Search Results for deviant causal chain
1-13 of 13 Search Results for
deviant causal chain
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... the agent's object-involving de se representation of that very exercise as justifying . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 basing relation inference operative reason motivating reason epistemic agency deviant causal chain transparency So-Hyun watches Al-Jazeera and also watches...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2019) 128 (4): 523–527.
Published: 01 October 2019
... takes to correctly respond to a reason. Drawing on cases of basing failures and deviant causal chains, he shows that correctly responding to a normative reason r can't just be analyzed as having r as your motivating reason for some act while r also happens to be a normative reason for it. Lord...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 404–410.
Published: 01 July 2017
...-specificity rules out the effects of deviant causal chains from being results of the exercise of relevant agential powers, but mere causal relations between events cannot do anything analogous (see, by way of comparison, Stout 2005 ). Those who claim that actions are events caused by mental states have a...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 495–532.
Published: 01 October 2007
... causal analysis by determining default states. 506 Prevention, Preemption, Sufficient Reason In addition to this definition of default and deviant values of a variable, I offer several rules of thumb. Temporary actions or events tend to be...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 548–550.
Published: 01 October 2005
..., indistinguishable from clear cases of ⌽s; however, make the causal chain take so unusual or extraordinary a path that we would decline to call the product a case of ⌽” (99). In the case of action, the literature on CTA is full with scenarios such as unnerved mountain climbers and novice robbers generating...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
... natural ways of using the term. If so, then my elucidation of the concept is partly stipulative. 499 CHRISTOPHER TUCKER to transmit the information to B. But consider another sort of case, one with a deviant causal chain. Suppose A...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 199–241.
Published: 01 April 2006
... fact, Burge needs a rather specifi c causal constraint, namely, that a justifying state is a “dynamic” cause—a causal event in a chain of such events, terminating in the formation of your belief. (As opposed to a “sustaining” cause.) This terminology is due to Audi 1993. 21. Where a state or...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 339–393.
Published: 01 July 2003
... SETIYA Here, “motivation” is a matter of causation, with the familiar proviso that “[the] causal chain must follow the right sort of route” (Davidson 1973, 78). Wayward or deviant causation is not allowed. This proviso deserves some comment. To begin with, nothing I say below turns on the...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2004) 113 (4): 451–506.
Published: 01 October 2004
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2007) 116 (3): 361–399.
Published: 01 July 2007
... without appeal to semantic notions a causal rela- tion between words and objects that can be identifi ed as reference. With the semantic properties of basic lexical items fi xed in this way, one can derivatively account for the semantic properties of more complex expres- sions, such as sentences.2...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 539–572.
Published: 01 October 2002
... sometimes unreflectively (or reflectively) stray from the pol- icies that we accept on full reflection and that show up in most of our actions. If maxims are general policies, it is quite mysterious how we might assign maxims to these deviant actions. O’Neill’s proposal about maxims, then, must be...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... pictures, such as photographs, Hopkins takes causal history, rather than intentions, to be crucial to determining pictorial content. I ignore this complication here. In section 4, I propose an intention-based resemblance account that encompasses both mechanically and manually produced pictures...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
... is that we can keep the Frege-Kaplan view of names and just set aside predicative names as requiring no more discussion than that. I take a different approach. I do not think we should set aside names in predicate position as ubiquitous deviants. We would do best to try to develop a unified...