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disagreement

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2007) 116 (2): 187–217.
Published: 01 April 2007
.... Philosophical Studies 123 : 115 -24. ____. Forthcoming. “Reflection and Disagreement.” Noûs . Feldman, Richard. Forthcoming. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” In Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life , ed. Louise Antony. New York: Oxford University Press...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
... disagreement, there are two main competing rules offered for belief-revision in the face of peer disagreement: maintaining your existing opinion, or meeting halfway. This article investigates the comparative reliability of these two rules using two measures of reliability for degrees of belief, calibration and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Han van Wietmarschen The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support (or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
... disagreements about how to pursue those ends. This essay defends the claim that, in certain circumstances of reasonable disagreement, proper care for a friend as a practical and moral agent requires allowing your friend's judgment to decide what you are to do, even when you disagree with that judgment (and even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 611–614.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Arthur Ripstein LAW AND DISAGREEMENT. By Jeremy Waldron. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. ix, 332 pp. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS upshot of his discussion is, roughly, that choices have more value the more they conform to one’s full set of values. This ideal of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
.... Benevolence seems to say that the only reason for departing from being bound to treat others like oneself is that more good would be produced. But the commonsense moralist will not agree that this is the only reason. In reply to the threat of an egoist's disagreement, this essay argues that many of the axioms...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 515–566.
Published: 01 October 2011
...David J. Chalmers The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... and subjective faces of the same practical coin. This has much the same metaphysical benefits as Lewis’s own view of chance and also throws interesting new light on Newcomb problems, providing an irenic resolution of the apparent disagreement between causal and evidential decision rules. © 2012 by...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 155–187.
Published: 01 April 2013
... intellect of God. Although other early moderns agreed that modal truths are in some way dependent on God, there were sharp disagreements surrounding two distinct questions: (1) On what in God do modal truths and modal truth-makers depend? (2) What is the manner(s) of dependence by which modal truths and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
... for what it means for an individual x to value ϕ under any conditions. Though there has been some disagreement, most subjectivists hold that x values ϕ if and only if x desires ϕ. This essay argues that subjectivists have erred in accepting a desiderative theory of valuing. Instead, it argues that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... disagreement between ideas. However, perceiving agreements between ideas seems to yield knowledge only of analytic truths, not propositions about existence. The second problem concerns the epistemic status of sensitive knowledge: How could the senses yield certain knowledge? This essay argues that the key to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
... H. Rieser, 38 -74. Berlin: de Gruyter. Reprinted in Formal Semantics: The Essential Readings, ed. P. Portner and B. H. Partee, 2002. Oxford: Blackwell. ____. 1986 . “Conditionals.” Chicago Linguistics Society 22 : 1 -15. Lasersohn, Peter. 2005 . “Context Dependence, Disagreement, and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2003) 112 (4): 586–589.
Published: 01 October 2003
... disagreement between us defeats the presumption. For “the conflict itself constitutes a relevant dissimi- larity between us, thereby undermining the consistency argument that gener- ates the presumption of trust in favor of the person’s opinions about the issue” (108). Defeat of prima facie credibility...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 619–620.
Published: 01 October 2011
... of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement 207 Merricks, Trenton, Foreknowledge and Freedom 567 Nielsen, Karen Margrethe, Deliberation as Inquiry: Aristotle’s Alternative to the Presumption of Open Alternatives 383 Proops, Ian, Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 671–672.
Published: 01 October 2013
... Scharp, Kevin , Truth, the Liar, and Relativism         427 Todd, Patrick , Prepunishment and Explanatory Dependence          619 van Wietmarschen, Han , Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness         395 Willer, Malte , Dynamics of Epistemic Modality         45 Belot, Gordon , Geometric...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 122–124.
Published: 01 January 2000
... must 122 BOOK REVlEWS be able to do at least something to resolve, by way of argument, moral disagreements even among people who share no “[relevant] initial sub- stantial moral opinions” (121). Naturalists will ask, however, if...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 321–326.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Gibbard’s basic idea is that if a sentence expresses a belief, approval, or allegiance to a norm, its negation expresses disagreement with the belief, approval, or allegiance. How Gibbard proposes projecting this idea to the negation of molecular sentences is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 326–329.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Gibbard’s basic idea is that if a sentence expresses a belief, approval, or allegiance to a norm, its negation expresses disagreement with the belief, approval, or allegiance. How Gibbard proposes projecting this idea to the negation of molecular sentences is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 439–447.
Published: 01 July 2016
... sentence, you assert the proposition that chili is not tasty according to your present standard. This sort of contextualism—which MacFarlane calls ordinary or indexical contextualism —has been subject to several objections in the literature in connection with its predictions concerning disagreement and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2003) 112 (1): 121–123.
Published: 01 January 2003
...). Disagreement with the subjects over what constitutes sex- ual harassment is not question begging, though. Social theorists often claim that the victims of oppression are unaware that the harm they suffer is oppres- sion, but to define it as such is not question begging, provided that they make a case for...