Search Results for condition
1-20 of 663 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2006) 115 (3): 273–316.
Published: 01 July 2006
... dis- positional properties, but rather to examine whether the very idea of conditionality makes such analyses subject to a characteristic style of objection and hence unsuitable for use in analysis. The result of this examination will be a picture of what conditionals must be like for such an...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 385–443.
Published: 01 July 2008
... essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in order for the truth-conditions thereby specified to be satisfied, on the other. This...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 325–349.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Anthony S. Gillies What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... true if Adams’s Thesis is. For were it not, Adams’s Thesis would not survive belief change by Jeffrey conditionalization. This argument is not persuasive. As Richard Jeffrey himself point- ed out, rationality does not require belief revision by Jeffrey condition- alization. It is rationally...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
...Joseph Y. Halpern PROBABILITY AND CONDITIONALS: BELIEF REVISION AND RATIONAL DECISION. Edited by Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. vii, 207 Cornell University 2000 Adams, E. 1966 . “Probability and the Logic of Conditionals.” In Aspects of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 609–611.
Published: 01 October 2002
...Brian Weatherson William G. Lycan, Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2001. Pp. ix, 223. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS References Evans, G. 1979. Reference and Contingency. Monist 62...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... follows. Modal rationalists claim that for all nonphenomenal macro properties, the appropriate supervenience conditional is both necessary and a priori. Hence, type-B materialists must engage in special pleading when they claim that the relevant supervenience conditional for phenomenal properties...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
... actually think this is a weakness in the condition, though, as will become clear below. 66 Dragging and Conﬁrming to conditionalize H2 (or any conjunction containing H2) on E; clearly, the condition under consideration does require us to do this...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Matthew Mandelkern; Ginger Schultheis; David Boylan This essay proposes a new theory of agentive modals : ability modals and their duals, compulsion modals. After criticizing existing approaches—the existential quantificational analysis, the universal quantificational analysis, and the conditional...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Tyler Burge A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine constitutive conditions under which accurate (objective) empirical representation of the macrophysical environment is possible. A view that dominated attitudes on this project maintained that an individual...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Dale Dorsey Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued , under the proper conditions, by x . Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 165–200.
Published: 01 April 2010
...Niko Kolodny Rousseau's thought is marked by an optimism and a pessimism that each evoke, at least in the right mood, a feeling of recognition difficult to suppress. We have an innate capacity for virtue, and with it freedom and happiness. Yet our present social conditions instill in us a restless...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 1–47.
Published: 01 January 2008
... female ones and despite the number of mosquitoes that don't carry the virus being ninety-nine times the number that do. Puzzling facts such as these have made generic sentences defy adequate semantic treatment. However complex the truth conditions of generics appear to be, though, young children grasp...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
Published: 01 October 2013
...John Mackay A person of average height would assert a truth by the conditional ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be taller than I am,’ in which an indicative clause ‘I am’ is embedded in a subjunctive conditional. By contrast, no one would assert a truth by ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... never appealed to the law of additivity. 12 Of course, we did use certain facts about conditional credences and conditionalization, so it's natural to worry that we might have illicitly smuggled in some such assumptions about conjunctions or additivity, in which case the streamlined argument...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 481–524.
Published: 01 October 2008
...Seana Valentine Shiffrin The power to promise is morally fundamental and does not, at its foundation, derive from moral principles that govern our use of conventions. Of course, many features of promising have conventional components—including which words, gestures, or conditions of silence create...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
... object is doing and activities like looking or visually scrutinizing which have as their aims knowledge of the states or conditions of the objects of perceptual awareness. Cornell University 2009 Alexander, H. G. 1953 . “Paying Heed.” Mind 62 : 518 -20. Baldwin, Tom. 2003 . “Perception...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
... conditions of their possessors, in principle there can be a “package deal” definition that simultaneously defines both. Cornell University 2009 Burge, T. 2003 . “Memory and Persons.” Philosophical Review 112 : 289 -337. Lewis, D. 1972 . “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 201–242.
Published: 01 April 2010
... conditionally so. Her motivation could quite easily have been undermined had her circumstances been different. Arpaly takes her example to show that a thesis like the Coincident Reasons Thesis can provide only a necessary condition for the moral worth of actions. She argues that another factor, which...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
...? Because if determinism is true—if the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the Big Bang determined a unique future for our universe—then doing anything other than what you are determined to do would require one of two things: either a miracle , a violation of the actual laws of nature, or a...