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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
... Peter . 2010 . “ On Having No Reason: Dogmatism and Bayesian Confirmation .” Synthese 117 : 1 - 17 . McKinsey Michael . 2003 . “ Transmission of Warrant and Closure of Apriority .” In New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge , ed. Nuccetelli Susan , 97 - 116...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 241–294.
Published: 01 July 2022
.... As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idealized setting). This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems showing that, in this setting, any...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2025) 134 (1): 1–33.
Published: 01 January 2025
...Sinan Dogramaci; Miriam Schoenfield This article gives a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. The article also attempts to explain what goes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 149–177.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Darren Bradley This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
... of the dialectical context with the compatibilist . Hence, it is not the compatibilists' burden to produce counterexamples to it. Rather, it is van Inwagen's burden to produce relevant confirming instances of it. Cornell University 2008 Ayer, A. J. 1954 . “Freedom and Necessity.” In Philosophical Essays...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (3): 265–308.
Published: 01 July 2024
...Brian Hedden; Jacob M. Nebel Multidimensional concepts are everywhere, and they are important. Examples include moral value, welfare, scientific confirmation, democracy, and biodiversity. How, if at all, can we aggregate the underlying dimensions of a multidimensional concept F to yield verdicts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 355–458.
Published: 01 July 2023
... explain two of the core causes of polarization: confirmation bias and the group polarization effect. [email protected] © 2023 by Cornell University 2023 Polarization Ambiguous evidence Confirmation bias Value of evidence Reflection (martingale) principles Bayesian persuasion I...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 229–232.
Published: 01 April 2018
... to appearances, disparage this method as a mere second best. Chapter 5 draws on the three descriptions of the method, at Meno 86e6–87b2 and Phaedo 100a3–8 and 101d1–e3, to characterize this method as consisting of a two-part “proof stage” and a two-part “confirmation stage” (115). The next three chapters use...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 325–329.
Published: 01 April 2023
... and justification, there is ampliative consequence. When we axiomatise, the only relation that we employ is logical consequence. Kvanvig notes a ‘holistic/atomistic’ distinction between ‘the conditions under which a [theory] is supported, confirmed or implicated by a given total system of information...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2025) 134 (2): 227–231.
Published: 01 April 2025
.... It is astonishing how much ground he covers and how consistently he keeps things accessible and exciting. This is a highly welcome addition to the metaethics shelf. At least part of the answer is that Kagan doubts that moral principles can be confirmed/disconfirmed by empirical observation. This brings us...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
... are brighter than in other debates, such as measuring coherence, confirmation, and explanatory power. Ordinally equivalent measures—that is, measures that impose the same causal strength rankings on any set of cause-effect pairs—will be identified with each other. Formally, two measures η and η...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 135–138.
Published: 01 January 2000
... not as underivative judgments, but rather as conclusions based on moral theory plus tacit knowledge of the facts (36-37), he thinks that many ordinary intuitions can be construed as confirming utilitarianism. He aims at a “reconstruction of our intuitions as utilitarian under prevail- ing factual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 476–479.
Published: 01 July 2001
...” (208). Unless those who are offended remain silent, they can only confirm the book’s success in achieving these aims! Though I admire the way in which Adams carries out her self-imposed task, despite my numerous disagreements with her on points of detail, I think there is one major...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 385–449.
Published: 01 July 2021
... to a promising explanation of Prolegomena §13’s apparent failure to furnish its promised support for the “demotion” of time. It will also explain a puzzling feature of his exposition flagged at the outset—his framing of incongruence as a second-string or merely “confirming” justification of idealism. Consider...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 419–423.
Published: 01 July 2005
... emphasized the deductive structure of these arguments. These reconstructions were employed as evidence that Darwin employed a hypothetico-deductive strategy to confirm his hypotheses about common origins, descent with modification, and natural selection. Kitcher argues that this sort of reconstruction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 643–644.
Published: 01 October 2012
...., Freedom and the Fixity of the Past 179 Kment, Boris, Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals 573 Kotzen, Matthew, Dragging and Confirming 55 Mahtani, Anna, Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments 443 Pettigrew, Richard, Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle 241 Price, Huw, Causation, Chance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 580–586.
Published: 01 October 2003
... that the making of aes- thetic distinctions was non-esoterically discernible in the imaginative lives of young children. He thought that even though critics, in deploying distinctively aesthetic vocabulary, did not give reasons for their statements that would pre- empt the need for the confirmation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 156–158.
Published: 01 January 2015
... be argued, since it appears confirmed by massive evidence coming out of cognitive science). The rudimentary first-person perspective is a dispositional property that does not require language, allows phenomenal consciousness, and makes it possible for an organism to interact, consciously and intentionally...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 395–404.
Published: 01 July 2003
..., Rational Acceptance, and Minimally Inconsistent Sets. In Induction, Probability, and Confirmation (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 6 ), ed. G. Maxwell and R. M. Anderson, 295 -323. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ____. 1990 . Theory of Knowledge . London: Routledge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 118–120.
Published: 01 January 2003
... are not. He points out that even with a straightforward coordination problem in which one outcome is favored by all, the costs of being among a minority choosing that outcome may be high enough that participants will require some independent confirmation of one another’s intentions. Thus, assurance...