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causal strength

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
...Jan Sprenger This article develops axiomatic foundations for a probabilistic theory of causal strength as difference-making. I proceed in three steps: First, I motivate the choice of causal Bayes nets as an adequate framework for defining and comparing measures of causal strength. Second, I prove...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 296–300.
Published: 01 April 2001
... for causal decision theory. Early in the twentieth century, behaviorists in economics worried about the meaningfdness of ascribing cardinal utility fLinc- tions to agents (that is, functions measuring the strength of preference, notjust reflecting preference rankings). The project of deriving cardinal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 250–254.
Published: 01 April 2019
.... Sellars thought of himself as a Humean about modality, too, in some respects. In “Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities” ( 1958 ) he endorses the “core truth” of what he takes to be a Humean empiricist view of both normative and causal language: that it is simply not in the same line...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 411–413.
Published: 01 July 2005
.... This explanation of my action seems to be a paradigmatic example of a reasons explanation. Successful reasons explanations reveal the agent’s purpose in acting the way she did. According to the prevailing view, reasons explanations are causal explanations that, when complete, make essential reference to some...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 63–114.
Published: 01 January 2005
... unhelpful, since such a propensity would be the disposition to develop an ongoing desire for a substance upon experiencing its intoxicating effect for the first time. Evil however cannot lie in the inclinations, for then it would be a function of the causal laws of the world and not free choice...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 612–615.
Published: 01 October 2002
... an elegant explanation of how weakness of will is possible. On his view, occasions for self-controlled or weakly willed actions arise when there is a con- flict between the motivational strength of an agent’s (resistible) desires and her decisive best judgments regarding the best (or better) courses...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 136–140.
Published: 01 January 2017
... study of the aspects of reality, such as kindhood, lawhood, causal power, and causation, which impose order on the world and make our scientific disciplines possible . . . and also the study of the metaphysical relationship between the various scientific disciplines” (14). The editors explicitly rule...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 199–241.
Published: 01 April 2006
..., or from the source to the recipient of testimony. Importantly, the process does not affect the warrant’s being a priori or a posteriori; nor does it affect the warrant’s strength. So, on Burge’s view, if one’s earlier self has a priori (or a posteriori) warrant for the belief that p, then, if all...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 383–421.
Published: 01 July 2011
...; it essentially consists in causal mapping. Unlike the comparative model presupposed in the literature on deliberation, Aristotle's model can account for the virtuous agent's deliberation, as well as deliberation with a view to “satisficing” desires and deliberation that fails to uncover any expedient course...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 393–398.
Published: 01 July 2017
... on the strength of Hume's PPM-based argument against the mechanical philosophy. I am not convinced that De Pierris succeeds in removing the tension between Hume's skepticism and naturalism. For two reasons, it seems to me that the Humean scientist of man, as characterized by De Pierris, is irrational by his...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
... in chapter 1, Mele argues in chapter 2 that human beings can have unconscious intentions that are causally relevant to action. Now, to most contemporary philosophers, the idea that we have unconscious intentions probably sounds like a no-brainer, but psycholo- gists and neuroscientists often write...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 452–455.
Published: 01 July 2011
... 2 that human beings can have unconscious intentions that are causally relevant to action. Now, to most contemporary philosophers, the idea that we have unconscious intentions probably sounds like a no-brainer, but psycholo- gists and neuroscientists often write as if it’s analytic that all...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 455–460.
Published: 01 July 2011
... conceptual background in chapter 1, Mele argues in chapter 2 that human beings can have unconscious intentions that are causally relevant to action. Now, to most contemporary philosophers, the idea that we have unconscious intentions probably sounds like a no-brainer, but psycholo- gists...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 461–467.
Published: 01 July 2011
... in chapter 1, Mele argues in chapter 2 that human beings can have unconscious intentions that are causally relevant to action. Now, to most contemporary philosophers, the idea that we have unconscious intentions probably sounds like a no-brainer, but psycholo- gists and neuroscientists often write...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 311–315.
Published: 01 April 2021
... suggests, the volume has many strengths that recommend it to anyone interested in Kant. Giving the principles of common understanding a bedrock normative role in critical philosophy provides a fresh take on questions of growing scholarly interest, especially those bearing on epistemic normativity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 451–457.
Published: 01 July 2012
... to the prior association. The strength of the argument depends on the extent to which we know that these consequences have analogs in the target domain. This criterion 1. The analogy is that between artificial selection as practiced by plant and animal breeders and the natural...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 457–460.
Published: 01 July 2012
...- er the analogous assumptions are known to hold, or at least not known not to hold, in the target domain” (26). . “In explanatory analogies, any known observable consequence of the hypothesis Q counts as central to the prior association. The strength of the argument...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 461–464.
Published: 01 July 2012
...- er the analogous assumptions are known to hold, or at least not known not to hold, in the target domain” (26). . “In explanatory analogies, any known observable consequence of the hypothesis Q counts as central to the prior association. The strength of the argument...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 464–467.
Published: 01 July 2012
...- er the analogous assumptions are known to hold, or at least not known not to hold, in the target domain” (26). . “In explanatory analogies, any known observable consequence of the hypothesis Q counts as central to the prior association. The strength of the argument...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 467–471.
Published: 01 July 2012
...- er the analogous assumptions are known to hold, or at least not known not to hold, in the target domain” (26). . “In explanatory analogies, any known observable consequence of the hypothesis Q counts as central to the prior association. The strength of the argument...