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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 43–87.
Published: 01 January 2023
...Benjamin A. Levinstein Chance both guides our credences and is an objective feature of the world. How and why we should conform our credences to chance depends on the underlying metaphysical account of what chance is. I use considerations of accuracy (how close your credences come to truth-values...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... set of credences that violates the probability axioms, there is a set that satisfies those axioms that is closer to every possible set of truth values. This article replaces truth values with objective chances in this argument; it shows that for any set of credences that violates the probability...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Huw Price In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance.” The present essay aims to motivate this same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
... physical chance. (ii) Counterfactual conditionals can be defined by appeal to a relation of closeness between possible worlds. The essay tries to show that absurd consequences ensue if either of these assumptions is combined with antihaecceitism. Then it considers a natural response by the antihaecceitist...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
.... Is that a weird case of changing the past? No. The fact that some lottery gives someone a certain chance is in part a fact about what happens after the chance mechanism has done its work. A lottery gives you a 50 percent chance to receive a certain good only if two things hold: the chance of the favorable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 130–132.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Edward Stein FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE. By Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Wikler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiv, 398 Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Christian List; Marcus Pivato This article offers a new argument for the claim that there can be nondegenerate objective chance in a deterministic world. Using a formal model of the relationship between different levels of description of a system, the article shows how objective chance at a higher...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (1): 96–101.
Published: 01 January 2024
...Carl Hoefer carl.hoefer@ub.edu Myrvold Wayne C. , Beyond Chance and Credence . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2021 . xvi + 286 pp. © 2024 by Cornell University 2024 In the postscripts to “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis (1986: 118) wrote...
FIGURES
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Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 9. Two groups are presented with arguments favoring q ; red group never scrutinizes, while blue group always does. Top left: 0 % chance of finding flaw if there is one; full blue polarization. Top right: 100 % chance of finding flaw if there is one; no blue polarization More
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... important about what the pursuit of probabilistic knowledge demands from us. It does not demand that we give hypotheses equal treatment , by affording them equal credence. Rather, it demands that we give them equal consideration , by affording them an equal chance of being discovered. 29. For our...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... to Lewis's results is to claim that conditional claims, or claims about subjective value, lack truth conditions. For this strategy to have a chance of success, it needs to give up basic structural principles about how epistemic states can be updated—in a way that is strikingly parallel to the commitments...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
..., Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time , ed. Harper William L. Stalnaker Robert Pearce Glenn , 211 – 47 . Dordrecht : D. Reidel . Hájek Alan . 1989 . “ Probabilities of Conditionals—Revisited .” Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 : 423 – 28 . Jackson Frank . 1979...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 73–114.
Published: 01 January 2018
... would conjecture that the rate is between 93% and 95%, regardless of her data, then there is zero chance that her estimate is wrong in the actual world. However, her estimate is wrong with probability one in every world in which the efficacy is greater than 95%. Thus, there is no single probability...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
... as he or she is reasonably tolerant of risk, would take a 25/26 chance of cured Tolerabalitus and a 1/26 chance of unrelieved Maleficitus over a 25/26 chance of uncured Tolerabalitus and a 1/26 chance of (slightly) relieved Maleficitus. And for you, the doctor, insofar as your concern for others...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 485–531.
Published: 01 October 2014
..., the total chance of r heads in n tosses is ( n r ) ∫ 0 1 p r ( 1 − p   ) n − r d p = ( n r ) n − r r + 1 ∫ 0 1 p r + 1 ( 1 − p   ) n − r − 1 d p = ( n r + 1...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 571–575.
Published: 01 October 2015
... no distinction at all. The principal differences Weiss sees are as follows: (1) One kind of philosopher escapes corruption and becomes ruler by chance (32), whereas the other is “designed.” (2) One has a philosophical nature, whereas the other is nonphilosophic by nature (40, 50, 67). (3) One has no love...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 643–644.
Published: 01 October 2012
...., Freedom and the Fixity of the Past 179 Kment, Boris, Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals 573 Kotzen, Matthew, Dragging and Confirming 55 Mahtani, Anna, Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments 443 Pettigrew, Richard, Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle 241 Price, Huw, Causation, Chance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 149–177.
Published: 01 April 2012
... where each member of the population has an equal chance of being selected for the sample. This is familiar from statistics (Stuart 1962). For simplicity, we will assume that random pro- cedures always select at least one object. Of the many nonrandom procedures, we will need only the fol...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
... process. Let S be a partition of alternative hypotheses concerning the outcome of this pro- cess. Beauty knows the objective chance of each hypothesis in S,andshe also knows how many times she will awaken conditional on each of these 4. See Lewis 2001 for an early defense of this position...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 279–322.
Published: 01 July 2018
...-Humean conceptions of objective chance, because my objection to realism is exactly analogous. Ironic, then, that the problem with realism can be found in the writings of someone I take to be an arch realist! But ironies aside, let us review Lewis's argument so as to use it as a guide. Lewis noted...