...Dale Jamieson Korsgaard Christine M. , Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals. . New York : Oxford University Press , 2018 . xiii + 252 pp . © 2021 by Cornell University, 2021 Over the last several decades, Christine Korsgaard has produced a tightly woven body...

...Sydney Shoemaker Tyler Burge argues on the basis of an account of memory that the notion of quasimemory cannot be used to answer the circularity objection to psychological accounts of personal identity. His account implies the impossibility of the “Parfit people,” creatures psychologically like us...

... the possibility of there being creatures like us, with both sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have different pure forms of sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and discursive cognizers. But they would not be human. And this raises a question about the pure forms of the understanding...

...Christopher Tucker The Neo-Moorean Deduction (I have a hand, so I am not a brain-in-a-vat) and the Zebra Deduction (the creature is a zebra, so it isn't a cleverly disguised mule) are notorious. Crispin Wright, Martin Davies, Fred Dretske, and Brian McLaughlin, among others, argue...

... of how God’s causal power relates to the natural causal activity of creatures, Leibniz held that both God and the creature are directly involved in the occurrence of these effects. A divine concurrentist, in general, intends to satisfy two theses that were held by the vast majority of theologians...

... “justifying reasons” to care about human welfare (and perhaps the welfare of other sentient creatures), but not “requiring reasons,” although the Anselmian being does have decisive reasons not to “intend evil,” which Murphy defines as intending the absence of due perfection or well-being in creatures (86...

... that “zombies” (crea- tures physically identical to conscious creatures but who lack consciousness) are conceivable, hence possible. The objection is not to the premise that zom- bies are conceivable, but rather to the inference to the conclusion that they are possible. Chapter 3 is the core of the book...

... of the explanatory gap exactly what they say they want. 2. The Stopgap Clearly, to avoid charges of missing the point, my attempt to stop up the explanatory gap must come face to face with the concept of there being something it is like for a creature to have a feature. The feature might be a nonmental kind...

... most important. First, the focus on species nature avoids the “occasionalism” of some tradi- tionally proposed sources of value. If the valuable feature is an occurrent state of a creature (one that must be supported by full consciousness, for example) or the creature’s ability to instantiate...

... left to chance. Rather God is “knowingly and lovingly directing each and every event involving each and every creature toward the ends he has ordained for them” (12).Flint acknowledges that the choice between un- compromising libertarianism (the belief that God cannot both grant a per- son...

... on the relation between God and the created world, it is somewhat surprising that he does not discuss divine concurrence. After all, Leibniz’s endorsement of concurrentism—or the doctrine that all creaturely actions require divine cooperation—may seem to threaten his naturalism. Concurrentists claim...

..., on Individuation, Metaphysical Disputa- tion V: Individual Unity and Its Principle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982), 268. 6. What to say about the dependence of creatures upon God was a matter of some- what greater controversy and complexity. For two different approaches, see Thomas Aquinas...

...) Sellars gives his own accounts of the distinctive nondescriptive function of normative and causal expressions in the lives of creatures like us. The details needn't concern us; what matters is the stance. For Sellars, the right approach to an understanding of modality and norms is to ask not about...

..., but not necessarily conceptually, structured—a creature must have a “grasp” of itself as an embodied agent capable of acting in relation to spatially organised physical objects and events. (2) Self-Others Principle (chap. 6): In order to enjoy thought and experi- ence of an objective space populated...

... for “revealing itself” to sentient creatures (55)—a claim that is an important piece of groundwork for Kelsey’s ultimate view that sensibility is part of the form of perceptible objects. Another question concerns how best to characterize the dialectic between Aristotle and his predecessors about...

... begs the question against the defender of near bias. Compare an analogous argument against partiality in ethics. The first premise would state that a moral agent’s strongest and overriding desire is that things go as well as possible overall for sentient creatures. The second premise is that if you...

... to specifically neo-Platonist theology that Leibniz adopted from his early teachers. On this view creatures emanate from God in such a way that creaturely essences mirror, in varying degrees of perfection, all the divine attributes. Further, she argues, Leibniz endorses a neo-Platonist theme according...

...) There are reasons why animals act as they do, but only in the most tenuous sense can we say that they have reasons for acting as they do. Only a language-using creature can reason and deliberate, weigh the conflict- 217 NOMY ARPALY AND TIMOTHY...

.... Although such perversity is not an essential aspect of rational agency in general, it is a necessary feature of any freedom that can be attained by a temporal creature that develops its reason out of a natural origin.7 1. Human evil is a profound challenge to Kant’s...

... it is clearly possible for creatures to be extended and experience pain, many believed that it was not possible for a perfect being to be extended or experience pain. Yet, according to Spinoza’s account, if it is possible for a finite essence to be extended, God is actually extended as well. In other words...