... consequentialization deontic equivalence underdetermination choice theory The aim of this essay is to propose a new approach to the formal representation of moral theories. We show that any moral theory within a very large class can be represented in terms of two parameters: (i) a specification of which...

... on the assumption of the semantic uniformity thesis. If the claim that Sartre’s young French- man ought to join the Free French is not equivalent to the claim that it ought to be that he joins the Free French, then intrapersonal deontic conflicts don’t motivate the conclusion that there can be conflicts...

... one: the theory of overall value depends on the theory of final value, and the deontic theory depends on the theory of overall value. A teleologist's theory of final value can be formulated in two different, but equivalent, ways, depending on whether it is formulated in terms of objects/ends...

.... 33. Our structural approach to the distinction parallels Cariani, Kaufmann, and Kaufmann's (2013) approach to deontic modals. We assume that this distinction admits of gradations tracking different ways of specifying a practical situation. 34. This generally matches intuitions, modulo...

... the normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (2) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (3) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value...

... is not completely uncontroversial. In particular, those who think that there are rational dilemmas, that is, cases in which Of and O : f, will want to reject such a closure principle since rational dilemmas together with this closure principle lead to deontic trivialization. For this type of worry see...

... I can. That is what I ought to do. The second premise is a general principle concerning the relation between the deontic status of actions and the deontic status of their proper parts. Call it Weak Agglomeration : P2 For any composite action A 1 . . . A n , if irrespective of whether you...

... is that lacking the ability to obey an obligation is sufficient for lacking the obligation (equivalently, having the ability to obey an obligation is necessary for having the obligation; i.e., OIC is true). So in the rest of this section I defend INFIL. 29 To start with, consider the following scenario...

... in the case of (84a) but not in the case of the semantically equivalent (83a). (One possibility is that this assumption holds for a given sentence just in case that sentence is nowhere embedded under an overt modal. But this can't be right, since embedding (84a) under a modal does not improve it.) 75...

... possible courses of action. But I think it's useful to give a statement of the semantics that is independent of this assumption. 51. Notice also that the idea of quantifying over courses of actions is echoed by some recent and less recent work on the semantics of deontic modals (see, for example...

... . New York : Oxford University Press . Haji Ishtiyaque . 1998 . Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities . New York : Oxford University Press . ———. 1999 . “ Moral Anchors and Control .” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 : 175 - 203 . ———. 2002 . Deontic...

... on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing consequentialism seems too demand- ing since it labels so many...

... to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing...

... to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing...

... to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing...

... to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing...

... on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing consequentialism seems too demand- ing since it labels so many...

... the end of the story. The awkwardly titled “How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations...

... on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing consequentialism seems too demand- ing since it labels so many...

... to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing...