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conflict

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2004) 113 (4): 557–560.
Published: 01 October 2004
...Christopher Bobonich Nicholas White, Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xv, 369. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 113, No. 4 (October 2004) Nicholas...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2004) 113 (4): 582–584.
Published: 01 October 2004
...David Boonin Rosamund Scott, Rights, Duties and the Body: Law and Ethics of the Maternal-Fetal Conflict. Oxford and Portland, Ore.: Hart Publishing, 2002. Pp. xxxv, 437. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS of further elaboration if it is to satisfy his...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 654–656.
Published: 01 October 2007
...Allen Coates Peter Baumann and Monika Betzler, eds., Practical Conflicts . Cambridge University Press, 2004. vii + 344 pp. Cornell University 2007 book reviews Joseph L. Camp Jr., Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2003) 112 (2): 215–245.
Published: 01 April 2003
...David O. Brink Cornell University 2003 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 2 (April 2003) Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value David O. Brink Prudence and authenticity are sometimes seen as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Jacob Ross This essay argues that there is a conflict between the principle of Countable Additivity and standard views of how we should update centered or de se beliefs. The latter views, this essay argues, entail a general principle, which the essay calls the Generalized Thirder Principle, that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometimes conflict. In certain famous cases of conflict—medical Newcomb problems—CDT and BT seem to get things right, while EDT seems to get things...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 159–191.
Published: 01 April 2008
... between the agent and others, which conflicts intractably with a presupposition of consequentialism. This allows him to differentiate three potentially conflicting evaluative spheres: morality, prudence, and aesthetics. This essay's account of Mill's utilitarianism coheres with his defense of individual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 425–464.
Published: 01 October 2009
... objectionable on independent theoretical grounds: it conflicts with physicalism and requires us to posit hidden facts about our persistence. This essay shows how to resolve this conflict using the idea that imagining from the first-person point of view is a guide to centered possibility , a type of possibility...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict: the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. This essay argues that this conflict does arise and that it creates problems...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
... under entailment, or does the preface paradox show that rational agents can believe inconsistent propositions? Does whether you believe a proposition depend partly on your practical interests? My account of belief resolves the tension between conflicting answers to these questions that have been...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 337–364.
Published: 01 July 2010
... filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. No matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are created, the proposal conflicts with other strong intuitions we have about fictional characters. © 2010 by Cornell...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided by...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 1–40.
Published: 01 January 2018
... incorruptible material substance. However, I also consider some surprising features of the argument in the Synopsis. One is that this argument conflicts with the implication in Descartes that any two “really distinct” substances can each exist without the other existing. Another is that the argument tends to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... and discharges some remaining grounds for resistance to these skeptical conclusions, as well as the possibility of defending a weaker version of a normative lottery principle. The conclusion is that we have no reason to believe that where equal claims conflict, we are morally required to hold a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
... probabilism isn't to blame for the failure of rational introspection and that Caie's modified accuracy criterion conflicts with Dutch book considerations, is scoring rule dependent, and leads to the failure of rational introspection. Theorem 3. According to Caie's Accuracy Criterion, Roy is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 286–289.
Published: 01 April 2015
...” the default. For example, a default rule tells us to conclude that Tweety flies (F ) if we accept the premise that Tweety is a bird (B). Horty proposes that the premise P of a triggered default is what we mean by a reason for C. These rules can issue conflicting instructions. A different default...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2003) 112 (4): 586–589.
Published: 01 October 2003
... assumption. Given that, consistency should push me to trust others. 587 BOOK REVIEWS Difficulties in the account emerge in considering the situations in which the opinion of others conflicts with my own. The credibility of others is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 647–650.
Published: 01 October 2007
... one might not adopt a semantics for the confused person’s language that deploys Truth and Falsehood, the properties, as semantic values. Unwittingly, a confused person combines potentially conflicting perspectives. But how are we to make semantic sense of this (without the world...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 650–653.
Published: 01 October 2007
... person’s language that deploys Truth and Falsehood, the properties, as semantic values. Unwittingly, a confused person combines potentially conflicting perspectives. But how are we to make semantic sense of this (without the world as such being revealed)? Camp’s idea seems to be that we...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 657–663.
Published: 01 October 2007
... person combines potentially conflicting perspectives. But how are we to make semantic sense of this (without the world as such being revealed)? Camp’s idea seems to be that we should consider those possible con- flicting perspectives on their own, when being used wittingly by other people. Which...