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deontic equivalence

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... properties weighing of reasons reason-based representation consequentialization deontic equivalence underdetermination choice theory The aim of this essay is to propose a new approach to the formal representation of moral theories. We show that any moral theory within a very large class can be...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
... the requirement that any facts that there might be about deontic notions such as obligation, permission, and rightness must obtain in virtue of facts about value, give us the heart of the teleological point of view. With that in mind, we can define a teleological normative theory (whether in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... Deontic Logic: The Simplest Solution to All of Them in One Fell Swoop.” In New Studies in Deontic Logic , ed. Risto Hilpinen, 37 –86. Dordrecht: Reidel. Chierchia, Gennaro. 1989 . “Anaphora and Attitudes De Se.” In Language in Context , ed. R. Bartsch, J. van Benthem, and P. van Emde Boas, 1 –31...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
... whether we have an objective or subjective description of the agent's practical situation in mind. We thus distinguish between objective and subjective readings of agentive modals, a distinction that parallels the distinction between objective and subjective readings of deontic modals. In the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
... between the deontic status of actions and the deontic status of their proper parts. Call it Weak Agglomeration : P2 For any composite action A 1 . . . A n , if irrespective of whether you do A 2 through A n , you ought to do A 1 , and . . . and irrespective of whether you do A 1 . . . A n-1 , you...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
... is sufficient for losing the obligation (i.e., if INFIL is true), the only plausible explanation is that lacking the ability to obey an obligation is sufficient for lacking the obligation (equivalently, having the ability to obey an obligation is necessary for having the obligation; i.e., OIC is true...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... Wittgenstein disjunction essentially equivalent to the corresponding Moore disjunction, and thus felicitous. So why don't we interpret Wittgenstein disjunctions this way? In other words, why don't we interpret Wittgenstein disjunctions as (somewhat periphrastic) expressions of ignorance about the relevant...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... dilemmas together with this closure principle lead to deontic trivialization. For this type of worry see, for example, Van Fraassen 1973. Let me note, then, that the cases in which I will be appealing to multipremise closure for rational obligations are all cases in which such trivialization is avoided...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 35–82.
Published: 01 January 2016
... main functional role is guiding performance of action. The overall project of this paper connects to a trend of recent work in philosophy of language. Over the past ten years, a number of writers have defended brands of expressivism about epistemic, deontic, and probabilistic vocabulary that are...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
... . New York : Oxford University Press . Haji Ishtiyaque . 1998 . Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities . New York : Oxford University Press . ———. 1999 . “ Moral Anchors and Control .” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 : 175 - 203 . ———. 2002 . Deontic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 105–107.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 108–112.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 115–117.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 118–121.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 121–124.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 124–127.
Published: 01 January 2006
....) Fortunately, this isn’t the end of the story. The awkwardly titled “How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 127–131.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 131–133.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... withholding belief from q—that is, Ought‐ [ ∼ ( Bq & Wq ) ] . (2) It is a familiar principle of deontic logic that one cannot have logically incompatible obligations, and thus that if Ought-(∼A), then ∼Ought-A. And it is furthermore familiar that the obligation operator aggregates over...