... is the set of worlds at which Venus is visible. De re* belief bears some resemblance to Hintikka’s (1969) treat- ment of attitude verbs. There are important differences, however. For one thing, Biron can be simultaneously so related to contradictory...

... be insufficiently general also because, as already noted, expressions in various syntactic positions may be read de re within the context of an attitude verb, not merely the subject. 37. The basic challenge here is familiar already in the literature on non-Fregean treatments of the de re . Some...

... to recover the representational aspect of concepts from their more fundamental inferential nature through an account of the expressive and inferential role distinctive of de re attitude ascrip- tions. Chapter 6 outlines an inferentialist account of objectivity, arguing that the norms governing...

.... This notion is obviously, and conveniently, vague. Spelling out this notion requires taking sides in a number of debates about con- tent and de re attitudes. For example, it requires choosing between a reductionist and a nonreductionist position about de re attitudes. (On the former, de re attitudes turn...

... [pointing to Venusmy response would have to be “no What about de re knowledge attributions? Does my account require that a person who does not know that Hesperus is Phosphorus therefore does not know of Hesperus that ‘Hesperus’ (or ‘Phosphorus’) refers to it? De re attitude ascriptions...

.... 4. An Example of Bare Quantification Quantificational attitude-reports are subject to a de re/de dicto ambiguity. In “On Denoting” Russell handles the distinction as a matter of scope: in de re reports the quantifier phrase outscopes the attitude verb, while in de dicto reports the scope order...

... of modality. One is a view about modal language argued for by Quine, that de re modal formulae are unintelligible (see Quine 1956, 1960, 1961). The other is a view about ontology argued for by Lewis, that there is no significant difference between the actual and the merely possible (Lewis 1973, 1986...

...⌝ means. 64 Now suppose we have a sentence of the form ⌜ S Ψ-s that the F is G ⌝, where is an attitude verb. That is famously ambiguous between de dicto and de re readings: (40) a.  S Ψ-s that the F is G .    b. Sam believes that the star of Top Gun is tall. (41) a.  S Ψ-s...

... that OMNISCIENCE and IGNORANCE are true, and so we arrive at the conclusion that INTROSPECTION is false. 24. I have in mind what Robert Adams (1979, 26) calls “moderate haecceitism.” 25. As Lewis (1983b, 157) puts it, “Belief de se is a special case of belief de re .” 26. Lewis...

... de- sires or other pro or con attitudes about one’s first-order desires or inclinations. In contrast, the idea of strong reflectiveness can seem puzzling. How can we say in what strong reflective endorse- ment consists except by citing some complex of attitudes, including higher-order...

... and propositional memory. All experiential memory is de re and must go back to a previous experience of a particular. (It must, of course, still involve general, categorizational elements.) Substantive content mem- ory consists either in purely general, non–de re presentations, or in de re propositional...

... aberrations and periods of de- tachment, reevaluation, and the like). Though he has long believed that he loves Chris, it is no exaggeration to say that he is now quite indifferent to Chris’s attitudes and feelings toward him. We would normally take this to show that Ben doesn’t love (or no longer loves...

... skepticism in not considering external world skepticism. Not all modern commentators think that Descartes’s skepticism is more radical than ancient skepticism. For the opposing view, see L. Robin, Pyr- rhon et le skepticisme grec (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1944), 88- 90 (though he...

.... 8 Before considering how an advocate of this framework might try to respond to this problem, it is worth noting that standard semantic theories predict that our two inferences are valid only on the assumption that (1), (2), and (5) are (syntactically) de re modal predications. Neither...

...-inspired examples of true identity state- ments. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are dedicated to semantic issues typically deemed to be intractable from the New Theory’s viewpoint. Berger confronts problems related to attitude reports, such as Kripke’s disquotational principle and the de dicto/de re distinction...

... Sartrean “wanting to be” and the Beauvoirian “wanting to disclose being.” Bergoffen reiterates the distinction in “Simone de Beauvoir: (Re)counting the Sexual Difference,” using it as a basis for her claim that Beauvoir under- stands the “erotic as the concretely lived original intentionality” (261...

... is smart,” uttered by Lingens. This is not surprising, given that such beliefs are de re, as discussed below, so here too sense can shift so long as reference is known to remain the same. In general, if the Lauben “test” is passed/ failed by pairs of expressions in direct contexts, it will be passed...

... with a grounding in speech-act theory) methodological orientation—is variously illustrated in chapters on slurs, paradox, moral discourse, relative truth, and taste. The book is a tour de force. However, those immersed in certain of the book's subject matters—this best describes my relationship to the material...

... a defense of the view that art-related practices are constitutively evaluative spheres of human activity; reflects ( de se fabulatur ) on whether philosophers can make worthwhile contributions to “conversations about evaluation [had] by creators, performers, and critics” (318); contends that the evaluation...

...., 18. 25 Ibid., 19. 26 See David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 18–19. 27 This intention must be a de dicto intention to build something under the mode of presentation provided by the concept house, not a mere de re inten- tion...