Search Results for epistemic deontology

... theories I have just mentioned are nonteleological in structure, it is tempting to refer to them as examples of what might be called “epistemic deontology.” However, that temptation should be resisted, for two reasons. First, the name “epistemic deontology” has already been appropriated by epistemologists...

... of distinctively epistemic normative standards without sacrificing extensional adequacy. But this article proposes that veritism cannot fulfill this promise. It goes on to explain why not, in part by showing that three radically different developments of veritism—one consequentialist, one deontological, and one...

... and obligation. Section 5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate. © 2020 by Cornell University 2020 epistemic consequentialism epistemic deontology epistemic value epistemic justification ethics of belief While there has been a recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism...

... -30. Reprinted in Alston 1989, 319-49.Page references are to reprint. ____. 1986b . “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology.” Philosophical Topics 14 : 179 -221. Reprinted in Alston 1989, 185-226. Page references are to reprint. ____. 1988 . “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic...

...Samuel C. Rickless Leiter Brian , Why Tolerate Religion? Princeton : Princeton University Press , 2013 . 192 pp . © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 This book considers the important question whether a good moral case can be made, on deontological or consequentialist grounds...

... and the Development of Epistemic Modality.” English Language and Linguistics 2 : 295 –317. Radford, Andrew. 2004 . Minimalist Syntax: Exploring the Structure of English . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Romero, Céline. 2005. “L'évolution syntaxique des verbes modaux dans l'histoire de l'anglais...

... the board. Where the 1970s had been dominated by Kantian deontological moral and political theory, owing mainly to Rawls's influence, Parfit vigorously defended teleology in its most radical form: act consequentialism grounded in an “ultimate moral aim: that outcomes be as good as possible.” 1 Rawls had...

... to Little’s discussion of epistemic generalities.) In sum, reasons holism doesn’t establish metaphysical particularism, because some neglected forms of generalism can account for it. Therefore I strongly suspect that the papers collected in Moral Particularism proceed from a false consensus...

.... References Alston William P. 1988 . “ The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification .” Philosophical Perspectives 2 : 257 – 99 . Aristotle . 2008 . Politics , trans. Jowett Benjamin Davis Henry William Carless . New York : Cosimo Inc. Brandom Robert...

...), and that such reflection is a duty (A/B: 263/319). 1 But for Merritt the reflective ideal goes beyond a supposed duty to reflect. It also points to the “supreme value Kant accords to being rationally reflective” (2). The ideal therefore covers both the axiological and deontological theses Kant advances with respect...

... and very explicitly as a response to racial injustice. As theoretically elegant as Shelby's recommendation is, Mills remains dissatisfied. Of the many objections he lobs at Shelby, two seem most potent. First, Rawls's theory is radically deontological, thus is not a candidate for ostensibly...

... depending on the probabilities relative to which this expectation is calculated. The most natural candidates seem to be the subjective probabilities, which are given by your current credences, and the evidential or epistemic probabilities, which can be thought of as the credences that are most...

... in the Treatise that can be solved only by the irreligious interpre- tation. By ‘Hume’s skepticism’, Russell evidently means radical (“Pyrrhonian”) conclusions about reason and evidence, conclusions individually or collectively entailing that no beliefs have any epistemic merit or substantial probability...

... in the Treatise that can be solved only by the irreligious interpre- tation. By ‘Hume’s skepticism’, Russell evidently means radical (“Pyrrhonian”) conclusions about reason and evidence, conclusions individually or collectively entailing that no beliefs have any epistemic merit or substantial probability...

... interpre- tation. By ‘Hume’s skepticism’, Russell evidently means radical (“Pyrrhonian”) conclusions about reason and evidence, conclusions individually or collectively entailing that no beliefs have any epistemic merit or substantial probability of being true. Examples of claims that Russell appears...

... in the Treatise that can be solved only by the irreligious interpre- tation. By ‘Hume’s skepticism’, Russell evidently means radical (“Pyrrhonian”) conclusions about reason and evidence, conclusions individually or collectively entailing that no beliefs have any epistemic merit or substantial probability...

... interpre- tation. By ‘Hume’s skepticism’, Russell evidently means radical (“Pyrrhonian”) conclusions about reason and evidence, conclusions individually or collectively entailing that no beliefs have any epistemic merit or substantial probability of being true. Examples of claims that Russell appears...

... in the Treatise that can be solved only by the irreligious interpre- tation. By ‘Hume’s skepticism’, Russell evidently means radical (“Pyrrhonian”) conclusions about reason and evidence, conclusions individually or collectively entailing that no beliefs have any epistemic merit or substantial probability...

... in the Treatise that can be solved only by the irreligious interpre- tation. By ‘Hume’s skepticism’, Russell evidently means radical (“Pyrrhonian”) conclusions about reason and evidence, conclusions individually or collectively entailing that no beliefs have any epistemic merit or substantial probability...

... in the Treatise that can be solved only by the irreligious interpre- tation. By ‘Hume’s skepticism’, Russell evidently means radical (“Pyrrhonian”) conclusions about reason and evidence, conclusions individually or collectively entailing that no beliefs have any epistemic merit or substantial probability...