...-neutral, monistic, atomistic, or teleological? Or are some of these attributes “deontically inert”? How does this finding relate to the “Extensional Equivalence Thesis” defended by scholars such as Dreier (2011) and Portmore (2007) , the claim that every plausible moral theory is extensionally...

... on the assumption of the semantic uniformity thesis. If the claim that Sartre’s young French- man ought to join the Free French is not equivalent to the claim that it ought to be that he joins the Free French, then intrapersonal deontic conflicts don’t motivate the conclusion that there can be conflicts...

... hypologos for ‘hold accountable or liable’, I owe to Michael J. Zimmerman [2002, 554] .) Although it is standard to assume that deontic notions are interdefinable in a fairly straightforward manner (‘S is obligated to φ’ being logically equivalent to ‘S is not permitted to not φ’, and so on), the exact...

... points out, for any account that validates the substitution of equivalent prejacents under agentive modals—since in this case, pushing the seventh button is equivalent to winning the prize . 35 Our characterization of practical availability can resolve this puzzle, however. Though we do predict...

... the normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (2) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (3) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value...

... is not completely uncontroversial. In particular, those who think that there are rational dilemmas, that is, cases in which Of and O : f, will want to reject such a closure principle since rational dilemmas together with this closure principle lead to deontic trivialization. For this type of worry see...

... about it. This is just between me and her, and I am acting out of concern for her interests as best I can. That is what I ought to do. The second premise is a general principle concerning the relation between the deontic status of actions and the deontic status of their proper parts. Call it Weak...

... the obligation (equivalently, having the ability to obey an obligation is necessary for having the obligation; i.e., OIC is true). So in the rest of this section I defend INFIL. 29 To start with, consider the following scenario: The funeral scenario . You are vacationing in Honolulu, and on Monday at 9 p.m...

... apparently, quite natural ones: for instance, an accessibility relation tracking the group's knowledge/beliefs, or the speaker's knowledge/beliefs, would render a Wittgenstein disjunction essentially equivalent to the corresponding Moore disjunction, and thus felicitous. So why don't we interpret...

... role to the norm parameter—for example, to handle the semantics of deontic modals. 21 Similarly, on the developed version of my semantics for know-how (in the appendix), some elements of infinitival questions selectively manipulate an extra parameter. But it's important to emphasize...

... (Feldman [1986] and Zimmerman [1996]) treat OIC as an axiom in their deontic logics. Philosophical Review, Vol. 120, No. 3, 2011 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1263674 q 2011 by Cornell University...

... on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing consequentialism seems too demand- ing since it labels so many...

... to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing...

... to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing...

... to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing...

... to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing...

... on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing consequentialism seems too demand- ing since it labels so many...

... the end of the story. The awkwardly titled “How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations...

... on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing consequentialism seems too demand- ing since it labels so many...

... to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst, maximizing...