...Michael Bergmann Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Pp. vii, 240. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review...

... for the latter to secure in a principled way. Section 2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. Section 3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in section 1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. Section 4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (1) best explains...

...Jennifer Lackey This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs— inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where...

..., intuitively, is a case like this. In contrast to Reasoning as Evidence, Well-Groundedness makes epistemic justification sensitive to certain nonevidential considerations. Because these considerations are facts about the belief and what it is grounded in, Well-Groundedness gives us a standard of what you...

... the agent relates to the epistemically distorting systems in which they are embedded. 24 Justification, for the internalist, is a sort of meritocratic good: it is available to all minimally competent agents, regardless of their circumstances, distorted or veridical. All that is required...

... sides. Moreover, Goldberg not only aims to give an extensionally adequate theory of epistemic justification, but he also digs into hard questions about the nature of epistemic normativity. According to Goldberg, our epistemic obligations are rooted in the expectations we have of each other. As such, he...

... cannot know anything. They cannot know anything because they cannot have any epistemic justification for their beliefs. And that is because all epistemic justification derives from mental states that are, or are disposed to cause, phenomenally conscious mental states. Smithies has written a long book...

... is a claim about epistemic justification. Epistemic justi- fication is contrasted with pragmatic justification. The intuitive idea is that the epistemic justification for a belief is constituted by evidence forthe truth of that belief—it is a consideration that counts in favor of that I would like...

... in believing that proposition. When so much is at stake, a stranger’s casual word isn’t good enough. You should check further.2 Suppose these intuitions are correct: you are justified in Train Case 1 but not in Train Case 2. What follows is that epistemic justification is not simply a matter...

... is not permitted to not φ’, and so on), the exact connection—if any—between deontic and hypological notions is a more controversial matter, whether in the case of action or belief. So really we should distinguish the deontic conception of epistemic justification from the hypological conception of epistemic...

... Dogmatism.” In Tucker 2013a: 270–89 . Bonjour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. 2003. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Malden, MA: Blackwell . Chisholm, Roderick M. 1942. “The Problem of the Speckled Hen.” Mind 51, no. 204: 368–73 . Chisholm, Roderick M...

...Michael Bergmann Alston, William. 1985 . “Concepts of Epistemic Justification.” Monist 68 : 57 -89. Reprinted in Alston 1989, 81-114.Page references are to reprint. ____. 1986a . “Epistemic Circularity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 : 1 -30. Reprinted in Alston 1989...

... against physicalism. The topic of part IV is knowledge. Chapter 13 (“Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Skepticism”) assumes an externalist view of epistemic justification and argues that Cartesian skepticism is ineffective against reliabilist theories of epistemic justification. The topic of Cartesian...

... of producing a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification that makes a belief‘s epistemic status a function of the reli- ability of the cognitive processes that produced it. Beyond that, it must be transformed into cognitive science, for it is only the latter that can tell us which cognitive...

...Mona Simion 2. Lackey also considers cases of alleged different epistemic risk between members and the group, sourced in different practical stakes. Lackey forcefully and rightly dismisses these cases as involving deontic confusion between practical and epistemic justification. 1. Note...

... an epistemic status at all, rather than under what conditions a state has a positive epistemic status as justified. However, the key conceptual connection between reasons and justification is also useful in determining aptness for epistemic status. Underlying the standard take on the different epistemic roles...

... of knowledge not as a proper source of justification, but as a psychological trigger for the exercise of our rational faculties, which would be the only true source of justification and epistemic value. Such a view is closer to rationalism than to empiricism. Alternatively, perception could be taken...

... that RE’S standards for belief revision impose no constraints on justification: After all, any such standard, since it cannot on Quinean grounds be justified or shown to be epistemically relevant independently of considerations of ad- justment to experience, is . . . equally open...

... intuitionism’, then, might be used to refer to a theory of belief acquisition, according to which we acquire certain moral beliefs through a faculty that we call “moral intuition.” However, the phrase ‘moral intuitionism’ also has been used to refer to a theory of epistemic justification, according...

...: 73–114 . Mayo-Wilson, Conor. Forthcoming. “An Epistemic Justification of Interval Estimation.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science . Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press . Royall, Richard. 1997. Statistical Evidence...