Search Results for definition
1-20 of 425 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 465–470.
Published: 01 July 2002
...Michael Glanzberg André Chapuis and Anil Gupta, eds., Circularity, Definition and Truth. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2000. Pp. vi, 402. Cornell University 2002 Gupta, Anil, and Nuel Belnap. 1993 . The Revision Theory of Truth . Cambridge: MIT Press...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2003) 112 (2): 247–250.
Published: 01 April 2003
...Stein Haugom Olsen Robert Stecker, Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Pp.xi, 322. Cornell University 2003 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 2 (April 2003...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
... predicates that are true of their bearers. When a name appears as a bare singular in argument position, it really occupies the predicate position of what in this essay is called a denuded definite description : a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. Sloat provided good evidence for...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
... conditions of their possessors, in principle there can be a “package deal” definition that simultaneously defines both. Cornell University 2009 Burge, T. 2003 . “Memory and Persons.” Philosophical Review 112 : 289 -337. Lewis, D. 1972 . “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... counterfactuals can capture the notion of overdetermination and argue in section 2 for a negative answer. First, I consider David Lewis's (1986) and Jonathan Schaffer's (2003) definitions of overdetermination, and possible revisions to them, and show that the conditions they specify are neither necessary nor...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
... definition as well as the scope of the notion of substance. For it is often thought that the ultimate subject of properties need not—and, in some cases, cannot—be independent. Drawing on a suite of historical, textual, and philosophical considerations, this essay argues for an interpretation that reconciles...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
... count noun. This data set, they say, reveals that names’ interaction with the determiner system differs from that of common count nouns only with respect to the definite article ‘the’. They conclude that this special distribution of names is best explained by the-predicativism, the view that posits the...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2005) 114 (1): 1–31.
Published: 01 January 2005
... Bivalence Diana Raffman It is generally agreed that vague predicates like ‘red’, ‘rich’, ‘tall’, and ‘bald’, have borderline cases of application. For instance, a cloth patch whose color lies midway between a definite red and a definite orange is a borderline case for ‘red...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 251–256.
Published: 01 April 2018
... are no grounds for assuming that the lives of many or most people with disabilities would go better without them. In chapter 1, Barnes searches for a unifying or explanatory definition of disability that includes paradigm conditions, doesn't beg normative questions about the (dis)value of...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 135–138.
Published: 01 January 2016
... the continuity of Aristotle's capacity-centered approach with DA 's explanatory project: the basic capacities Aristotle describes as “parts” of soul, and whose essence he seeks to define in the remainder of DA , are parts of the definitions of various types of soul, differentiae that mark off one...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 98–101.
Published: 01 January 2002
... of priority. As Wedin points out, chapter 4 specifies that there will be definitions, the linguis- tic correlate of essences, only of primary things, and primary things “are those which do not involve one thing being said of another” (1030a10–11). For Wedin, this specification of the object of...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 415–419.
Published: 01 July 2015
... Raffman calls “the Standard Analysis” of borderline cases: The Standard Analysis: x is borderline ϕ just in case x is neither definitely ϕ nor definitely not- ϕ . Now it is worth noting that there are various versions of the Standard Analysis that are possible depending on how one understands...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 314–316.
Published: 01 April 2008
... descriptions, proper names, and pronouns are the same—they have the same syntactic as well as semantic structure. They are definite descriptions, with the definite article THE taking two arguments, an index andaNoun Phrase. Elbourne’s proposal targets two dominant views, one in linguistics, the other in...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 247–250.
Published: 01 April 2014
... concomitantly in C (2). Several things are noteworthy about this definition. First, just like Lewis, Marmor stipulates that conventional rules are arbitrary in that other rules would be possible as well. Second, the reason for an agent to follow the convention is that most or enough others follow it as...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 238–241.
Published: 01 April 2014
... practices is necessary to the discovery of truth and that such discovery (when constrained by the Harm Principle) “contributes to overall utility” (19). In chapter 2, Leiter attempts a definition of religion for the purpose of applying any principle of toleration grounded in the arguments of chapter 1...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 123–126.
Published: 01 January 2017
... Spinozistic terminology and casually cite definitions, axioms, and demonstration by number alone without elaboration. This can make them resemble prisoners who have lived together for so long in a single cell that they can crack each other up merely by citing, for example, joke #12, in lieu of actually...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 536–541.
Published: 01 October 2017
... philosophical categories that we work in today. In the opening chapter, Deborah Modrak focuses on the role of definition in Plato's “evolving conception of meaning” (16). Modrak argues that, in his later works, Plato attempts but fails to develop an account of philosophically perspicuous definition that has...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 481–532.
Published: 01 October 2015
... explanation and the notion of a completely satisfactory explanation to arrive at a notion of ground satisfying all the principles in figure 1 . 39 As a first pass, we give the following definition. 40 Let's say that if φ does not stand in need of explanation, then the one-step argument that just...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 404–410.
Published: 01 July 2017
..., Anscombe, Frankfurt, Hornsby, and others do) but leaves in place the general idea that voluntary, intentional, rational, and distinctively human action are roughly coordinate categories, liable to unified treatment in terms of a common source. Hyman's remedy is to offer clear definitions of these...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 289–290.
Published: 01 April 2001
... associated with randomness (in the “product”sense) of the dynamical orbits, and chapter 10, directed at the problem of giving a formal definition of a chaotic system, delves more deeply into the basic mathematical structures that lie behind the chaotic results. A number of philosophical themes...