms related to epistemic norms? At first glance, they seem quite closely connected. Aren't epistemic norms norms that bind inquirers qua inquirers? And isn't epistemology the place to look for a normative theory of inquiry...

...Selim Berker When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value...

... of distinctively epistemic normative standards without sacrificing extensional adequacy. But this article proposes that veritism cannot fulfill this promise. It goes on to explain why not, in part by showing that three radically different developments of veritism—one consequentialist, one deontological, and one...

... sides. Moreover, Goldberg not only aims to give an extensionally adequate theory of epistemic justification, but he also digs into hard questions about the nature of epistemic normativity. According to Goldberg, our epistemic obligations are rooted in the expectations we have of each other. As such, he...

... weigh against epistemic reasons, but epistemic and practical reasons never weigh against each other directly. This isn't mere pedantry. It is important that epistemic considerations do normative work in an epistemic domain by the light of distinctively epistemic standards. This is precisely what our...

... view that this essay goes on to develop and defend, called the group epistemic agent account : groups are epistemic agents in their own right, with justified beliefs that respond to both evidence and normative requirements that arise only at the group level but that are nonetheless importantly...

.... In that case, it is unclear why FAA is a competitor to “intended function” accounts, including those that ground the goodness of assertion in the epistemic intentions embedded in constitutive rules, linguistic norms, or other social norms governing the practice of assertion. First, why do Kelp and Simion...

... of their justified beliefs that p yields a belief set that is coherent. (2) Full disclosure of the evidence relevant to the proposition that p , accompanied by rational deliberation about that evidence among the members of G in accordance with their individual and group epistemic normative requirements, would...

... the normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (2) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (3) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value...

... the actions that the understanding licenses” (56). Or so Elgin holds. This reorientation, Elgin suggests, requires deeper epistemic shifts: in particular, toward “holism, nonfactivism, and a reconception of the basis of epistemic normativity” (31). Nonfactivism is required because accounts that provide...

.... Mumford helpfully subdivides these negative particulars into the following categories: nonbeings, limits, privations, omissions, negative epistemic states, normative negatives, and logical/mathematical constructs. This chapter covers a lot of ground, and is difficult to summarize. One point worth...

... read that paints a sweeping and convincing picture of epistemology as part of a broader normative landscape grounded in reasons. Especially intriguing is Schroeder’s account of how the balance of epistemic reasons, across a range of prima facie problematic cases, determines whether a belief...

.... The book has two well-coordinated parts. In the first, McCormick argues that epistemic value is inseparable from moral or prudential value: the same norms apply to belief and action. In the second, she argues that doxastic agency is basically identical to moral agency: both sorts of control involve taking...

... questions about its components. Virtue epistemology follows two traditions, as Ernest Sosa explains in this fine new book. One conceives of epistemic normativity in terms of the manifestation of virtuous intellectual character traits such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage. The other conceives...

... the inference or argument. I assume, second, that epistemic norms and warrant attach to the agent of the inference. Psychological states are also spoken of as war- ranted, but they are warranted for individuals. The individual that car- ries out a step in an inference is the agent who is warranted...

... they do—like keeping their promises or following the rules by which to judge cause and effect in arriving at causal conclusions. They appear to be positive principles of “epistemic normativity.” Is “the method of rightly conducting one's reason” finally at hand? References Hume David [THN...

... candidate algorithms themselves. Moreover, once we uncover the relevant algorithm, we can ask a range of normative questions about it, which philosophy can help us answer: Is the algorithm rational to follow? How does it relate to genuine epistemic norms? Pinillos is not attempting to explain all doubt...

... ection meant to be eschewed. In chapter 5 Kornblith tackles the question of the source of epistemic normativity. He defends the view that epistemic norms are universal hypotheti- cal imperatives: such norms are “imperatives contingent upon having any goals whatever” (147) and are “derived...