Search Results for conceive

... the rational psychologist might arrive at such a view. It is further argued that the source of the fallacy in the first paralogism is a confusion about the very nature of conceivability and that, in identifying this confusion, Kant makes a philosophical contribution of lasting value. © 2010 by Cornell...

...Joseph Levine Type-B materialists (to use David Chalmers's jargon) claim that though zombies are conceivable, they are not metaphysically possible. This article calls this position regarding the relation between metaphysical and epistemic modality “modal autonomism,” as opposed to the “modal...

...Jonathan Cottrell This essay gives a new interpretation of Hume's second thoughts about minds in the Appendix, based on a new interpretation of his view of composition. In Book 1 of the Treatise , Hume argued that, as far as we can conceive it, a mind is a whole composed by all its perceptions...

... (1623–73) disagrees. In cases of veridical perception, she holds that grass is green in precisely the way it visually appears to be. In defense of her realist approach to sensuous colors, Cavendish argues that (i) it is impossible to conceive of colorless bodies, (ii) the very possibility of color...

... that there is an “explanatory gap” between the mental (spe- cifically, consciousness) and the physical. Chapter 1 argues for materialism on the ground that it “is required if we are to make sense of the causal efficacy of the mental” (26). Chapter 2 replies to the conceivability argument against materialism, namely...

...Graham Oppy Speaks Jeff The Greatest Possible Being Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018 viii +175 pp. © 2020 by Cornell University 2020 Perfect being theology recommends a modal conception of God: God is the greatest conceivable being; or God is the greatest possible...

... attribute. For example, an extended substance cannot be explained by or conceived through a thinking substance. The Identity of Indis- cernibles says that if x and y aren’t identical then there is some qualitative dif- ference between x and y that allows us to conceive of them as distinct. Della...

.... Instead he presents a general reductio. He argues that any attempt to conceive of an absent qualia functional dupli- cate leads to a contradiction and that such cases are thus inconceivable.1 As in most reductio arguments, Tye relies on supplemental assumptions to derive his contradiction, and two...

...- independent existence], it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects [i.e., collections of ideas] from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing...

...- nism (F)—and argues against the three types of materialist view. The core argument here is the conceivability argument. This argument has been the subject of a great deal of discussion; in a nutshell, and ignoring a raft of impor- tant distinctions, it goes like this: (i) it is conceivable...

... is the conceivability argument. This argument has been the subject of a great deal of discussion; in a nutshell, and ignoring a raft of impor- tant distinctions, it goes like this: (i) it is conceivable that a world be a physical duplicate of our world but differ phenomenally from it; (ii) if this is conceivable...

... views: interactionist dualism (type D), epiphenomenalism (E), and mo- nism (F)—and argues against the three types of materialist view. The core argument here is the conceivability argument. This argument has been the subject of a great deal of discussion; in a nutshell, and ignoring a raft of impor...

... and develops what currently Hill takes to be a better theory of the nature of the mind and its place in the world, namely, representationalism. The first two essays of part II (“In Defense of Type-Materialism” and “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem”) are classic works...

... that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regard- ing p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails...

... or psychological functions. This conceptual isolation explains why you can think “I could have globally broadcast nonconceptual content without This-R ,” even if ‘ This-R ’ in fact refers to globally broadcast nonconceptual content. It also explains why you believe in the explanatory gap, why you can conceive...

... realism/antirealism disputes, to discussion of further questions about the nature and appropriate- ness of the marks of realism outlined by Wright and about how Wright’s plu- ralism about truth is best conceived and how it relates to other issues about truth. Although many of the essays in the present...

..., or official, position (79). Melamed devotes chapter 3 to an articulation of the connections and differences among three central notions in Spinoza: inherence, conception, and causation. Melamed recognizes that, for Spinoza, if x inheres in y , then x is caused by y and x is conceived through...

.... It forces us to reengage with questions about what we are doing when we do metaphysics, and presents a startling different picture to many that have emerged in recent times. Rather than conceiving of metaphysics as the search for the fundamental joints of reality, or for those things that give rise...

... in accord with the laws of nature, both are performing just as their intrinsic natures require. But does Descartes even have the resources to conceive of an animal body as a distinctive object that retains its identity through changes in its material composition? Brown and Normore claim that he does...

... there are such principled reasons: the conceiv- ability of zombies, say, suggests that what it’s like to be conscious isn’t a func- tional property at all, since it suggests that functional duplicates needn’t be duplicates with respect to consciousness. Melnyk will argue, no doubt, that this is precisely the sort...