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cognitive processes

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 621–623.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Alan Millar THE BODY IN MIND: UNDERSTANDING COGNITIVE PROCESSES. By Mark Rowlands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Pp. x, 270. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 4 (October 2001) THE BODY...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
...). According to DRH, perceptual processes are constrained to compute over a bounded range of dimensions, while cognitive processes are not. This view allows that perception is cognitively penetrable, but places strict limits on the varieties of penetration that can occur. The article argues that DRH enjoys...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
...Jack C. Lyons The paper offers a solution to the generality problem for a reliabilist epistemology, by developing an “algorithm and parameters” scheme for type-individuating cognitive processes. Algorithms are detailed procedures for mapping inputs to outputs. Parameters are psychological variables...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 462–465.
Published: 01 July 2000
... of producing a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification that makes a belief‘s epistemic status a function of the reli- ability of the cognitive processes that produced it. Beyond that, it must be transformed into cognitive science, for it is only the latter that can tell us which cognitive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 413–418.
Published: 01 July 2018
... likely the judgment is to be accepted by others ( Koriat 2008 ). In the absence of specific topic knowledge, this subjective confidence does not depend on the content of the judgment, but on properties of the cognitive process generating it, in particular on the “fluency” or subjective ease with which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2019
... constraints)” (174). These notions are then deployed in an empirically supported analysis and speculation about how the human hands and other bodily features modulate sophisticated cognitive processes, like reasoning and imagination. To summarize, Enactivist Interventions is an interdisciplinary work...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 341–348.
Published: 01 July 2019
... as an Active Cognitive Process .” Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 8, art. 35. doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2014.00035 . Remez Robert E. , Rubin Philip E. , Pisoni David B. , and Carell Tom D. 1981 . “ Speech Perception without Traditional Speech Cues .” Science 212 : 947 – 50 . ...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 126–130.
Published: 01 January 2019
... processing, Siegel suggests, does not touch the fact that thinking affects experience, which any introspective perceiver can appreciate. Some will object that it is not evident that extra-perceptual cognition or emotion affects experience itself, understood as perceptual phenomenology, rather than how...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 243–246.
Published: 01 April 2006
... and to check whether there is any. Although they dispute its source, apriorists and empiricists have substantial common ground on the scope of what is known. Agreeing that we have justifi ed beliefs in logic, mathematics, and the sciences, both sides can investigate the cognitive processes that actually...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 246–251.
Published: 01 April 2006
... have justifi ed beliefs in logic, mathematics, and the sciences, both sides can investigate the cognitive processes that actually produce and sustain these beliefs (160–61). Casullo (148) proposes “viewing ‘experience’ as a putative natural kind term whose extension is fi xed by reference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 251–255.
Published: 01 April 2006
... and to check whether there is any. Although they dispute its source, apriorists and empiricists have substantial common ground on the scope of what is known. Agreeing that we have justifi ed beliefs in logic, mathematics, and the sciences, both sides can investigate the cognitive processes that actually...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2006
... have justifi ed beliefs in logic, mathematics, and the sciences, both sides can investigate the cognitive processes that actually produce and sustain these beliefs (160–61). Casullo (148) proposes “viewing ‘experience’ as a putative natural kind term whose extension is fi xed by reference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 259–262.
Published: 01 April 2006
... have justifi ed beliefs in logic, mathematics, and the sciences, both sides can investigate the cognitive processes that actually produce and sustain these beliefs (160–61). Casullo (148) proposes “viewing ‘experience’ as a putative natural kind term whose extension is fi xed by reference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 263–267.
Published: 01 April 2006
... have justifi ed beliefs in logic, mathematics, and the sciences, both sides can investigate the cognitive processes that actually produce and sustain these beliefs (160–61). Casullo (148) proposes “viewing ‘experience’ as a putative natural kind term whose extension is fi xed by reference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 426–431.
Published: 01 July 2018
... of input-output values can, I think, be applied to cognitive processes without fear of circularity. Nevertheless, there are other questions for which the fix is not so easy. ...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 536–541.
Published: 01 October 2018
... to a strict division between types of cognitive systems. In this volume for example, Frankish and Mallon rely on looser conceptions of two-systems theory to understand implicit bias and stereotype threat. Keith Frankish (1.1) employs a nonstandard form of dual-process theory that eschews many of the hard...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 623–626.
Published: 01 October 2001
... that Rowlands is chasing after something like this. (In this connection it is significant that he expresses the environmen- talist ontological claim both as a claim about cognitive processes (31) and as a claim about mental processes (8 So far as perception is concerned, what really matters to him...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... beliefs), and integrates that information with sensory data. These systems are informationally encapsulated modules, operating largely independently from both beliefs stored in central cognition and from other perceptual subsystems. Carey hypothesizes that we have evolved these dedicated processing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 583–589.
Published: 01 October 2015
... other geometry.” The upshot is a theory comparable in interest and originality to those of Leibniz and Newton, but without the Euclidean baggage typically associated with the Kantian view. Readers may, of course, feel unease over the suggestion that our cognitive process might attach AUA directly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 473–482.
Published: 01 July 2000
.... Rosenthal. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. Pp. x, 184. The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. By Mark Rowlands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. x, 270. Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy...