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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... true if Adams’s Thesis is. For were it not, Adams’s Thesis would not survive belief change by Jeffrey conditionalization. This argument is not persuasive. As Richard Jeffrey himself point- ed out, rationality does not require belief revision by Jeffrey condition- alization. It is rationally...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 385–443.
Published: 01 July 2008
.... The essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in order for the truth-conditions thereby specified to be satisfied, on the other...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 325–349.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Anthony S. Gillies What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2006) 115 (3): 273–316.
Published: 01 July 2006
... examine whether the very idea of conditionality makes such analyses subject to a characteristic style of objection and hence unsuitable for use in analysis. The result of this examination will be a picture of what conditionals must be like for such an analysis to be free of fallacy. This result...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 609–611.
Published: 01 October 2002
...Brian Weatherson William G. Lycan, Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2001. Pp. ix, 223. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS References Evans, G. 1979. Reference and Contingency. Monist 62:161–89. Neale, S. Term Limits. In...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
...Joseph Y. Halpern PROBABILITY AND CONDITIONALS: BELIEF REVISION AND RATIONAL DECISION. Edited by Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. vii, 207 Cornell University 2000 Adams, E. 1966 . “Probability and the Logic of Conditionals.” In Aspects of Inductive Logic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... follows. Modal rationalists claim that for all nonphenomenal macro properties, the appropriate supervenience conditional is both necessary and a priori. Hence, type-B materialists must engage in special pleading when they claim that the relevant supervenience conditional for phenomenal properties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Matthew Mandelkern; Ginger Schultheis; David Boylan This essay proposes a new theory of agentive modals: ability modals and their duals, compulsion modals. After criticizing existing approaches—the existential quantificational analysis, the universal quantificational analysis, and the conditional...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
... actually think this is a weakness in the condition, though, as will become clear below. 66 Dragging and Confirming to conditionalize H2 (or any conjunction containing H2) on E; clearly, the condition under consideration does require us to do this...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Dale Dorsey Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued, under the proper conditions, by x. Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Tyler Burge A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine constitutive conditions under which accurate (objective) empirical representation of the macrophysical environment is possible. A view that dominated attitudes on this project maintained that an individual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... use certain facts about conditional credences and conditionalization, so it's natural to worry that we might have illicitly smuggled in some such assumptions about conjunctions or additivity, in which case the streamlined argument could be blocked by one of these maneuvers after all. Indeed, the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 1–47.
Published: 01 January 2008
... female ones and despite the number of mosquitoes that don't carry the virus being ninety-nine times the number that do. Puzzling facts such as these have made generic sentences defy adequate semantic treatment. However complex the truth conditions of generics appear to be, though, young children grasp...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 165–200.
Published: 01 April 2010
...Niko Kolodny Rousseau's thought is marked by an optimism and a pessimism that each evoke, at least in the right mood, a feeling of recognition difficult to suppress. We have an innate capacity for virtue, and with it freedom and happiness. Yet our present social conditions instill in us a restless...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
Published: 01 October 2013
...John Mackay A person of average height would assert a truth by the conditional ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be taller than I am,’ in which an indicative clause ‘I am’ is embedded in a subjunctive conditional. By contrast, no one would assert a truth by ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
... in other respects (for example, modally or causally), it satisfies this independence-by-nature condition. © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 Descartes substance independence essence causation inherence Less celebrated than Descartes's contributions to epistemology, but no less significant, are...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 251–280.
Published: 01 July 2014
...Kieran Setiya This essay is about love and its place in ethics. It argues that there is no one it is irrational to love, that it is rational to act with partiality to those we love, and that the rationality of doing so is not conditional on love. It follows that Anscombe and Taurek are right: you...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... counterfactuals can capture the notion of overdetermination and argue in section 2 for a negative answer. First, I consider David Lewis's (1986) and Jonathan Schaffer's (2003) definitions of overdetermination, and possible revisions to them, and show that the conditions they specify are neither necessary nor...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
...Alexander W. Kocurek A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem nontrivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions...
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
... several representation theorems for probabilistic measures of causal strength—that is, I demonstrate how these measures can be derived from a set of plausible adequacy conditions. Third, I use these results to argue for a specific measure of causal strength: the difference that interventions on the cause...