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epistemic agency

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Selim Berker When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 399–404.
Published: 01 July 2017
..., Sosa aims to show how a competence-based virtue epistemology can and should give a central role to epistemic agency. He continues to deny that the manifestation of character traits such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage can constitute knowledge. They are only auxiliary virtues. He...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 551–554.
Published: 01 October 2017
... find here. The book has two well-coordinated parts. In the first, McCormick argues that epistemic value is inseparable from moral or prudential value: the same norms apply to belief and action. In the second, she argues that doxastic agency is basically identical to moral agency: both sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 169–198.
Published: 01 April 2006
..., Connie. 2003 . “Agency and the Open Question Argument.” Ethics 113 : 490 -527. Rysiew, Patrick. 2002 . “Reid and Epistemic Naturalism.” Philosophical Quarterly 52 : 437 -56. Schechter, Joshua, and David Enoch. Forthcoming. “Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens.” Noûs...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jennifer Lackey This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs— inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
... level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, the present argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties supervening on lower-level ones. The...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... the agent's object-involving de se representation of that very exercise as justifying . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 basing relation inference operative reason motivating reason epistemic agency deviant causal chain transparency So-Hyun watches Al-Jazeera and also watches...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., and are such that epistemic warrant is preserved across the episodes of fission and often involves quasimemories that are not memories. But what he says about memory does not support the denial that such creatures are possible. Where he thinks de se attitudes are necessary, de se * attitudes, indexed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
... period of time. On this view, watching is a kind of perceptual activity distinguished by a distinctive epistemic role. The essay presents a puzzle about watching an object that arises through elementary reflection on the consequences of two apparent truths about watching an object throughout a period of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... knowledge about oneself or indexical knowledge. So in order to envisage the gods' epistemic situation coherently, we need to assume that they lack those introspective abilities. But once we recognize that, it turns out that positing a special kind of information is a gratuitous addition. The two gods...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 501–532.
Published: 01 October 2009
... debate on mind-world relations shaping Kant's early cosmology points us to a widely recognized motivation for interactionism, turning on a constraint on agency within certain noninteractionist cosmologies. In particular, Kant's early conversion to a libertarian theory of freedom, together with his...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 197–224.
Published: 01 April 2018
... critics have raised. I also show how the argument fails because, at a crucial point, it begs the question in favor of the value of humanity. It thus fails for internal reasons that do not depend on rejecting Korsgaard's metaethical constructivism or her conception of rational agency. With these...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... Feldman Richard . 2010 . “ Earl Conee and Richard Feldman .” In A Companion to Epistemology , ed. Dancy Jonathan Sosa Ernest Steup Matthias , 123 – 30 . Oxford : Blackwell . Cresto Eleonora . 2010 . “ On Reasons and Epistemic Rationality .” Journal of Philosophy 107 ( 6...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 578–582.
Published: 01 October 2015
... above” and “the moral law” governing our freedom “within,” with his path tracing out conceptual and epistemic space for upholding the joint validity of both laws, without lapsing into either incoherence or un-Enlightened appeals to “divine interference” (4). Yet, for Ameriks (and more controversially...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 139–143.
Published: 01 January 2013
... .” Nineteenth Century Music 7 : 233 – 50 . ———. 1997 . “ Action and Agency in Mahler’s Ninth Symphony, Second Movement .” In Music and Meaning , ed. Robinson Jenefer , 132 . Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press . BOOK REVIEWS Paula Gottlieb, The Virtue of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 119–122.
Published: 01 January 2013
... has to know anything in order to pierce its target? Nadler valiantly tries to lend support to this line of thought, plausibly suggesting that volitional agency is being taken as the paradigm of causality (82). But questions remain. Even if volitional agency is taken as paradigmatic, why shouldn’t...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 122–125.
Published: 01 January 2013
... has to know anything in order to pierce its target? Nadler valiantly tries to lend support to this line of thought, plausibly suggesting that volitional agency is being taken as the paradigm of causality (82). But questions remain. Even if volitional agency is taken as paradigmatic, why shouldn’t...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 125–128.
Published: 01 January 2013
... weak—why should we suppose that (say) a bullet has to know anything in order to pierce its target? Nadler valiantly tries to lend support to this line of thought, plausibly suggesting that volitional agency is being taken as the paradigm of causality (82). But questions remain. Even if volitional...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 129–131.
Published: 01 January 2013
... has to know anything in order to pierce its target? Nadler valiantly tries to lend support to this line of thought, plausibly suggesting that volitional agency is being taken as the paradigm of causality (82). But questions remain. Even if volitional agency is taken as paradigmatic, why shouldn’t...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 132–134.
Published: 01 January 2013
... weak—why should we suppose that (say) a bullet has to know anything in order to pierce its target? Nadler valiantly tries to lend support to this line of thought, plausibly suggesting that volitional agency is being taken as the paradigm of causality (82). But questions remain. Even if volitional...