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The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
... it means for an individual x to value ϕ under any conditions. Though there has been some disagreement, most subjectivists hold that x values ϕ if and only if x desires ϕ. This essay argues that subjectivists have erred in accepting a desiderative theory of valuing. Instead, it argues that subjectivists...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 339–342.
Published: 01 July 2014
...Thomas M. Tuozzo Moss Jessica Dawn , Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2012 . xv +255 pp . © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 In the last chapter of the book (chap. 8), Moss continues her account...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 643–646.
Published: 01 October 2020
... for distinguishing the two, especially if this requires showing that spirit is “a natural psychological kind” (165). In chapter 4, Kamtekar argues that all three soul parts desire the good under a more or less adequate conception. It is striking that the distinctive motivations of spirit do not play any role...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Rachana Kamtekar Hendrik Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle . Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. 229 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Hendrik Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 95–130.
Published: 01 January 2020
...Eden Lin Extant discussions of subjectivism about reasons for action have concentrated on presentist versions of the theory, on which reasons for present actions are grounded in present desires. In this article, I motivate and investigate the prospects of futurist subjectivism, on which reasons...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Neil Sinhababu This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
...Kim Frost Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires (or intentions) are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
...J. Robert G. Williams Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 383–421.
Published: 01 July 2011
...; it essentially consists in causal mapping. Unlike the comparative model presupposed in the literature on deliberation, Aristotle's model can account for the virtuous agent's deliberation, as well as deliberation with a view to “satisficing” desires and deliberation that fails to uncover any expedient course...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
... of the epistemology literature. But it is principled and empirically grounded, and shows good prospects for yielding the desired epistemological verdicts. The paper articulates and elaborates the theory, drawing out some of its consequences. Toward the end, the fleshed-out theory is applied to two important case...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 351–374.
Published: 01 July 2009
...James Wilberding In the Republic Plato presents a hierarchy of five cities, each representing a structural arrangement of the soul. The timocratic soul, characterized by its governance by spirit and its consequent desire for esteem and aversion to shame, is ranked as the second-best kind of soul...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 263–267.
Published: 01 April 2001
... to be [i] t studied the specific capac- ities and powers, the different interests and desires that human beings by nature develop or are born with, and how one ought to limit, arrange, and organize those for the best” (x, emphasis in the original in all quotations). In particular, in a number...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 432–434.
Published: 01 July 2003
... elements of theoret- ical rationality and desires the basic elements of practical rationality. Beliefs provide us with a map of the world, desires with an itinerary. Just as noninfer- ential beliefs are justified by experience, intrinsic desires—desires for some- thing for its own sake—are warranted...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 165–200.
Published: 01 April 2010
... suggest that Rousseau’s project is to describe certain basic desires (although the word ‘desire’ may connote something overly nar- row, as we will see) such that in combination with certain beliefs, liable to arise under present conditions, inflamed amour-propre results as a kind 2. I have...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 35–61.
Published: 01 January 2000
... Endorsement: Authority and Explanatory Power Begin with our reflectiveness. Many philosophers have emphasized that we have the capacity not merely to be moved by our desires and inclinations. We have the capacity to step back and reflect on our desires and inclinations.2 We have the capacity...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 303–307.
Published: 01 April 2021
... theses: (A) Only desires or similar conative states provide impulses to act. (B) Beliefs alone cannot initiate action, nor cause affective states that in turn move us to act; they can only influence action by directing already-present desires. (C) Necessarily, all moral evaluations are motives. (D...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 313–347.
Published: 01 July 2000
... subjectivism.6 Thus, when Hobbes writes that “good and mil are names that signify our appetites” (15.40))and that whatever a person desires he “cal- leth good” (6.7), he is generally read as saying that ‘good’ means something like “desired by me.” Added to the premises that I de- sire self...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 539–572.
Published: 01 October 2002
... consciously responds to a bidding from the outside with respect to its judgments.”8 Christine Korsgaard provides a helpful gloss of this passage: “You may of course choose to act on a desire, but insofar as you take the act to be yours, you think you have made it your maxim to act on this desire. If you...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 598–601.
Published: 01 October 2000
... that generate prima facie entitlements, but which can be over- ridden in appropriate circumstances. He defends a sentientist principle that the lives of organisms with conscious desires have priority over those who lack the capacity for such desires, and a (contingently) anthropocen- tric principle...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 423–446.
Published: 01 July 2011
... to be said for a naturalist reduction of normative reasons. It would be better still if the reductive account explained norma- tive reasons at least partly in terms of the relevant agent’s psychology, perhaps his or her desires. This is so simply because in some cases such an explanation seems...