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disagreement

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 611–614.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Arthur Ripstein LAW AND DISAGREEMENT. By Jeremy Waldron. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. ix, 332 pp. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS upshot of his discussion is, roughly, that choices have more value the more they conform to one’s full set...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Han van Wietmarschen The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
... disagreements about how to pursue those ends. This essay defends the claim that, in certain circumstances of reasonable disagreement, proper care for a friend as a practical and moral agent requires allowing your friend's judgment to decide what you are to do, even when you disagree with that judgment (and even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 191–226.
Published: 01 April 2021
...Lara Buchak In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one's own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one's opinion on important matters...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 187–217.
Published: 01 April 2007
...... and Knowing It. Philosophical Studies 123 : 115 -24. ____. Forthcoming. “Reflection and Disagreement.” Noûs . Feldman, Richard. Forthcoming. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” In Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life , ed. Louise Antony. New York: Oxford...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
... of disagreement, there are two main competing rules offered for belief-revision in the face of peer disagreement: maintaining your existing opinion, or meeting halfway. This article investigates the comparative reliability of these two rules using two measures of reliability for degrees of belief, calibration...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
... seems to say that the only reason for departing from being bound to treat others like oneself is that more good would be produced. But the commonsense moralist will not agree that this is the only reason. In reply to the threat of an egoist's disagreement, this essay argues that many of the axioms...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 515–566.
Published: 01 October 2011
...David J. Chalmers The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... and subjective faces of the same practical coin. This has much the same metaphysical benefits as Lewis’s own view of chance and also throws interesting new light on Newcomb problems, providing an irenic resolution of the apparent disagreement between causal and evidential decision rules. © 2012 by Cornell...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 155–187.
Published: 01 April 2013
... in the intellect of God. Although other early moderns agreed that modal truths are in some way dependent on God, there were sharp disagreements surrounding two distinct questions: (1) On what in God do modal truths and modal truth-makers depend? (2) What is the manner(s) of dependence by which modal truths...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
... it means for an individual x to value ϕ under any conditions. Though there has been some disagreement, most subjectivists hold that x values ϕ if and only if x desires ϕ. This essay argues that subjectivists have erred in accepting a desiderative theory of valuing. Instead, it argues that subjectivists...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... or disagreement between ideas. However, perceiving agreements between ideas seems to yield knowledge only of analytic truths, not propositions about existence. The second problem concerns the epistemic status of sensitive knowledge: How could the senses yield certain knowledge? This essay argues that the key...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
... and the flexibility of the canon, it is abit of a surprise that simple cases of modal disagreement seem to pose a problem for it. Here is an old example from Kratzer (1986): Suppose a man is approaching both of us. You are standing over there. I am further away. I can only see the bare outlines...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 586–589.
Published: 01 October 2003
... it can be defeated if I have reasons to doubt another’s reliability, because of a history of errors, lack of relevant training, or cognitive impair- ment. It can be undermined, by the fact of conflict. Since trust in myself creates the presumption in favor of another, conflict or disagreement between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 122–124.
Published: 01 January 2000
... 122 BOOK REVlEWS be able to do at least something to resolve, by way of argument, moral disagreements even among people who share no “[relevant] initial sub- stantial moral opinions” (121). Naturalists will ask, however, if there are or could even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 439–447.
Published: 01 July 2016
... in Philosophy , ed. Preyer Gerhard and Peter Georg , 131 – 68 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Kölbel Max 2002 . Truth without Objectivity . London : Routledge . Kölbel Max 2004 . “ Faultless Disagreement .” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 : 53...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 321–326.
Published: 01 April 2011
...) and Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Gibbard’s basic idea is that if a sentence expresses a belief, approval, or allegiance to a norm, its negation expresses disagreement with the belief, approval, or allegiance. How Gibbard proposes projecting this idea to the negation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 326–329.
Published: 01 April 2011
...) and Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Gibbard’s basic idea is that if a sentence expresses a belief, approval, or allegiance to a norm, its negation expresses disagreement with the belief, approval, or allegiance. How Gibbard proposes projecting this idea to the negation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... the desire to be in agreement pervade OWM , as it did not RP ? Partly Parfit is moved by the general epistemological problem of disagreement between epistemic peers. Parfit tells us that although he had initially intended to think further about the questions he investigated in RP , he “became increasingly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... to be biased toward b; 2b 2b is not biased toward either. Thus, our fifth postulate demands that I is disagreement resolving in the following sense.11 Definition 3.5 (Disagreement resolution): I is disagreement resolving if, for all b; b 0 [ B and w [ W ,ifb– b 0 and I ðb; wÞ¼I ðb 0; wÞ, then there is 0...