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credence

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Kenny Easwaran Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones—they...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Jason Konek Sarah Moss (2013) argues that degrees of belief, or credences, can amount to knowledge in much the way that full beliefs can. This essay explores a new kind of objective Bayesianism designed to take us some way toward securing such knowledge-constituting credences, or “probabilistic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
...Michael Caie Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Richard Pettigrew In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism,” James M. Joyce attempts to “depragmatize” de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our credences ought to satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. This article adapts Joyce’s argument to give nonpragmatic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided by...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Sarah Moss This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Catrin Campbell-Moore In Michael Caie's article “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence,” Caie argues that in light of certain situations involving self-reference, it is sometimes rational to have probabilistically incoherent credences. This essay further considers his arguments. It shows that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
..., and Hannes Leitgeb. 2006 . “When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments.” Analysis 66 : 119 –27. Christensen, David. 1991 . “Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.” Philosophical Review 100 : 229 –47. ———. 2007 . “Does Murphy's Law Apply in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2007) 116 (1): 93–114.
Published: 01 January 2007
... . “Conditional Credence.” Mind 95 : 18 -36. Spohn, Wolfgang. 1977 . “Where Luce and Kranz Do Really Generalize Savage's Decision Model.” Erkenntnis 11 : 113 -34. Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory Andy Egan...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 443–450.
Published: 01 July 2012
... rather than diachronically incoherent. On Brigg’s view, an agent can be coher- ent even if the following two conditions hold, where Cr0 is the agent’s credence function at time t 0, and Cr1 is the agent’s credence function at some later time t 1:: SUSPICION : Cr 0ðCr 1ðAÞ¼rÞ¼d where 0 , d...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... -100. Gaifman, Haim. 1985 . “A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities.” In Causation, Chance, and Credence , ed. Brian Skyrms and William Harper, 191 -219. Boston: Kluwer Academic. Green, Mitchell S., and Christopher Hitchcock. 1994 . “Reflections on Reflection.” Synthese 98 : 297 -324...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
...- dence function.” For a story in which the agent’s degrees of belief evolve over time, we will need separate credence functions for each time of interest during the story. So to model a story, we start by selecting a time set. The time set of a model is a nonempty...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
....) Lewis's (1976) triviality theorem 2 addresses a principle about what subjective probability—or credence —it is reasonable to assign a conditional: Stalnaker's Thesis. For every reasonable credal state C , if C  ( A ) > 0, C   ( if   A ,   B ) = C   ( B   |   A...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
... credence to A over B when B follows from A ; and treats disjunctions and conjunctions appropriately. 9 The overall shape is what is crucial here. We have a characterization of rational belief directly in terms of truth values, a characterization of rational belief via logical constraints...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
..., some preliminaries. First, in what follows, I will make considerable use of probabilities. I will take these probabilities to be so-called evidential probabilities, or the subjective credences that rational agents are justified by the evidence in assigning. So, “pS ðH j E for example, will...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... ,whereA is a finite set of possible actions that the agent believes are available, K is a finite set of dependency hypotheses about how various value-level propositions depend counterfactually on the possible actions, and C is a credence function representing the agent’s beliefs. I’ll ela- borate on...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
.... 1. See, for example, Aristotle 1955 , esp. books 6–8; Prior 1957 ; Prior and Fine 1977 ; Waterlow 1982 ; Zalta 1987 ; Dyke 1998 ; Markosian 2001 and 2004; and Rini and Cresswell 2012 . 2. See Olson 1997 . 3. If I am being really careful about my credences, I should...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
... indexed to a particular history and time ( Lewis 1986 , Schaffer 2007 ). To indicate this, we use the notation Pr h , t . Chance assignments thus take the form “event E has objective chance p in history h at time t  ” (in short, Pr h , t  ( E ) =  p  ). 6 Epistemic probability (or credence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 279–322.
Published: 01 July 2018
... naturalness would be theory-guiding. Though I've modeled this on the objections to anti-Humeanism and the divine command theories above, I do not assume that those latter objections are successful. Perhaps there is some explanation of why an unHumean whatnot would be credence-guiding, or why God's commands...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 647–650.
Published: 01 October 2013
.../ethnicity fixation. These observations nicely lend credence to Boonin's position. The elimination of racial/ethnicity fixation on the part of all the members of society, whether individuals are law enforcement officers or not, is a good thing precisely because the fixation mind-set invariably undermines...