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The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
...Rachael Briggs It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 289–306.
Published: 01 April 2013
...Arif Ahmed The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
...Joseph Y. Halpern PROBABILITY AND CONDITIONALS: BELIEF REVISION AND RATIONAL DECISION. Edited by Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. vii, 207 Cornell University 2000 Adams, E. 1966 . “Probability and the Logic of Conditionals.” In Aspects...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 296–300.
Published: 01 April 2001
...Mirek Janusz THE FOUNDATIONS OF CAUSAL DECISION THEORY. By James M. Joyce. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xii, 268. Cornell University 2001 Anderson, Elizabeth, 1993 . Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Jeffrey, Richard, 1983...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 425–427.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Robert Sugden EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALITY: GAME THEORY REVISID BY DECISION RULES. By Paul Weirich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 235. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVEWS consistency and organic character of his political philosophy. ERIN KELLY Tujis University...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 93–114.
Published: 01 January 2007
...Andy Egan Cornell University 2007 Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory Andy Egan Australian National University/University of Michigan Many philosophers have been converted to causal decision theory...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... to causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
...J. Robert G. Williams Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Franz Dietrich; Christian List This essay presents a new “reason-based” approach to the formal representation of moral theories, drawing on recent decision-theoretic work. It shows that any moral theory within a very large class can be represented in terms of two parameters: (i) a specification...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... argue against this consensus. I adduce a variety of data that I argue can best be accounted for if we treat Wittgenstein sentences as being classically inconsistent. This creates a puzzle, since there is decisive reason to think that ⌜Might p⌝ is consistent with ⌜Not p⌝. How can it also be that ⌜Might p...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 1–23.
Published: 01 January 2002
... Can We Do?” Journal of Philosophy 60 : 435 -445. Davidson, Donald. 1963 . “Actions, Reasons, and causes.” Journal of Philosophy 60 : 685 -700. Gibbard, Alan, and William Harper. 1978 . “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Value.” In Foundations and Applications of Decision...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 657–661.
Published: 01 October 2013
...): agents have decisive reasons to do what they are morally required to do. 2) Nonimpersonal Reasons (NIR): agents have some fundamentally nonimpersonal reasons that sometimes provide them with sufficient reasons not to bring about the best overall state of affairs. 3) Consequentialist Moral...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 611–614.
Published: 01 October 2001
... decisions. 611 BOOK REVIEWS The many critics of legislation receive different responses from Waldron, but those responses share a common theme. Legislation, and majority enact- ment of it, he insists, is both necessary and principled...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56.
Published: 01 January 2003
...-Envelope Paradox. Analysis 62 : 155 -57. Chernoff, Herman, and Lincoln E. Moses. 1959 . Elementary Decision Theory . New York: Wiley. Clark, M., and N. Shackel. 2000 . The Two-Envelope Paradox. Mind 109 : 415 -42. Conway, John. 1976 . On Numbers and Games . London: Academic Press...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 545–581.
Published: 01 October 2000
.... Rousseau’s general will, I shall argue, is the totality of unrescinded decisions made by a community-that is, of an association of individuals contractually constituted as a “moral and collective body”-when its deliberation is subject to certain constraints.’ The interpretation of Rousseau...
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 230–235.
Published: 01 April 2022
...L. A. Paul email@example.com Pettigrew Richard , Choosing for Changing Selves . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2019 . 245 pp. © 2022 by Cornell University 2022 Choosing brings change. A major life choice, a “big decision,” as Edna Ullmann-Margalit termed...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 383–421.
Published: 01 July 2011
... a decision. But Hardie struggles to ﬁnd evidence in Aristotle’s discussion of deliberation in Nicomachean Ethics (EN ) 3, 3 that making a decision essentially involves making a choice between alternatives.6 He ﬁrst considers the proposal that the comparison is implicit rather than explicit...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
..., but we don't have clear, decisive reason for rejecting PROBABILISM in particular. In sections 3–4, I'll show that on closer inspection the case of Yuko provides us with the materials to develop a strong argument against PROBABILISM. Before doing so, however, let's look at another case that provides...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 435–439.
Published: 01 July 2016
... action or attitude. If you say that the fact that donuts are sugary is a reason, I will not understand what you mean until you tell me what it is a reason for : to eat donuts, or avoid them? But the responses that reasons support are none other than conclusions and decisions: to perform this action...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... there was an earlier point at which a chance event made a different decision equally likely. But it seems that the presence of such a factor does not make it the case that the decision is impartial and gives equal chances in the intuitively appropriate way. 15 Defenders of PA might instead choose to appeal...