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counterpart theory
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
... that accommodates nontrivial counterpossibles. In this article, I argue that none of these approaches can account for all the peculiar features of counteridenticals. Instead, I propose a modified version of Lewis's counterpart theory, which rejects the necessity of identity, and show that it can explain all...
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... that being possibly thus-and-so (in the epistemic sense of ‘possibly’) is not a trait that an object has in and of itself, but one that an object possesses only relative to a way of thinking of the domain of quantification. I consider two theories that implement this insight: a static version of counterpart...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 385–449.
Published: 01 July 2021
... is that Kant’s idealist argument from incongruent counterparts rests essentially on his theory of freedom. The surprising result sheds new light on deep and overlooked links among the pillars of transcendental idealism, pointing the way to a comprehensive and unified reading of Kant’s system of idealist...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
... – 67 . Dorr Cian . 2005 . “ Propositions and Counterpart Theory .” Analysis 65 : 210 – 18 . ———. n.d. “ How to Be a Modal Realist .” Unpublished manuscript . Edgington Dorothy . 2003 . “ Counterfactuals and the Benefit of Hindsight .” In Causation and Counterfactuals...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... . “ Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste .” Linguistics and Philosophy 28 , no. 6 : 643 – 86 . Lewis David K. 1968 . “ Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic .” Journal of Philosophy 65 , no. 5 : 113 – 26 . ———. 1973 . Counterfactuals...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 295–325.
Published: 01 July 2022
... that a zygote is numerically distinct from the genuine singleton it develops into. 3. I believe that the argument for the claim that human zygotes are developmentally plastic goes through in modal counterpart theory and the four-dimensionalist theories of persistence as well (cf. note 15 ). Yet...
FIGURES
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 110–113.
Published: 01 January 2003
... of the four-dimensionalist position, one that poses formi-
dable challenges to the three-dimensionalist. Sider begins, in chapter 2, by
offering powerful considerations in favor of the B-theory of time, which is in his
view most plausibly combined with four-dimensionalism. His remarks in chap-
ter 3...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... theory is “consequentializable” if its action-guiding recommendations are the same as those of some “counterpart theory” that is structurally consequentialist. 2 Some scholars, such as Jamie Dreier (1993, 2011) and Douglas Portmore (2007) , suggest that every moral theory—or at least every...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
... Wilhelm. 1982 . New Essays on Human Understanding . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (originally published 1739). Lewis, David. 1968 . “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.” Journal of Philosophy 65 : 113 –26. ———. 1971 . “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies.” Journal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 153–181.
Published: 01 April 2009
... Human Understanding . Indianapolis: Hackett. ____. 2001 . A Treatise of Human Nature . Oxford Philosophical Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kripke, Saul. 1980 . Naming and Necessity . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lewis, David. 1968 . “Counterpart Theory and Quantified...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 53–94.
Published: 01 January 2020
... the properties that S attributes to x . Epistemic counterparts are generally used, within possible worlds theories of mental content, to ‘locate’ actual world individuals within belief worlds of subjects. ( Santorio 2012: 13 ) So, in the context where Del Naja wakes up in a hospital bed with severe...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 51–91.
Published: 01 January 2007
... and Indiscernibility.” Journal of Philosophy 91 : 165 -84. ____. 1999 . “Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism, and Counterpart Theory.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 : 192 -95. ____. 2001 . Objects and Persons . Oxford: Clarendon. Myro, George. 1986 . “Identity and Time...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 297–326.
Published: 01 July 2005
...—like counterpart theory and his way of indi-
viduating worlds—are not, strictly speaking, necessary components of possi-
bilism. They are arguably the best way to fill possibilism out, but they are not in
the first instance what makes Lewis count as a possibilist.
2 Ideas from two-dimensional...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 256–258.
Published: 01 April 2009
...) is discussed and accepted in chapter 4.
With this, Mackie rules out option (iv). She considers Counterpart Theory
in chapter 5 and argues that, on examination, Counterpart Theory is no real
alternative to (iii): “[Lewis] does, in effect, allow that there can be haecceitistic
or ‘bare’ differences between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 241–244.
Published: 01 April 2009
...) is discussed and accepted in chapter 4.
With this, Mackie rules out option (iv). She considers Counterpart Theory
in chapter 5 and argues that, on examination, Counterpart Theory is no real
alternative to (iii): “[Lewis] does, in effect, allow that there can be haecceitistic
or ‘bare’ differences between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 244–247.
Published: 01 April 2009
...) is discussed and accepted in chapter 4.
With this, Mackie rules out option (iv). She considers Counterpart Theory
in chapter 5 and argues that, on examination, Counterpart Theory is no real
alternative to (iii): “[Lewis] does, in effect, allow that there can be haecceitistic
or ‘bare’ differences between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 247–250.
Published: 01 April 2009
... premise (the thesis that iden-
tity cannot be extrinsically grounded) is discussed and accepted in chapter 4.
With this, Mackie rules out option (iv). She considers Counterpart Theory
in chapter 5 and argues that, on examination, Counterpart Theory is no real
alternative to (iii): “[Lewis] does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 250–253.
Published: 01 April 2009
...) is discussed and accepted in chapter 4.
With this, Mackie rules out option (iv). She considers Counterpart Theory
in chapter 5 and argues that, on examination, Counterpart Theory is no real
alternative to (iii): “[Lewis] does, in effect, allow that there can be haecceitistic
or ‘bare’ differences between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 253–255.
Published: 01 April 2009
...) is discussed and accepted in chapter 4.
With this, Mackie rules out option (iv). She considers Counterpart Theory
in chapter 5 and argues that, on examination, Counterpart Theory is no real
alternative to (iii): “[Lewis] does, in effect, allow that there can be haecceitistic
or ‘bare’ differences between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 259–261.
Published: 01 April 2009
...) is discussed and accepted in chapter 4.
With this, Mackie rules out option (iv). She considers Counterpart Theory
in chapter 5 and argues that, on examination, Counterpart Theory is no real
alternative to (iii): “[Lewis] does, in effect, allow that there can be haecceitistic
or ‘bare’ differences between...
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