...Alison McIntyre RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY. By John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S. J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. viii, 277. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REKEWS The Philosophical Review...

...Douglas Anderson Christopher Hookway, Truth, Rationality, and Self-Control: Themes from Peirce. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. viii, 313. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2...

...Michael McKenna Alfred R. Mele, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. viii, 271. Cornell University 2002 Fischer, John Martin. The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994 . Fischer, John...

... conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I shall call the Assumption...

... of urges, and exercises of capacities that agents have to control their urges. The article elaborates the elements of the tripartite framework, in particular, the phenomenological contribution of motor imagery. It argues that experiences of urges and exercises of control over urges play coordinate roles...

... individuals) can develop into. This is because the early education ensures that the auxiliary and the philosopher share the same basic structure of soul, with reason being in control of each, though the auxiliary's natural deficiencies create some limitations in terms of his or her moral self-sufficiency...

... believed that the teen’s ADHD compromised his ability to control his actions. The example may be a bit triggering for people who have a personal relationship with this diagnosis, but, putting that aside, Jennings uses it to introduce the important concept of attention-based control. With reduced control...

... democratic procedures in such a way that we can reasonably speak of the state's actions being under the control of each citizen. So, the decisive difference between this group of authors and Pettit seems to be more on the level of reconstructing the relation between individual freedom and democracy...

... of a component effect. His 363 CHRISTOPHER HITCHCOCK 2. Illustrations 2.1 The Birth Control Pills My first illustration will be a familiar one from the probabilistic causation literature, due to Germund Hesslow (1976). One of the most dangerous...

... and republican political philosophy. Second, to show that this marriage bears important progeny, in the form of a theory of property-owning democracy (POD). Third, to show that POD is the marriage's only legitimate child. Welfare-state capitalism and worker control, in other words, are not legitimate heirs...

...: THE MOLNIST ACCOUNT By Tnoms P. FLINT. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Pp. xi, 258. Christian theists have always been concerned with the relationship between God’s providential control and human freedom. Flint’s book is an expli- cation and defense of what he sees as the best way...

... plant reports to his controller: ‘If the detector is working, either the reactor was not built to plan or the core is overheating’. Another engineer elsewhere in the plant reports: ‘If the detector is working, either the reactor was not built to plan or the core is not overheating’. Each engineer has...

... 2021 by Cornell University, 2021 He founds this advice on the “two main theses” of his book Belief: A Pragmatic Picture : first, that “belief is canonically manifested in controlled , attentive information-guidance and can be distinguished from other mental/neural phenomena on this basis...

... will in a deterministic universe pushes the burden of proof back on those who want to question our phenomenological experience that seems to clearly demonstrate that we do have control over our will. This she accomplishes brilliantly. Overall, Ismael's case for compatibilism is substantial. It may be that those...

... categories on the checklist do not apply. This is because “when we choose to act with others, or in the service of a collective goal, we consciously give up full control over what these others will do, and over the outcome of our shared endeavor. In doing this, we accept that we will be credited if our joint...

... of both substance and prom- ise. Ishtiyaque Haji’s main project is to determine sufficient conditions for moral appraisability: that is, for the propriety of holding an agent praise- worthy or blameworthy for an action. Identifymg three primary condi- tions-control, autonomy, and epistemic-he...

...) and the unexpected (in skipping, skateboarding, or jumping in unusual ways we test the limits of our balance and control) ( Spinka, Newberry, and Bekoff 2001 ). We are training, in other words, for evading predators and hunting. Lots of this training in early years involves roughhousing. But it is important...

... for advice that it is not the case that Larry ought to win the lot- tery—because it’s not under his control—it is intuitive that we are deny- ing anything like an obligation of Larry to win. More evidence is required for anything like a proof, but the case of Larry illustrates the naive view very...

... opposed to the causal (for example, 28, 84, 193), and ends up speaking as if “the causal dimension of agency … simply drops out—except insofar as it bears on the normative issue of whether the right sort of accord between the events within one’s domain of intentional control and the dictates of one’s...

..., and personal identity. In brief, ex post comparability between the utilities of treatment and control groups can fail, and for precisely the same reason as comparability between the utilities of one’s current and counterfactual selves can fail . You might hope that the problem can surmounted...