Search Results for credence
1-20 of 63 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Kenny Easwaran Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones—they...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Jason Konek Sarah Moss (2013) argues that degrees of belief, or credences, can amount to knowledge in much the way that full beliefs can. This essay explores a new kind of objective Bayesianism designed to take us some way toward securing such knowledge-constituting credences, or “probabilistic...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
...Michael Caie Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Richard Pettigrew In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism,” James M. Joyce attempts to “depragmatize” de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our credences ought to satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. This article adapts Joyce’s argument to give nonpragmatic...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided by...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Sarah Moss This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Catrin Campbell-Moore In Michael Caie's article “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence,” Caie argues that in light of certain situations involving self-reference, it is sometimes rational to have probabilistically incoherent credences. This essay further considers his arguments. It shows that...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
.... 2006 . “When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments.” Analysis 66 : 119 –27. Christensen, David. 1991 . “Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.” Philosophical Review 100 : 229 –47. ———. 2007 . “Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2007) 116 (1): 93–114.
Published: 01 January 2007
... . “Conditional Credence.” Mind 95 : 18 -36. Spohn, Wolfgang. 1977 . “Where Luce and Kranz Do Really Generalize Savage's Decision Model.” Erkenntnis 11 : 113 -34. Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory Andy Egan Australian National...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 443–450.
Published: 01 July 2012
... diachronically incoherent. On Brigg’s view, an agent can be coher- ent even if the following two conditions hold, where Cr0 is the agent’s credence function at time t 0, and Cr1 is the agent’s credence function at some later time t 1:: SUSPICION : Cr 0ðCr 1ðAÞ¼rÞ¼d where 0 , d , 1...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
.... Gaifman, Haim. 1985 . “A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities.” In Causation, Chance, and Credence , ed. Brian Skyrms and William Harper, 191 -219. Boston: Kluwer Academic. Green, Mitchell S., and Christopher Hitchcock. 1994 . “Reflections on Reflection.” Synthese 98 : 297 -324. Hall, Ned...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
...- dence function.” For a story in which the agent’s degrees of belief evolve over time, we will need separate credence functions for each time of interest during the story. So to model a story, we start by selecting a time set. The time set of a model is a nonempty...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
....) Lewis's (1976) triviality theorem 2 addresses a principle about what subjective probability—or credence —it is reasonable to assign a conditional: Stalnaker's Thesis. For every reasonable credal state C , if C ( A ) > 0, C ( if A , B ) = C ( B | A...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
...: logical consequence is (necessary) truth preservation. The classical theory of mind I set out earlier regiments these connections in a classical setting. We assume that the way to describe the belief state of an agent is by a function b that assigns to each sentence or proposition the credence (degree...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
... follows, I will make considerable use of probabilities. I will take these probabilities to be so-called evidential probabilities, or the subjective credences that rational agents are justiﬁed by the evidence in assigning. So, “pS ðH j E for example, will refer to the credence that it is rational for a...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... #3;,whereA is a finite set of possible actions that the agent believes are available, K is a finite set of dependency hypotheses about how various value-level propositions depend counterfactually on the possible actions, and C is a credence function representing the agent’s beliefs. I’ll ela- borate on...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
... lack of confidence in one's metaphysical judgments, and one should never have a credence of 1 in any such judgment. 3 Moreover, there is nothing wrong, or unusual, about having nonzero credences in each of two competing propositions, even if you are certain that at least one of them must be...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
... h , t ( E ) = p ). 6 Epistemic probability (or credence) functions are indexed to agents and their informational states (and optionally histories and times). Assignments of epistemic probability (or credence) thus take the form “agent A with information I (in history h at time t ) has...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 279–322.
Published: 01 July 2018
... belief. 30. Of course, one might now leverage the argument into an objection to the metaphysical posit itself. Compare Lewis's argument against anti-Humean conceptions of chance. Strictly speaking, all he argued was that the unHumean whatnot does not constrain rational credence, but he clearly took this...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 647–650.
Published: 01 October 2013
... lend credence to Boonin's position. The elimination of racial/ethnicity fixation on the part of all the members of society, whether individuals are law enforcement officers or not, is a good thing precisely because the fixation mind-set invariably undermines social trust in society. Instead, we want...