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deontic equivalence

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... between theories with a teleological structure and those without. Reason-based representations also shed light on an important but underappreciated phenomenon: the “underdetermination of moral theory by deontic content.” where w is some real number. Call such properties expected-welfare properties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 1–51.
Published: 01 January 2020
... normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (2) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (3) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
... the requirement that any facts that there might be about deontic notions such as obligation, permission, and rightness must obtain in virtue of facts about value, give us the heart of the teleological point of view. With that in mind, we can define a teleological normative theory (whether in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... Deontic Logic: The Simplest Solution to All of Them in One Fell Swoop.” In New Studies in Deontic Logic , ed. Risto Hilpinen, 37 –86. Dordrecht: Reidel. Chierchia, Gennaro. 1989 . “Anaphora and Attitudes De Se.” In Language in Context , ed. R. Bartsch, J. van Benthem, and P. van Emde Boas, 1 –31...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
... now. First, the CA makes the wrong predictions about compulsion modals. On the CA, ⌜S cannot but ϕ ⌝ will be predicted to mean ⌜Not (If S tries to not ϕ , she does not ϕ )⌝. On Stalnaker's theory of conditionals, which the CA is built on, this is equivalent to ⌜If S tries to not ϕ , she...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
... I am acting out of concern for her interests as best I can. That is what I ought to do. The second premise is a general principle concerning the relation between the deontic status of actions and the deontic status of their proper parts. Call it Weak Agglomeration : P2 For any composite...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... knowledge/beliefs, or the speaker's knowledge/beliefs, would render a Wittgenstein disjunction essentially equivalent to the corresponding Moore disjunction, and thus felicitous. So why don't we interpret Wittgenstein disjunctions this way? In other words, why don't we interpret Wittgenstein disjunctions as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
... is sufficient for losing the obligation (i.e., if INFIL is true), the only plausible explanation is that lacking the ability to obey an obligation is sufficient for lacking the obligation (equivalently, having the ability to obey an obligation is necessary for having the obligation; i.e., OIC is true...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... dilemmas together with this closure principle lead to deontic trivialization. For this type of worry see, for example, Van Fraassen 1973. Let me note, then, that the cases in which I will be appealing to multipremise closure for rational obligations are all cases in which such trivialization is avoided...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 35–82.
Published: 01 January 2016
... quantifying over courses of actions is echoed by some recent and less recent work on the semantics of deontic modals (see, for example, Jackson and Pargetter 1986 and Cariani 2013 ). 52. The asymmetry can be eliminated if we move away from the standard way of construing the interaction between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
... (Feldman [1986] and Zimmerman [1996]) treat OIC as an axiom in their deontic logics. Philosophical Review, Vol. 120, No. 3, 2011 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1263674 q 2011 by Cornell University...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 105–107.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 108–112.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 115–117.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 118–121.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 121–124.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 124–127.
Published: 01 January 2006
....) Fortunately, this isn’t the end of the story. The awkwardly titled “How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 127–131.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of diffi cul- ties are salient here: fi rst...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 131–133.
Published: 01 January 2006
... Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism” takes on the underlying source of this problem, namely, the uneasy fi t between our traditional deontic notions and the sorts of evaluations that spring from consequentialist views. Two sorts of...