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deviant causal chain

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 404–410.
Published: 01 July 2017
... counts as the result of the exercise of a power only if the right process produced it, but mere effects are indifferent to processes. This explains why causal theories of action have such trouble with the problem of causal deviance: process-specificity rules out the effects of deviant causal chains from...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 523–527.
Published: 01 October 2019
... on cases of basing failures and deviant causal chains, he shows that correctly responding to a normative reason r can't just be analyzed as having r as your motivating reason for some act while r also happens to be a normative reason for it. Lord suggests we can avoid this problem by saying...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... observations about representations of particulars more generally. © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 basing relation inference operative reason motivating reason epistemic agency deviant causal chain transparency So-Hyun watches Al-Jazeera and also watches CNN. She watches Al-Jazeera...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
... of the concept is partly stipulative. 499 CHRISTOPHER TUCKER to transmit the information to B. But consider another sort of case, one with a deviant causal chain. Suppose A just finished downloading the information, which makes Alvin so...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 45–96.
Published: 01 January 2021
... W 46 (section 1.1). This is striking even after you ve been persuaded that it is true. Why should a distinction between default and deviant behavior play a role in our causal thought and talk? The theory developed here suggests an answer. In rough outline, the theory says that C caused E whenever...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 199–241.
Published: 01 April 2006
... of knowledge by testimony that (unlike Burge’s) accords with the presumption, an account that I fi nd independently plausible.58 7. Deviant Causal Chains If we deny the presumption, we end up with a rather curious picture of the recipient’s motivational psychology. To see why, let us consider what...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 495–532.
Published: 01 October 2007
... are all deviant outcomes. When we construct a causal model < V, E>, it will be necessary to specify the default and deviant values of the variables in V, which we will do using the following notation: Def(X ) = x, Dev(X ) = x’. Nonbinary variables may have multiple deviant or default values, so...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 159–210.
Published: 01 April 2020
... is not of the appropriate kind, perhaps because the fact that the stay in that confined space was an injustice is entirely tangential to the piano-playing story. But I don't want to pretend that this story makes things here fully transparent. Here as elsewhere, it's not clear how to deal with “deviantcausal chains. I'm...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 548–550.
Published: 01 October 2005
...; however, make the causal chain take so unusual or extraordinary a path that we would decline to call the product a case of ⌽” (99). In the case of action, the literature on CTA is full with scenarios such as unnerved mountain climbers and novice robbers generating behavior that according...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 361–399.
Published: 01 July 2007
... that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else. Fodor himself develops a positive reductive account of “aboutness,” attempting to describe without appeal to semantic notions a causal rela- tion between words and objects that can be identifi ed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 339–393.
Published: 01 July 2003
... of the problem of wayward or deviant causal chains. There are straightforward cases of motivation in which it seems wrong to say that an agent acts for reasons, despite the fact that his behavior is guided purposively by desire. Velleman’s examples draw on Freudian themes: in one narrative, Freud’s sister...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 451–506.
Published: 01 October 2004
... and Hurvich 1978, 146) 41 The relationalist can allow for another (less ordinary) sense of error by excluding cases that involve deviant causal chains. For example, consider the telekinetically chromatic tomato: in addition to its ordinary capacity to look red, this tomato has a surface property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 539–572.
Published: 01 October 2002
...- icies that we accept on full reflection and that show up in most of our actions. If maxims are general policies, it is quite mysterious how we might assign maxims to these deviant actions. O’Neill’s proposal about maxims, then, must be supplemented by some account of how we are to assign policies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... CATHARINE ABELL resemble an orangutan. If, in frustration, I throw the paper into the fire, and the fire singes the paper in a pattern that resembles an orangutan in occlusion shape, I will not have depicted an orangutan because the causal chain linking the pattern on the surface to my intention...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
... do not think we should set aside names in predicate position as ubiquitous deviants. We would do best to try to develop a unified theory of names appearing in predicate positions and in argument positions. Moreover, I take this approach from the opposite direction. I begin with an account of names...