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epistemic justification

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 435–437.
Published: 01 July 2004
...Michael Bergmann Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Pp. vii, 240. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 1–51.
Published: 01 January 2020
... for the latter to secure in a principled way. Section 2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. Section 3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in section 1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. Section 4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (1) best explains...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jennifer Lackey This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs— inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
... that the independence principle should be interpreted in a restrictive sense. This interpretation, together with ES, leads to the conclusion that at t 3 , your evidence supports the belief that S's mistake explains the disagreement. So, if we understand epistemic justification in terms of evidential support...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
... in epistemology. According to epistemic internalism , justification is a matter of a subject’s (nonfactive) mental states: “internal” duplicates, the internalist says, do not differ in justification. A typical internalist says that epistemic justification is a matter of fit with one’s evidence, or with one’s...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 323–326.
Published: 01 April 2021
... sides. Moreover, Goldberg not only aims to give an extensionally adequate theory of epistemic justification, but he also digs into hard questions about the nature of epistemic normativity. According to Goldberg, our epistemic obligations are rooted in the expectations we have of each other. As such, he...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2021
... conscious. Philosophical zombies who are physical and functional duplicates of us but lack phenomenal consciousness cannot know anything. They cannot know anything because they cannot have any epistemic justification for their beliefs. And that is because all epistemic justification derives from mental...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 225–240.
Published: 01 April 2009
... is a claim about epistemic justification. Epistemic justi- fication is contrasted with pragmatic justification. The intuitive idea is that the epistemic justification for a belief is constituted by evidence forthe truth of that belief—it is a consideration that counts in favor of that I would like...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94.
Published: 01 January 2002
... in believing that proposition. When so much is at stake, a stranger’s casual word isn’t good enough. You should check further.2 Suppose these intuitions are correct: you are justified in Train Case 1 but not in Train Case 2. What follows is that epistemic justification is not simply a matter...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...?” or “What am I justified in believing?” we should not proceed by first identifying certain epistemic goods and then constructing a theory of epistemic justification in terms of what conduces toward or promotes those epistemic goods. My basic argument will be relatively simple. Consequentialist/teleological...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
..., Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. 2003. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Malden, MA: Blackwell . Chisholm, Roderick M. 1942. “The Problem of the Speckled Hen.” Mind 51, no. 204: 368–73 . Chisholm, Roderick M. 1966. Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, NJ...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 159–194.
Published: 01 April 2000
...Michael Bergmann Cornell University 2000 Alston, William. 1985 . “Concepts of Epistemic Justification.” Monist 68 : 57 -89. Reprinted in Alston 1989, 81-114.Page references are to reprint. ____. 1986a . “Epistemic Circularity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 : 1...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 264–268.
Published: 01 April 2018
... an externalist view of epistemic justification and argues that Cartesian skepticism is ineffective against reliabilist theories of epistemic justification. The topic of Cartesian skepticism is also taken up in the introduction (16–19). There, Hill offers a brief argument in support of the claim that Cartesian...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 462–465.
Published: 01 July 2000
... of producing a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification that makes a belief‘s epistemic status a function of the reli- ability of the cognitive processes that produced it. Beyond that, it must be transformed into cognitive science, for it is only the latter that can tell us which cognitive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... in the epistemic basing relation. Additionally, Conee discusses propositional justification, while my main focus is on doxastic justification. Nonetheless, the conceptual connection he highlights between justification and good reason carries over to the doxastic realm as well. 14. The type of reasons...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 469–496.
Published: 01 October 2005
... intuitionism’, then, might be used to refer to a theory of belief acquisition, according to which we acquire certain moral beliefs through a faculty that we call “moral intuition.” However, the phrase ‘moral intuitionism’ also has been used to refer to a theory of epistemic justification, according...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2000
... that RE’S standards for belief revision impose no constraints on justification: After all, any such standard, since it cannot on Quinean grounds be justified or shown to be epistemically relevant independently of considerations of ad- justment to experience, is . . . equally open...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 185–189.
Published: 01 January 2021
...: 73–114 . Mayo-Wilson, Conor. Forthcoming. “An Epistemic Justification of Interval Estimation.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science . Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press . Royall, Richard. 1997. Statistical Evidence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
... of justifiedness. These two—actual epistemic status and intuitive judgment about epistemic status—needn't have too much to do with each other, especially on an externalist theory that denies that first-order justification depends on a reflective metajustification. There are, of course, deep and complex...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 428–430.
Published: 01 July 2001
... pursue one issue here, after sketching the project of each substantial chapter. (i) Chapter 2 supports moral theory construction over particularism. The latter is argued to have the disadvantage of entailing that we lack epistemic justification for our moral beliefs. Chapter 3...