Search Results for conversational norms

...Sam Berstler Goldberg Sanford C. , Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2020 . ix + 255 pp. © 2022 by Cornell University 2022 Given our current communicative ecosystem—which is, thanks to the internet, both...

...Sam Berstler In conversation, we often do not acknowledge what we jointly know to be true. This article identifies a distinctive kind of non-acknowledgment norm, open secrecy norms, and analyzes how such norms constrain our speech. First, the author argues that open secrecy norms are structurally...

... possess some special institutionalized authority. The most controversial aspect of McGowan’s analysis is probably her central idea of harmful norm-enactment that requires no special speaker-authority (developed in chapters 1–4). In chapter 2, McGowan spells out the idea of conversational exercitives...

... “merely side-by-side” (20). Laden investigates the norms of three activities: casual conversation (chaps. 3–4), reasoning together (chap. 5), and particularly end-directed bouts of reasoning he calls “engagements” (chap. 6). The commonalities among the norms of these activities are more important than...

... in the literature on criticism and blame: norms about how morally fraught conversations among equals should be conducted. These facts are elephants in the room where the ‘standing to blame’ debate takes place. I suspect that this focus on peremptory, one-off volleys of criticism—‘drive-by criticism’, we might...

... anticipate these papers will inspire much fruitful discussion as they increasingly come into conversation with each other. Almost mirroring the debates about whether the normative force of certain speech acts is semantically or pragmatically encoded are the questions raised and answered in this volume...

... of this journal, I will focus on it. The central concept in Walton s framework-his new dialectic-is that of a dialogue. A dialogue type is an abstract, idealized normative model of a goal- directed conversation between two (or more) agents. Although dialogues are normative models, they can be hooked...

... attractively humane. The normative implications of the conversational theory are as moderate as the metaphysical demands it rests on are “modest.” The overall outlook articulated is one that has the reassuring feel of a sensible, reflective, empirically well-grounded common sense on the subject of moral...

... be derived from the truth norm and other norms of conversation. It would be hasty to declare the knowledge account simply false. It may be salvaged by relying on accounts of knowledge or assertion other than the most obvious ones. However, the salvaged knowledge account would no longer connect...

... the knowledge norm with something else. He follows Robert Stalnaker (1974) in modeling contexts as sets of possibilities compatible with the presuppositions of the conversation's participants. Assertions aim to add their contents to the conversation's presuppositions. Ichikawa introduces what he calls...

... question about the norms governing conversation: What counts as giving an explanation and being able to reply to a question satisfactorily? Again, Platonic Conversations gives an ambitious and striking answer. Knowledge cannot consist of independent and unconnected insights, wholly different in kind from...

... Louis kaplow tiple dimensions.2 These concepts will be considered here only as aspects of first-level or ideal normative theories, thus setting aside uses as prox- ies and others such as that emphasized by Rawls, especially in writing subsequent to the first edition ofA Theory of Justice.3...

... in favor of KRA in terms of how it predicts relevant conversational patterns. Third, Kelp and Simion think that the normativity of assertion is multidimensional in the following way: there is a distinction between an assertion’s being good (or valuable) and its being permissible...

... has it, does not imply that that practice is not also subject to other rules or norms (such as social norms or Gricean maxims of conversation) that can sometimes override the knowledge rule. Thus defenders of the knowledge account-cum-the “knowledge requires probability 1” thesis may be able...

... presuppose conventions. Marmor is mainly in discussion with Grice (1989) and Searle (1979) . Against the former, he argues that there is no such thing as conventional implicature (implicature determined by conventions) in addition to literal meaning and conversational implicature (108). Against the latter...

... appeared since Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature,” Michael Slote’s Moral Senti- mentalism seeks to show how to use empathy as a common thread to tie answers to metaethical and normative questions into a single, broadly “sentimentalist” picture. We are never told precisely what it means for a view to count...

... appeared since Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature,” Michael Slote’s Moral Senti- mentalism seeks to show how to use empathy as a common thread to tie answers to metaethical and normative questions into a single, broadly “sentimentalist” picture. We are never told precisely what it means for a view to count...

... appeared since Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature,” Michael Slote’s Moral Senti- mentalism seeks to show how to use empathy as a common thread to tie answers to metaethical and normative questions into a single, broadly “sentimentalist” picture. We are never told precisely what it means for a view to count...

... appeared since Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature,” Michael Slote’s Moral Senti- mentalism seeks to show how to use empathy as a common thread to tie answers to metaethical and normative questions into a single, broadly “sentimentalist” picture. We are never told precisely what it means for a view to count...

... of their justified beliefs that p yields a belief set that is coherent. (2) Full disclosure of the evidence relevant to the proposition that p , accompanied by rational deliberation about that evidence among the members of G in accordance with their individual and group epistemic normative requirements, would...