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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 53–94.
Published: 01 January 2020
...Anders J. Schoubye M ILLIANISM and DESCRIPTIVISM are without question the two most prominent views with respect to the semantics of proper names. However, debates between MILLIANS and DESCRIPTIVISTS have tended to focus on a fairly narrow set of linguistic data and an equally narrow set of problems...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
...Robin Jeshion Clarence Sloat, Ora Matushansky, and Delia Graff Fara advocate a Syntactic Rationale on behalf of predicativism, the view that names are predicates in all of their occurrences. Each argues that a set of surprising syntactic data compels us to recognize names as a special variety of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 45–92.
Published: 01 January 2013
... story extends the basic framework to cover some complicated data about retraction and the interaction between epistemic modality and tense. A comparison between the suggestion made in this essay and current versions of the orthodoxy is provided. © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 For comments...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 1–47.
Published: 01 January 2008
... give voice to our most cognitively primitive generalizations and that this hypothesis accounts for a variety of facts ranging from acquisition patterns to cross-linguistic data concerning the phonological articulation of operators. I go on to develop an account of the nature of these cognitively...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... argue against this consensus. I adduce a variety of data that I argue can best be accounted for if we treat Wittgenstein sentences as being classically inconsistent. This creates a puzzle, since there is decisive reason to think that ⌜Might p⌝ is consistent with ⌜Not p⌝. How can it also be that ⌜Might p...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
... explains the data at least as thoroughly as opposing views can, while fitting within a simpler total account of how we deliberate and act. Cornell University 2009 The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended Neil Sinhababu...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 337–364.
Published: 01 July 2010
... filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. No matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are created, the proposal conflicts with other strong intuitions we have about fictional characters. The...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
...-free.” Russell's notion of acquaintance, since it fits this bill, is therefore motivated by his solution to the puzzle, as is his choice of sense-data to be the referents of genuine Russellian names of particulars. Finally, the article argues that since a version of the George IV puzzle arises for...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 185–189.
Published: 01 January 2021
... that “for data to warrant a hypothesis H requires not just that (S-1) H agrees with the data ( H passes the test), but also (S-2) with high probability, H would not have passed the test so well, were H false” (92). Mayo's two criteria are inspired by the Neyman-Pearsonian maxim that good...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 536–541.
Published: 01 October 2018
... general and evolving views on implicit bias in particular. With respect to implicit bias, though, as I explain below, recent empirical evidence is sometimes difficult to interpret, one clear lesson from these data is that implicit biases are not literally automatic and not completely opaque to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 438–441.
Published: 01 July 2004
... to advance the cause of statistics, is frequentism person- ified. For him, probabilities always measure the relative proportions with which members of a hypothetically infinite population exhibit traits of interest. Items of data are random samples from such populations. If H is a hypothesis about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2002
... in the occur- rences of ‘that’ in ‘that is nice’. As a result, philosophers interested in inten- tionality, from the sense-data theorists to contemporary philosophers of mind, have devoted considerable attention to the question of how a demonstrative thought links to its object. The second reason...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... her cognitive ability or skill (skill in assessing the current polling data, extracting the right general lessons from previous elections, and so on), then it will be safe as well. It could not easily have been inaccurate. Suppose the election is, in fact, proceeding fairly normally, or typically...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 73–114.
Published: 01 January 2018
... endorsed in the sciences. Theorem 2 Suppose that E is tested against its negation ¬ E and that some test has (asymptotically) low size and high power. If E is sp -knowable a,b in a world θ given data x, then it is Nozick a,b- knowable in θ given x 22 . Similarly for...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 453–456.
Published: 01 July 2000
... consulted.) The dominant theme of these essays is the project of deriving all em- pirical knowledge from statements about sense-data-the given. The philos- opher who looms largest in these essays is C. I. Lewis. Lewis’s influence is followed by that of J. L. Austin, who challenged the Cartesian...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 462–465.
Published: 01 July 2000
... theory is implicitly testable if and only if it is probable that there are observational data that would justify a person in accepting or rejecting the theory. If we are to avoid apriorism, then we must consider philosophy to be empirical by virtue of its being testable in this sense. Is such a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 97–143.
Published: 01 January 2021
... illocutionary acts. Both effects are locutionary. I begin by further motivating KRE (sec. 2). With supporting data laid out, I discuss how to probatively explain KRE (sec. 3). Then parenthe- ticalism is proposed (secs. 4 5), and argued to be preferable to standard Figure 1. Division of labor. A. Benton (2011...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 361–399.
Published: 01 July 2007
.... Broadly, these “interpretationisms” adopt a two-step strategy. One begins with facts about the states of the world in which sentences are uttered. One then gives a recipe for extracting data in the form of a correlation of sentences with appropriate contents.3 Secondly, one maintains that for an...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 465–469.
Published: 01 July 2000
... philosopher’s armchair. Why, then, did he not succumb to the apm’om’sm he so emphatically rejects? If we employ his own criterion, we would have to say that what he does in his book escapes apriorism and qualifies as a form of naturalism only if it is probable that there are public observational data...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 449–485.
Published: 01 October 2006
... in the course of this proj- ect is subject to the exact same standards of evaluation as are employed in the empirical sciences generally. That is to say, any hypothesis stating that a particular rule governs the practice of assertion must face the linguistic data about that practice; if two or...