1-20 of 93 Search Results for

deference, 

Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account

Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
Close Modal
Sort by
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 483–523.
Published: 01 October 2003
..., Vol. 112, No. 4 (October 2003) Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: Is Deference Compatible with Autonomy? Andrea C. Westlund She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled in the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
... when the judgment is in fact mistaken). In these instances, your friendship can make it the case that you may not act on your own practical and even moral judgments because, at those times, you have a duty as their close friend to defer to their judgments. As a result, treating your friend properly as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 459–462.
Published: 01 July 2002
... metalinguistic charac- ter the day she thought of as ‘tomorrow’, and refers to the day she thought of as ‘tomorrow’. The metalinguistic operator mandates a circumstance shift that takes effect only after the pretense-induced context shift. Some non-cumulative echoes involve deferring to another’s...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... J. 2008 . “ Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug .” Noûs 42 , no. 2 : 292 – 307 . Joyce J. M. 1998 . “ A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism .” Philosophy of Science 65 , no. 4 : 575 – 603 . ———. 2007 . “ Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance .” Proceedings of the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 586–589.
Published: 01 October 2003
... does not mean that I should not, after all, trust another. Additional information about the individual’s expertise or reliability may give me special reason to defer to their opinion (109). And con- flict with one’s epistemic peers may reasonably lead one to suspend judgment. When we have a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
.... Indeed, requiring A to split the difference when he or she disagrees with B is equivalent to requiring A to completely defer to C. The Equal Weight view is therefore equivalent to the view that, in light of peer disagreement with B, A ought to completely defer to C. On most plausible accounts of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 191–214.
Published: 01 April 2003
... (3), rep- resents my utterance of (3) for semantic purposes. The Bar Italia case is one of what W. V. O. Quine calls “deferred ostension” (1968, 194): I’m pointing at a picture of Frege, but ‘he’ refers to Frege himself rather than to the picture of him. We know what the demonstration is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 532–535.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Ian Proops Zalabardo José , Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein's “Tractatus.” Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2015 . 263 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 In deference to the extraordinary richness and dialectical subtlety of the Tractatus , José Zalabardo does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 359–398.
Published: 01 July 2005
.... n.d. Incomplete Understanding, Deference, and the Content of Thought . Unpublished manuscript. Heck, Richard. 2000 . Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons.” Philosophical Review 109 : 483 -524. Kelly, Sean. 2001a . Demonstrative Concepts and Experience. Philosophical Review...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 515–566.
Published: 01 October 2011
... James’s squirrel case, it is far from obvious that the two parties assert and deny distinct propositions. Consider the deferential squirrel case. This combines the original squirrel case with the stipulation that the quarreling parties both use the expression ‘go round’ with deference to their...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 453–456.
Published: 01 July 2000
... opinions should be deferred to, but mostly irrelevant to the central concerns of the working philosopher. Its practi- 456 ...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 456–459.
Published: 01 July 2000
... be deferred to, but mostly irrelevant to the central concerns of the working philosopher. Its practi- 456 BOOK REVLEWS tioners, however, often display a strikingly different attitude. Much of the enthusiasm for the subject matter...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 145–149.
Published: 01 January 2018
... are atoms arranged tablewise, do not apply the term “cup.” Application conditions need not be descriptive and may involve deference to experts and to the world (90–94). Coapplication conditions tell us the conditions under which we can reapply the same sortal term; for example if the atoms remain...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 435–439.
Published: 01 July 2016
... “what sorts of responses might continue the activity of reasoning and what sorts of responses would mark its degeneration into other activities, such as commanding and deferring” (206). The resulting account is a mix of voluntarism and coherentism: some of the reasons that apply to us do so because we...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 251–256.
Published: 01 April 2018
... it “always, or almost always,” has a net positive or negative effect, respectively, on well-being (84). Barnes's deference to the DRM also complicates her chapter-2 distinction between a disability's essential and inessential features. She readily acknowledges that all or most disabilities have...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 489–495.
Published: 01 July 2020
... just as unassertable as “Smith has a lot of books.” Indeed, they seem just as semantically indeterminate as the latter. The only way I can hear these as assertable is as metalinguistically deferred, as in, “It’s unlikely that Smith has a lot of books by academic standards,” where the uncertainty is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 462–465.
Published: 01 July 2002
... himself as ‘he himself’, in which case (15) involves no “deference” to the character John associates with that expression. We come closer to what is wanted with (17) John believes of himself, thought of as ‘I’, that he is courageous. But this not only departs from the mixed quotation paradigm, it...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 165–200.
Published: 01 April 2010
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 397–420.
Published: 01 July 2001
... concept possession, for reasons that have been discussed extensively in the literature. In particular, if it is possible to possess a general concept in virtue of one’s capacity to defer to an expert user of terms that express that concept, then it will be possible to possess the concept...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 497–534.
Published: 01 October 2005