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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Christopher Evan Franklin Swinburne Richard , Mind, Brain, and Free Will . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2013 . vii + 242 pp . © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 In chapter 4, Swinburne argues that no one could ever be justified in believing epiphenomenalism, and since it...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Geoffrey Lee Prinz Jesse , The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience . New York : Oxford University Press , 2012 . xiii +397 pp . © 2014 by Cornell University 2015 In his superb book The Conscious Brain , Prinz defends a theory of consciousness: a theory that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Christopher Tucker The Neo-Moorean Deduction (I have a hand, so I am not a brain-in-a-vat) and the Zebra Deduction (the creature is a zebra, so it isn't a cleverly disguised mule) are notorious. Crispin Wright, Martin Davies, Fred Dretske, and Brian McLaughlin, among others, argue that these...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
... Illusions Influence How We Read But Not How We Grasp An Object.” Experimental Brain Research 111 : 473 -76. Carey, D. 2001 . “Do Action Systems Resist Visual Illusions?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 : 109 -13. Clark, A. 1999 . “Visual Awareness and Visuomotor Action.” Journal of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2018
... Association. I am grateful to Chirimuuta for very helpful discussion. Let us set aside this phenomenological issue. A follow-up question arises. Suppose you have a normal experience of a tomato. Then suppose your brain state is artificially duplicated in the absence of the tomato, so you have an...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2019
..., perception, emotion, and so on, and as inextricably interconnected with the brain and the environment. This interconnection is not merely causal, but it is, as we learn from chapters 3 and 4, what constitutes a minded subject. I found chapters 3 and 4 very interesting, because Gallagher offers a credible...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
...Ned Markosian Meanwhile, Hare reports that what seems true to him “from the outside” (i.e., from a third-person point of view) is that it is not possible that Adam is identical to Sili-Brain. (Hare's reason is that he is convinced that “people are wholly physical things, with persistence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... structural state types that can be exemplified both by concrete neural state tokens and by isomorphic state tokens in artificial brains. More specifically, mental state types are identical with compositional state types—abstract characteristics that “something has solely by virtue of intrinsic features of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 264–268.
Published: 01 April 2018
... the concepts that we deploy when we introspectively examine, focus on, or even take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences are conceptually (or logically) isolated from the concepts that we use to represent (conceive of, categorize, etc.) physical or brain states. By utilizing this...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 300–303.
Published: 01 April 2001
... calls “naturalistic mysterianism.” The view is naturalistic because it maintains that states of consciousness are reducible to physical properties of the brain. It counts as “mysterian”because it asserts that the physical properties in question are entirely beyond our ken- that they lie...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 586–588.
Published: 01 October 2002
... multiple containers of it: the brain; the head; the whole organism; every other brain-containing part of the organism, however gerrymandered; and any merely conjunctive objects that contain O or O’s brain.) Fourth, C is, I agree, the complete organism, not the complement of that organism’s left index...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 267–270.
Published: 01 April 2000
... examples” gives a distinctive slant to the rest of their account.’ One such example is Assassin: Sam tells Jack of his plan to murder the mayor of their town. Jack worries that Sam might fail to go through with the plan or change his mind, so he has secretly installed a device in Sam’s brain that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 426–431.
Published: 01 July 2018
... computation and recommend it strongly to philosophers of mind, physics, biology, or any other area in which appeals to concrete computation arise. Reference Haugeland J. 1980 . “ Formality and Naturalism .” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 : 81 – 2 . The remainder of the book...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 132–135.
Published: 01 January 2000
... BOOK REVIEWS itated, by a brain-manipulating “counterfactual intervener.” The fact that in such cases the agent “could not have acted differently” does not dispose us to withhold blame: rather, we blame her for the act because it results from volitional control, and would have withheld...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 621–624.
Published: 01 October 2000
..., Cleveland holds that in trying to move one’s arm when unaware it’s paralyzed, one’s trying involves intending de re of some brain activity that it be arm movement (145). So, instead of having to posit a volition for this case, one only needs a special de re intention regarding some brain activity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 269–272.
Published: 01 April 2006
... Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. University Park: Pennsylvania State University. xviii + 358 pp. Reiff, Mark R. 2005. Punishment, Compensation, and Law: A Theory of Enforceability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. x + 261 pp. Rockwell, W. Teed. 2005. Neither Brain Nor Ghost: A...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... that is visible to all of them. The instructions are such that the participating Chinese people function like individual neurons, and the radio links like synapses, so that together the Chinese people duplicate the causal organization of a normal human brain down to a very fi ne-grained level...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 277–284.
Published: 01 April 2012
... . 1974 . “ What Is It Like to Be a Bat? ” Philosophical Review 83 : 435 – 50 . Searle John . 1980 . “ Minds, Brains and Programs .” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 : 417 – 57 . ———. 1997 . The Mystery of Consciousness . New York : New York Review of Books . Tye Michael...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
... cracking my skull open on the pavement. The impact disconnected the left and right hemispheres of my brain. Luckily, it is the technologically advanced future, and these two parts of my brain were immediately scooped up off the pavement and rushed to the hospital. The left hemisphere of my brain was...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 624–627.
Published: 01 October 2000
... trying to move one’s arm when unaware it’s paralyzed, one’s trying involves intending de re of some hain activity that it be arm movement (145). So, instead of having to posit a volition for this case, one only needs a special de re intention regarding some brain activity. But if trying (and...