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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 296–300.
Published: 01 April 2001
...Mirek Janusz THE FOUNDATIONS OF CAUSAL DECISION THEORY. By James M. Joyce. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xii, 268. Cornell University 2001 Anderson, Elizabeth, 1993 . Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Jeffrey, Richard, 1983...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 93–114.
Published: 01 January 2007
...Andy Egan Cornell University 2007 Some Counterexamples
to Causal Decision Theory
Andy Egan
Australian National University/University of Michigan
Many philosophers have been converted to causal decision theory...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 289–306.
Published: 01 April 2013
...Arif Ahmed The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 425–427.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Robert Sugden EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALITY: GAME THEORY REVISID BY DECISION RULES. By Paul Weirich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 235. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVEWS consistency and organic character of his political philosophy. ERIN KELLY Tujis University...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
...Rachael Briggs It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... in Lewis’s views on these two matters, by presenting a class of decision problems—some of them themselves Newcomb problems—in which Lewis’s view of the relevance of inadmissible evidence seems in tension with his causal decision theory. It offers a diagnosis for this dilemma and proposes a remedy, based...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Franz Dietrich; Christian List This essay presents a new “reason-based” approach to the formal representation of moral theories, drawing on recent decision-theoretic work. It shows that any moral theory within a very large class can be represented in terms of two parameters: (i) a specification...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
...J. Robert G. Williams Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (1): 1–32.
Published: 01 January 2024
... allows us to capture that awareness growth consists in the increase of one’s capacity of discernment. [email protected] © 2024 by Cornell University 2024 Awareness growth problem of new theories catchall propositions decision theory Bayesian epistemology Subjects often...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 1–23.
Published: 01 January 2002
... Theory , ed. C. A. Hooker, J. J. Leach, and E. F. McClennen, 125 -62. Dordrecht: Reidel. Goldman, Alvin. 1970 . A Theory of Human Action . Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jeffrey, Richard. 1965 . The Logic of Decision . New York: McGraw-Hill. ____. 1983 . The Logic of Decision. 2d...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 153–158.
Published: 01 January 2020
... are not identical to any precise propositions, and that vague thoughts are thoughts whose contents are vague propositions. This strategy is motivated, in part, by Bacon's desire to use standard decision theory as a theory of rational action in light of vague attitudes. Standard decision theory has no place...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... (73) will be both defined and true, and so this point does not seem decisive to me; but this is an unattractive feature of the strong bounded theory avoided by the weak bounded theory. I consider, first, a variant on the bounded theory that I argue we should take seriously. Recall...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56.
Published: 01 January 2003
...-Envelope Paradox. Analysis 62 : 155 -57. Chernoff, Herman, and Lincoln E. Moses. 1959 . Elementary Decision Theory . New York: Wiley. Clark, M., and N. Shackel. 2000 . The Two-Envelope Paradox. Mind 109 : 415 -42. Conway, John. 1976 . On Numbers and Games . London: Academic Press...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 241–286.
Published: 01 April 2016
... in this situation. 43 The second group of problems arises if beliefs about counterfactuals play a central role in rational decision , as they do on what is arguably the most widely accepted form of decision theory, the so-called causal decision theory sketched by Stalnaker (1981) and developed by Gibbard...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489.
Published: 01 July 2020
... . Gallow, J. Dmitri. Forthcoming. “Updating for Externalists.” Noûs . Greaves, Hilary . 2013 . “ Epistemic Decision Theory .” Mind 122 , no. 488 : 915 – 52 . Greaves, Hilary, and David Wallace . 2006 . “ Justifying Conditionalisation: Conditionalisation Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 230–235.
Published: 01 April 2022
... it, brings the possibility of changing who you are. Richard Pettigrew’s important new book, Choosing for Changing Selves , explores theories of decision-making for choices that change us, with a particular focus on life-changing decisions. Life-changing decisions are decision cases where a persisting...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (4): 329–365.
Published: 01 October 2024
... with respect to some goal; to do that, we can use tools borrowed from decision theory. 9 A decision-theoretic explication of what truth demands For any doxastic attitude B , proposition p , and evidence E : B ( p ) is a fitting response to the value of truth in light of E...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2025) 134 (1): 35–64.
Published: 01 January 2025
... Choices : You must choose between a local steak and a vegan wrap. You have credence 0.51 in an anthropocentric moral theory, according to which, because ordering the steak would help local farmers, and because animals have no moral status, there is weakly decisive moral reason to order the steak. You have...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
..., it follows that in these cases an agent ought to be probabilistically incoherent. In section 4, I present the accuracy-dominance argument for PROBABILISM in more explicit decision-theoretic terms. In decision theory, we can sometimes argue that an act or act-type is rationally required by showing...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 371–375.
Published: 01 July 2019
..., and effortful. ( Schurz forthcoming makes the same point.) Leitgeb appears to believe that, even granting dual-process theories, without a connection between categorical beliefs and graded beliefs, conflicts may arise between decisions based on the former and decisions based on the latter. But to insist...
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