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epistemic justification

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 435–437.
Published: 01 July 2004
...Michael Bergmann Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Pp. vii, 240. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 1–51.
Published: 01 January 2020
... for the latter to secure in a principled way. Section 2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. Section 3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in section 1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. Section 4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (1) best explains...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jennifer Lackey This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs— inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
... be justified to believe? How confident should you be? What degree of confidence would be rational for you? In this article, I show that these questions are ambiguous between two different standards of epistemic justification. We can understand these questions to be exclusively about evidential support...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
... present, I want to suggest, a serious challenge to a widely held view in epistemology. According to epistemic internalism , justification is a matter of a subject’s (nonfactive) mental states: “internal” duplicates, the internalist says, do not differ in justification. A typical internalist says...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 323–326.
Published: 01 April 2021
... sides. Moreover, Goldberg not only aims to give an extensionally adequate theory of epistemic justification, but he also digs into hard questions about the nature of epistemic normativity. According to Goldberg, our epistemic obligations are rooted in the expectations we have of each other. As such, he...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2021
... for the view Smithies calls Accessibilism: epistemic justification is luminously accessible in the sense that, necessarily, you’re always in a position to know which doxastic attitudes you have epistemic justification to hold at any given time. Supposing this view is true, then how does it relate to Phenomenal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 225–240.
Published: 01 April 2009
... is a claim about epistemic justification. Epistemic justi- fication is contrasted with pragmatic justification. The intuitive idea is that the epistemic justification for a belief is constituted by evidence forthe truth of that belief—it is a consideration that counts in favor of that I would like...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94.
Published: 01 January 2002
... in believing that proposition. When so much is at stake, a stranger’s casual word isn’t good enough. You should check further.2 Suppose these intuitions are correct: you are justified in Train Case 1 but not in Train Case 2. What follows is that epistemic justification is not simply a matter...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...?” or “What am I justified in believing?” we should not proceed by first identifying certain epistemic goods and then constructing a theory of epistemic justification in terms of what conduces toward or promotes those epistemic goods. My basic argument will be relatively simple. Consequentialist/teleological...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... (or experience) should depend on its content in a plethora of ways that phenomenal conservatism is insensitive to. © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 phenomenal conservatism seemings appearances epistemic justification the oomph view probabilism content neutrality The core thesis of what has...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 159–194.
Published: 01 April 2000
...Michael Bergmann Cornell University 2000 Alston, William. 1985 . “Concepts of Epistemic Justification.” Monist 68 : 57 -89. Reprinted in Alston 1989, 81-114.Page references are to reprint. ____. 1986a . “Epistemic Circularity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 : 1...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 264–268.
Published: 01 April 2018
... will find this chapter useful. Its treatment of conceivability has clear implications for modal arguments against physicalism. The topic of part IV is knowledge. Chapter 13 (“Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Skepticism”) assumes an externalist view of epistemic justification and argues that Cartesian...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 462–465.
Published: 01 July 2000
... of producing a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification that makes a belief‘s epistemic status a function of the reli- ability of the cognitive processes that produced it. Beyond that, it must be transformed into cognitive science, for it is only the latter that can tell us which cognitive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 537–541.
Published: 01 October 2022
... with conceiving group epistemic states along such lines. Rather, this piece’s focus will be twofold: I will first put forth a worry for Lackey’s preferred account of group justification. Second, I will look at Lackey’s arguments against inflationism, and identify ways for my favorite variety of inflationism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... relation core cognition reasons perception perceptual justification According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 499–502.
Published: 01 October 2022
... be considered a starting point in a merely causal sense. Sensible experience would contribute to the acquisition of knowledge not as a proper source of justification, but as a psychological trigger for the exercise of our rational faculties, which would be the only true source of justification and epistemic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 469–496.
Published: 01 October 2005
... intuitionism’, then, might be used to refer to a theory of belief acquisition, according to which we acquire certain moral beliefs through a faculty that we call “moral intuition.” However, the phrase ‘moral intuitionism’ also has been used to refer to a theory of epistemic justification, according...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2000
... that RE’S standards for belief revision impose no constraints on justification: After all, any such standard, since it cannot on Quinean grounds be justified or shown to be epistemically relevant independently of considerations of ad- justment to experience, is . . . equally open...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 185–189.
Published: 01 January 2021
... Closure in Science.” Philosophical Review 127, no. 1: 73–114 . Mayo-Wilson, Conor. Forthcoming. “An Epistemic Justification of Interval Estimation.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science . Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press...