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conceivable

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 533–569.
Published: 01 October 2015
...Jonathan Cottrell This essay gives a new interpretation of Hume's second thoughts about minds in the Appendix, based on a new interpretation of his view of composition. In Book 1 of the Treatise , Hume argued that, as far as we can conceive it, a mind is a whole composed by all its perceptions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
... (1623–73) disagrees. In cases of veridical perception, she holds that grass is green in precisely the way it visually appears to be. In defense of her realist approach to sensuous colors, Cavendish argues that (i) it is impossible to conceive of colorless bodies, (ii) the very possibility of color...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 449–495.
Published: 01 October 2010
... the rational psychologist might arrive at such a view. It is further argued that the source of the fallacy in the first paralogism is a confusion about the very nature of conceivability and that, in identifying this confusion, Kant makes a philosophical contribution of lasting value. © 2010 by Cornell...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
...Joseph Levine Type-B materialists (to use David Chalmers's jargon) claim that though zombies are conceivable, they are not metaphysically possible. This article calls this position regarding the relation between metaphysical and epistemic modality “modal autonomism,” as opposed to the “modal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 594–597.
Published: 01 October 2002
... that there is an “explanatory gap” between the mental (spe- cifically, consciousness) and the physical. Chapter 1 argues for materialism on the ground that it “is required if we are to make sense of the causal efficacy of the mental” (26). Chapter 2 replies to the conceivability argument against materialism, namely...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 664–669.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Graham Oppy Speaks Jeff The Greatest Possible Being Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018 viii +175 pp. © 2020 by Cornell University 2020 Perfect being theology recommends a modal conception of God: God is the greatest conceivable being; or God is the greatest possible...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 139–143.
Published: 01 January 2004
... attribute. For example, an extended substance cannot be explained by or conceived through a thinking substance. The Identity of Indis- cernibles says that if x and y aren’t identical then there is some qualitative dif- ference between x and y that allows us to conceive of them as distinct. Della...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 277–284.
Published: 01 April 2012
.... Instead he presents a general reductio. He argues that any attempt to conceive of an absent qualia functional dupli- cate leads to a contradiction and that such cases are thus inconceivable.1 As in most reductio arguments, Tye relies on supplemental assumptions to derive his contradiction, and two...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 314–318.
Published: 01 April 2002
...- independent existence], it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects [i.e., collections of ideas] from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 125–131.
Published: 01 January 2012
...- nism (F)—and argues against the three types of materialist view. The core argument here is the conceivability argument. This argument has been the subject of a great deal of discussion; in a nutshell, and ignoring a raft of impor- tant distinctions, it goes like this: (i) it is conceivable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 131–137.
Published: 01 January 2012
... is the conceivability argument. This argument has been the subject of a great deal of discussion; in a nutshell, and ignoring a raft of impor- tant distinctions, it goes like this: (i) it is conceivable that a world be a physical duplicate of our world but differ phenomenally from it; (ii) if this is conceivable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 137–139.
Published: 01 January 2012
... views: interactionist dualism (type D), epiphenomenalism (E), and mo- nism (F)—and argues against the three types of materialist view. The core argument here is the conceivability argument. This argument has been the subject of a great deal of discussion; in a nutshell, and ignoring a raft of impor...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 264–268.
Published: 01 April 2018
.... 2009 . Consciousness . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Chapter 15 (“Conceivability and Possibility”) is one of the highlights of part IV. Its topic is the epistemology of modal knowledge. In it, Hill argues, inter alia, for the following conclusions. First, conceivability can yield...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 497–534.
Published: 01 October 2005
... that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regard- ing p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 619–623.
Published: 01 October 2021
... think “I could have globally broadcast nonconceptual content without This-R ,” even if ‘ This-R ’ in fact refers to globally broadcast nonconceptual content. It also explains why you believe in the explanatory gap, why you can conceive of zombies, and why Mary can’t deduce what it’s like to see red...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 292–297.
Published: 01 April 2016
..., or official, position (79). Melamed devotes chapter 3 to an articulation of the connections and differences among three central notions in Spinoza: inherence, conception, and causation. Melamed recognizes that, for Spinoza, if x inheres in y , then x is caused by y and x is conceived through...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 288–292.
Published: 01 April 2004
... realism/antirealism disputes, to discussion of further questions about the nature and appropriate- ness of the marks of realism outlined by Wright and about how Wright’s plu- ralism about truth is best conceived and how it relates to other issues about truth. Although many of the essays in the present...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 386–390.
Published: 01 July 2022
... of these necessitarian positions is very compelling, so goes the thought, because it seems clear that we are able to conceive of worlds in which the objects exist, and also to conceive of worlds in which they don’t, and we don’t have any good story about why some of these worlds really are possible, and others...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 587–591.
Published: 01 October 2021
... in accord with the laws of nature, both are performing just as their intrinsic natures require. But does Descartes even have the resources to conceive of an animal body as a distinctive object that retains its identity through changes in its material composition? Brown and Normore claim that he does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 125–128.
Published: 01 January 2005
... there are such principled reasons: the conceiv- ability of zombies, say, suggests that what it’s like to be conscious isn’t a func- tional property at all, since it suggests that functional duplicates needn’t be duplicates with respect to consciousness. Melnyk will argue, no doubt, that this is precisely the sort...