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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 609–614.
Published: 01 October 2021
..., John. 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Siegel, Susanna. 2016. The Rationality of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press. sethi@brandeis.edu Gupta Anil , Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Mark Balaguer Mele Alfred R. , Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will . New York : Oxford University Press , 2009 . ix + 178 pp. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 BOOK REVIEWS Alfred R. Mele, Effective Intentions: The Power...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
... that, in fact , all conscious representations are intermediate level, he doesn't explain why consciousness is constrained in this way. One thing that makes this especially puzzling is that he rejects representationalism, holding that qualitative character is determined by intrinsic features...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 300–303.
Published: 01 April 2001
...: CONSCIOUS MINDS DV A MATERIAL WORLD. By Corn McGm. New York Basic Books, 1999. Pp. xiii, 242. As the subtitle indicates, this book is concerned with the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. It recommends a novel and disturbingly pessimistic view about this topic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Michael LeBuffe Spinoza's remarks about consciousness in the Ethics constitute two theories about conscious experience and knowledge. Several remarks, including 3p9 and 4p8, make the point that self knowledge—an especially valuable good for Spinoza—is not available to introspection. We...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Andy Clark How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
... of the Aristotelian Society 96 : 91 -116. Chalmers, David J. 1996 . The Conscious Mind . New York: Oxford University Press. ____. 2003 . “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.” In Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays , ed. Q. Smith and A. Jokic, 220 -72. Oxford: Clarendon. Chisholm...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
..., and deploy a new theoretical tool in the empirical investigation of consciousness. A noteworthy consequence of this new framework is that the structure of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamentally different from the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects. It may...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
.... 1988 . “ Quining Qualia .” In Consciousness in Contemporary Science , ed. Marcel A. Bisiach E. , 42 – 77 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . ———. 1991 . Consciousness Explained . London : Penguin . Dretske F. 1993 . “ Conscious Experience .” Mind 102 : 263 – 83...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 277–284.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Robert Van Gulick In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 523–528.
Published: 01 October 2022
.... (17) Papineau seems to be arguing that the naive realist commits to a radical disconnect between consciousness and introspection—pushing our very concept of consciousness to breaking point. This, he suggests, is a consequence of their commitment to conscious differences between veridical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 586–588.
Published: 01 October 2002
... now sitting in my chair” (95). Then might it be that consciousness is “maximal,” and thus not intrinsic, and that the atoms-minus fail to compose a conscious being simply because they are part of a larger group that composes a conscious being? No, says Mer- ricks, because it is incredible...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 427–431.
Published: 01 July 2004
... and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. vii, 267. What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Camp- bell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 338–343.
Published: 01 April 2023
... is conscious. In brief, assuming consciousness exists, it seems we are forced to reject one of these two claims, both of which are highly plausible according to Tye: (1) Materialism is true of consciousness. (2) Consciousness is sharp (i.e., not vague). Chapter 2 considers a possible resolution...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 619–623.
Published: 01 October 2021
... Carruthers’s version of global workspace theory works (I focus only on visual consciousness). You become phenomenally conscious of a visual feature when a nonconceptual representation of that feature is encoded into a “global workspace” which globally broadcasts this representation to a broad set...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 31–75.
Published: 01 January 2001
... perceptions to volition to the purely intellectual understanding of mathematical truths.9 What ties all of these phe- nomena together under the category of thought? Consciousness. Cartesian thoughts are conscious in the sense that in having them we are inevitably conscious of them. Descartes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 310–313.
Published: 01 April 2008
... are truth-evaluable assertions, they are not made on the basis of (and do not need to be backed up by) grounds or evidence of their truth. (c) A thought or feeling of mine is conscious just in case I am able to express that thought or feeling by self-ascribing it: thus, given (a), I have first...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 594–597.
Published: 01 October 2002
... that “zombies” (crea- tures physically identical to conscious creatures but who lack consciousness) are conceivable, hence possible. The objection is not to the premise that zom- bies are conceivable, but rather to the inference to the conclusion that they are possible. Chapter 3 is the core of the book...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 141–144.
Published: 01 January 2000
...), fundamental (to any further musical understanding), and central (to worthwhile musical experience of any kind) ” (33). The “intellectual grasp of large-scale connections between parts” that concatenationism claims is not necessary for basic musical understanding is identified as “conscious...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 473–480.
Published: 01 July 2020
... of the mental, that the heart of his claim is that intentionality is the mark of consciousness . Noting that intentionality is supposed to be something accessible from the first-person point of view, Kriegel interprets Brentano’s “mark of the mental” as the claim that “all and only conscious states exhibit...