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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 394–398.
Published: 01 July 2022
...Bob Beddor This is a simple and elegant way of modeling degrees of rationality. But it faces two challenges. One challenge is raised by Staffel (153), who introduces two logic students, uncertain Una and certain Cera. Both Una and Cera entertain a complicated conditional q that turns out...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 143–148.
Published: 01 January 2016
... in which rational agents have degree of belief 1 only in things of which they are certain. Titelbaum Michael Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2013 . xii +345 pp. © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 Many...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
...Hannes Leitgeb This essay develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief; the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief; and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
... Beauty awakens her degree of belief in heads should be one-third. This demonstrates that it can be rational for an agent who gains only self-locating beliefs between two times to alter her degree of belief in a non-self-locating claim. © 2008 by Cornell University 2008 Arntzenius, F. 2003...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
... or virtuous people is conscious. The characterization of human consciousness that underlies both theories is best understood as one on which a wide variety of ideas in human minds are conscious, and the intensity or degree of consciousness of a given idea is a function of its power. For human minds, because...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 481–531.
Published: 01 October 2021
... is suffused with valence. What it’s like to undergo perceptual experiences—from pains to supposedly “neutral” visual experiences—standardly feels good or bad to some degree. The second aim is to argue, by appealing to theoretical and empirical considerations pertaining to the phenomenon of (perceptual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
... that Lewis's treatment of two of Parfit's puzzle cases—degreed survival and fission—presuppose different nonclassical treatments of belief and desire. © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 Third, I don't think we should underplay the significance of having a detailed argument taking us from premises about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Jason Konek Sarah Moss (2013) argues that degrees of belief, or credences, can amount to knowledge in much the way that full beliefs can. This essay explores a new kind of objective Bayesianism designed to take us some way toward securing such knowledge-constituting credences, or “probabilistic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Carlotta Pavese Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
... of disagreement, there are two main competing rules offered for belief-revision in the face of peer disagreement: maintaining your existing opinion, or meeting halfway. This article investigates the comparative reliability of these two rules using two measures of reliability for degrees of belief, calibration...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Huw Price In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance.” The present essay aims to motivate this same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This article argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure : for example, consider...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 371–375.
Published: 01 July 2019
.... That there must be such a connection has seemed a plausible premise, given that categorical and graded beliefs live in the same space, colloquially known as ‘a human's head’. Also, given that degrees of belief are degrees of belief and categorical belief is belief , how could there fail to be a connection...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 149–153.
Published: 01 January 2020
... ontological degreeism be the view that being is gradable—some entities enjoy more being or a greater degree of existence than others. Being fragments just in case either ontological pluralism or degreeism is true. While the idea that being fragments has played an import role in the history of philosophy...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 373–416.
Published: 01 July 2002
... degrees. The properties of figures on the sphere are in fact precisely those of the corresponding figures in Riemannian or doubly elliptical geometry. Putting the two parts together, we get the result that the geometry of visibles is not Euclidean, but Riemannian. Let us now examine the two parts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... of the Aristotelian Society 107 , no. 2 : 187 – 206 . ———. 2009 . “ Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief .” In Degrees of Belief , ed. Huber F. Schmidt-Petri C. , 263 – 97 . Dordrecht : Springer . Lewis D. 1980 . “ A Subjectivist’s Guide...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (1): 107–111.
Published: 01 January 2022
... that Kant asks us to suppose that someone has ten degrees of a passion, e.g., miserliness, which … is assumed to be sufficient to conflict with the duty of beneficence. We are further to suppose that this person applies twelve degrees of effort exercised in accordance with the principles of beneficence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
... are not sufficiently weighty. 31. Unsurprisingly, the notion of being made q-worse off also applies to division cases. Consider a division case in which Lefty and Righty will live qualitatively identical lives and will each be made worse off to degree X at some point in the future. Insofar as I am...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... for conditionalization reveals true incoherence, whereas the Dutch book for Reflection reveals only self-doubt. Dutch Books For Bayesians, probabilities represent subjective degrees of certainty, and probability axioms are logical norms governing belief. An agent can believe a proposition A to degree 1 (certainty...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 187–217.
Published: 01 April 2007
... that I want to concentrate on here. How should I react when I discover that my friend and I have very different beliefs on some topic? Thinking about belief in a quantitative or graded way, the question concerns cases in which my friend and I have very different degrees of confi dence in some...