Search Results for create
1-20 of 331 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 481–524.
Published: 01 October 2008
...Seana Valentine Shiffrin The power to promise is morally fundamental and does not, at its foundation, derive from moral principles that govern our use of conventions. Of course, many features of promising have conventional components—including which words, gestures, or conditions of silence create...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 337–364.
Published: 01 July 2010
...Stuart Brock This essay explains why creationism about fictional characters is an abject failure. Creationism about fictional characters is the view that fictional objects are created by the authors of the novels in which they first appear. This essay shows that, when the details of creationism are...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 323–348.
Published: 01 July 2008
... after. For biological conception is most plausibly seen as a momentous event in the continuing life of a preexisting organism—the egg—rather than a cataclysmic event ending one life and creating another. This article considers and rebuts the most likely challenges to this claim. This metaphysical point...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
...) may also be shifted by operators in the representation language. Indeed verbs that create hyperintensional contexts, like `think', are treated as operators that simultaneously shift the world and assignment parameters. By contrast, metaphysical modal operators shift the world of assessment only. Names...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 351–374.
Published: 01 July 2009
...-souled individuals) can develop into. This is because the early education ensures that the auxiliary and the philosopher share the same basic structure of soul, with reason being in control of each, though the auxiliary's natural deficiencies create some limitations in terms of his or her moral self...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict: the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. This essay argues that this conflict does arise and that it creates problems...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... argue against this consensus. I adduce a variety of data that I argue can best be accounted for if we treat Wittgenstein sentences as being classically inconsistent. This creates a puzzle, since there is decisive reason to think that ⌜Might p⌝ is consistent with ⌜Not p⌝. How can it also be that ⌜Might p...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
...Cian Dorr; John Hawthorne Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 135–163.
Published: 01 April 2010
... Jeffrey K. McDonough Harvard University 0. Introduction Leibniz famously maintains that God has created the best of all possible worlds. Not surprisingly, it is often objected that other possible worlds seem better and so that a benevolent, all-powerful God should...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 438–441.
Published: 01 July 2000
...- product of God’s creating things that are inferior (necessarily) to God. All created things are good, contrary to Manichean doctrine. Having been created ex nihilo, all material things are inherently mutable. (4) Moral evil or sin always involves choosing a lesser good over a greater good. Sin is...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 94–98.
Published: 01 January 2000
... is well-ordered variety (14), and still other times harmony is a particular kind of good order, namely the connection or agreement between created objects. This certainly reflects some unclarity in Leibniz’s own writing, but the latter description of harmony is the one that is central to...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 617–621.
Published: 01 October 2000
... lost if he had created Wp instead of the actual world (hence no good articulated by OT), and so it seems that prehistoric NERNP constitutes a massive amount of NERNP that is necessarily gratu- itous. By the end of chapter 4 we have O’Connor’s considered argument: 1. There is a massive...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
... term ‘substance’ does not apply univocally , as they say in the Schools, to God and to other things; that is, there is no distinctly intelligible meaning of the term which is common to God and to his creatures. In the case of created things, some are of such a nature that they cannot exist without...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 1–40.
Published: 01 January 2018
... fully understand this argument, we must see why Descartes thinks that it follows from the nature of created substance as such that bodies-taken-in-general are incorruptible. A clue is provided by Descartes's account of substance in terms of its “principal attribute.” An important consequence of this...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 148–151.
Published: 01 January 2016
... criticism of global inequality. We have reason to care about global economic inequality, since it is the global institutional set that creates it; we do not, however, have to focus on all imagined cases of difference, because Tan's “institutional egalitarianism” (2) is not in the business of eliminating all...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2003) 112 (1): 124–126.
Published: 01 January 2003
...-ranging impact on the life-chances of subordinate “races” creates a heavy burden that is properly thought of as a form of oppres- sion. Calling these lesser wrongs “racist” reminds us of the seriousness of these sources of disadvantage, even if their perpetrators are not moral monsters. The second...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2005) 114 (1): 139–141.
Published: 01 January 2005
... that it is possible to create a fictional character, despite argu- ments that either there are no such things, or there are, but they are eternal and hence uncreatable. We create them, he says, by creating narratives in which they appear, and the minimum required for this is that the narrative must...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 233–236.
Published: 01 April 2019
... package of privileges, rights, and duties recognized, and then grant each based on de facto financial and emotional practices, and the dependencies, interdependencies, and reasonable expectations created by actual living or support arrangements. Chambers spends the first half of her book taking down...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 285–288.
Published: 01 April 2005
... justify taking these earnings from them. The authors pin the popularity of this assumption on an implicit libertarian view of property rights and desert: that individuals with strong natural property rights exercise these rights within a government- free market, creating a presumptively just baseline...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 427–431.
Published: 01 July 2003
.... Intentionally created, they come to be at one time and cease to be at another (say, when irrecoverably and entirely for- gotten). Fictional characters are such abstracta. Ontologically dependent, they would not have existed were it not for the existence of some material things (say, books) and mental states...