Search Results for case
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The Philosophical Review (1 April 2007) 116 (2): 251–266.
Published: 01 April 2007
...Robert Stalnaker Cornell University 2007 Critical Notice of Scott Soames’s Case against Two-Dimensionalism Robert Stalnaker Massachusetts Institute of Technology This rich and stimulating book1 gives both a clear and cogent big...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2007) 116 (3): 465–467.
Published: 01 July 2007
...Thomas Hofweber Jody Azzouni, Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism . New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. viii + 241 pp. Cornell University 2007 BOOK REVIEWS Jody Azzouni, Defl ating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York: Oxford University Press...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 159–191.
Published: 01 April 2008
... liberty and his embrace of supererogation, both of which elude traditional interpretations. Cornell University 2008 Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill Daniel Jacobson Bowling Green State University In...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 337–364.
Published: 01 July 2010
... and Meaning, 58–75, New York: Cambridge University Press. All page references are to the 1979 text. Soames, Scott. 2002 . Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of “Naming and Necessity.” Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stevenson, Robert Louis. 1886/2004 . The Strange Case of Dr...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 455–460.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Robin McKenna; Duncan Pritchard DeRose Keith , The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context . vol. 1 . New York : Oxford University Press , 2009 fpage. xiii + 288 pp. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 BOOK REVIEWS Alfred R. Mele, Effective Intentions: The...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2005) 114 (1): 1–31.
Published: 01 January 2005
.... The Southern Journal of Philosophy . Suppl. no. 33: 133 -60. ____. 1997 . Further Reflections on the Sorites Paradox. In Keefe and Smith 1997 , 204 -250. Originally published 1987. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 1 (January 2005) Borderline Cases and Bivalence...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 315–336.
Published: 01 July 2010
...John Martin Fischer The Frankfurt cases have been thought by some philosophers to show that moral responsibility does not require genuine metaphysical access to alternative possibilities. But various philosophers have rejected this putative “lesson” of the cases, and they have put forward a...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 127–129.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Don Loeb ETHICAL NORMS, PARTICULAR CASES. By James D. Wallace. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xi, 171. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS This book is a must-read for those interested contemporary normative ethical theory...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
...Matthew McGrath Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it's a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such is the case. This phenomenology...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 189–214.
Published: 01 April 2013
... determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed to perform. This essay argues...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometimes conflict. In certain famous cases of conflict—medical Newcomb problems—CDT and BT seem to get things right, while EDT seems to get things...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided by...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition is...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
... objects in its entirety. According to this solution, the various cases of distinct coincidents do not clash with the anticoincidence principle since the cases and the principle manifest different yet compatible perspectives on the world. © 2010 by Cornell University 2010 For comments on the material...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition would be the case. What is important to the naive view is that there is also a deliberative...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 149–177.
Published: 01 April 2012
... gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects. © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 I have had...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 481–527.
Published: 01 October 2017
... less controversial case for response-dependence about the funny. In part 2, it shows the tight analogy between anger and amusement in developing the harder and more controversial case for response-dependence about a kind of blameworthiness (and so response-dependence about a kind of responsibility). It...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... discussing a possible picture of mental causation that suggests itself in light of these results. The overdetermination problem has long been raised as a challenge to nonreductive physicalism. The problem is that a nonreductive physicalist view of mind seems to make every case of mental causation a case of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
... possible. The key claim in this argument is that the goal of representing the world as accurately as possible is best served by having credences that are probabilistically coherent. This essay shows that this claim is false. In certain cases, the goal of having accurate credences is best served by being...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 1–34.
Published: 01 January 2016
... section sets the stage by introducing a case study from Leibniz's technical work on the strength of extended, rigid beams. The second section draws on that case study to introduce a model for understanding Leibniz's views on the relationship between derivative and primitive forces. The third section draws...