... is insufficiently general to lead us to the Lottery Requirement. True, there are many cases in which we have reason to fear that our choice might be influenced by motives that are sexist, racist, or otherwise objectionably partial. But surely there may also be cases in which the parties in need share all...

... of which properties of the objects of moral choice matter in any given context, and (ii) a specification of how these properties matter. Reason-based representations provide a very general taxonomy of moral theories, as differences among theories can be attributed to differences in their two key parameters...

..., Howard. 1978 . Probability, Chance, and Choice: A Theory of Rational Agency. Unpublished paper presented at a workshop on Pragmatism and Conditionals at the University of Western Ontario, May 1978 . von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O. 1944 . Theory of Games and Economic Behavior . New York: Wiley...

...Edward Stein FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE. By Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Wikler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiv, 398 Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review...

... that one should think of attitude formation like one does (practical) choices among options. The article motivates this view linguistically, extending “relevant alternatives” theories of the attitudes to both belief and to the other, non-doxastic attitudes. Given a natural principle governing choice...

...Sara Aronowitz Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valuable outcomes, and actions which put us in a better position to learn. These choices exemplify what is called the exploration / exploitation trade-off . In computer science and psychology, this trade-off has...

..., with respect to objective causation. The essay begins with Newcomb problems, which turn on an apparent tension between two principles of choice: roughly, a principle sensitive to the causal features of the relevant situation, and a principle sensitive only to evidential factors. Two-boxers give priority...

... are. In particular, investigating prepunishment can help to bring out the inadequacy of the “Ockhamist” reply to the argument, as well as the sense in which God's past beliefs need to depend on what we do, if we are plausibly to have a choice about those beliefs. © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 Arguments...

...-free.” Russell's notion of acquaintance, since it fits this bill, is therefore motivated by his solution to the puzzle, as is his choice of sense-data to be the referents of genuine Russellian names of particulars. Finally, the article argues that since a version of the George IV puzzle arises...

...Jan Sprenger This article develops axiomatic foundations for a probabilistic theory of causal strength as difference-making. I proceed in three steps: First, I motivate the choice of causal Bayes nets as an adequate framework for defining and comparing measures of causal strength. Second, I prove...

... not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery of Ockhamism, with its distinction between hard facts and soft facts; indeed, those arguments do not require any complex machinery at all...

... of compulsion, as this definition sug- gests, then is it correct to say that a drug addict chooses to take their drug of choice? Similarly, does it make sense to say that a person in the grip of fear really chooses to flee from what frightens them? In this book, Jon Elster argues that in general...

... writes: [Kant] started from the fact that when we make a choice we must regard its object as good. . . . He asked what it is that makes these objects good, and, rejecting one form of realism, he decided that the goodness was not in the objects themselves. Were it not for our desires and inclinations...

... at the time. It follows that all of our choices and acts are unavoidable, and so is every- thing that happens in the world (see van Inwagen 1983, chap. 3; and Ginet 1990, chap. 5). In response, some philosophers have conceded that causally determined agents cannot make a difference in the world...

... to Sturgeon and Piper. Ethics 106 : 538 -54. ____. 1999 . What is the Point of Equality? Ethics 109 : 287 -337. Arrow, Kenneth. 1963 . Social Choice and Individual Values . 2d ed. New York: John Wiley. Barry, Brian. 2001 . Culture and Equality . Cambridge: Harvard University Press...

... concerns a prop- osition that will be true a thousand years in the future: (1*) Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t will be true a thousand years from now. (2*) Necessarily, if that Jones sits at t will be true a thousand years from now, then Jones sits...

..., at 404) and that, in his opinion, the three arguments will stand or fall together (Essay on Free Will, 56-57). 2Van Inwagen, Essay on Free Will, 96; “When Is the Will Free?” 405. 525 MICHAEL HUEA4ER Np = No one has any choice...

... minutes in the future from now, and consider the Main Argument: (1) Jones has no choice about: that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. (2) Necessarily, if that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago, then Jones sits at time t...

... if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law” ( MM 6:230). The Universal Principle of Right states what the book is about: the conditions under which free beings (those with the power to choose ends) can exercise their power of choice consistently with the like power...

... determine her choice? As Pettigrew demonstrates with clear, elegant prose and mathematical precision, given a small set of reasonable assumptions, making these choices rationally requires one to modify orthodox expected utility theory. Blending formal epistemology with the metaphysics of selves...