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The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 1–51.
Published: 01 January 2020
...Kurt L. Sylvan Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This article articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism , which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth . Section 1 tackles some...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Selim Berker When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 501–536.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Jane Friedman Call the norms of inquiry zetetic norms. How are zetetic norms related to epistemic norms? At first glance, they seem quite closely connected. Aren't epistemic norms norms that bind inquirers qua inquirers? And isn't epistemology the place to look for a normative theory of inquiry...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 399–404.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Matthew McGrath Sosa Ernest , Judgment and Agency . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2015 . xiii + 269 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 Virtue epistemology follows two traditions, as Ernest Sosa explains in this fine new book. One conceives of epistemic normativity in...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 551–554.
Published: 01 October 2017
... find here. The book has two well-coordinated parts. In the first, McCormick argues that epistemic value is inseparable from moral or prudential value: the same norms apply to belief and action. In the second, she argues that doxastic agency is basically identical to moral agency: both sorts of...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 169–198.
Published: 01 April 2006
..., Connie. 2003 . “Agency and the Open Question Argument.” Ethics 113 : 490 -527. Rysiew, Patrick. 2002 . “Reid and Epistemic Naturalism.” Philosophical Quarterly 52 : 437 -56. Schechter, Joshua, and David Enoch. Forthcoming. “Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens.” Noûs...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 423–462.
Published: 01 October 2019
...C. Thi Nguyen Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jennifer Lackey This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs— inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... the agent's object-involving de se representation of that very exercise as justifying . basing relation inference operative reason motivating reason epistemic agency deviant causal chain transparency So-Hyun watches Al-Jazeera and also watches CNN. She watches Al-Jazeera because she...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
... level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, the present argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties supervening on lower-level ones. The...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
...Barry Maguire; Jack Woods It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension, the...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., and are such that epistemic warrant is preserved across the episodes of fission and often involves quasimemories that are not memories. But what he says about memory does not support the denial that such creatures are possible. Where he thinks de se attitudes are necessary, de se * attitudes, indexed...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
... period of time. On this view, watching is a kind of perceptual activity distinguished by a distinctive epistemic role. The essay presents a puzzle about watching an object that arises through elementary reflection on the consequences of two apparent truths about watching an object throughout a period of...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... knowledge about oneself or indexical knowledge. So in order to envisage the gods' epistemic situation coherently, we need to assume that they lack those introspective abilities. But once we recognize that, it turns out that positing a special kind of information is a gratuitous addition. The two gods...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 501–532.
Published: 01 October 2009
... debate on mind-world relations shaping Kant's early cosmology points us to a widely recognized motivation for interactionism, turning on a constraint on agency within certain noninteractionist cosmologies. In particular, Kant's early conversion to a libertarian theory of freedom, together with his...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 197–224.
Published: 01 April 2018
..., not epistemic. It is reflection itself that is radically disaffecting, at least if one cannot answer the questions it raises in such a way as to end the reflective regress. One might reject Korsgaard's conception of rational agency in favor of the view that, when we reflect, we accept some commitments...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 363–366.
Published: 01 July 2019
... vindicated not by [any] external end, but by being products and promoters of responsible epistemic agency” (91). The bulk of the work for this part of the project is, then, in the development of an account of what epistemic agency amounts to. What results is an account of what Elgin calls ‘procedural...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 323–326.
Published: 01 April 2021
... a belief can be Gettiered but still satisfy all of the distinctly epistemic standards on knowledge because the relevant standards are those that apply to us in virtue of our epistemic agency (23). Something notable here is Goldberg's methodology: Goldberg doesn't assume , as many authors do, that...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... Feldman Richard . 2010 . “ Earl Conee and Richard Feldman .” In A Companion to Epistemology , ed. Dancy Jonathan Sosa Ernest Steup Matthias , 123 – 30 . Oxford : Blackwell . Cresto Eleonora . 2010 . “ On Reasons and Epistemic Rationality .” Journal of Philosophy 107 ( 6...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 135–139.
Published: 01 January 2020
... the epistemic probability (from the killer's perspective) that the target is not liable, and that civilians are on average less likely to be liable than soldiers. Chapter 5 appeals to the idea that civilians are more vulnerable and defenseless in war than soldiers are. Chapter 6 sets out a range of...