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The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Geoffrey Lee Prinz Jesse , The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience . New York : Oxford University Press , 2012 . xiii +397 pp . © 2014 by Cornell University 2015 In his superb book The Conscious Brain , Prinz defends a theory of consciousness: a theory...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Christopher Evan Franklin Swinburne Richard , Mind, Brain, and Free Will . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2013 . vii + 242 pp . © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 Anyone familiar with his work over the past fifty years knows that ‘Richard Swinburne’ means systematicity...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
... intuitively attractive theory. But these “bad ideology” cases do not merely yield intuitive verdicts that favor externalism over internalism. These cases are, moreover, analogous to precisely those canonical cases widely taken to be counterexamples to externalism: cases featuring brains-in-vats, clairvoyants...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Christopher Tucker The Neo-Moorean Deduction (I have a hand, so I am not a brain-in-a-vat) and the Zebra Deduction (the creature is a zebra, so it isn't a cleverly disguised mule) are notorious. Crispin Wright, Martin Davies, Fred Dretske, and Brian McLaughlin, among others, argue...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2018
... perceivers, objects, and the like, and take that to be the bearer of chromatic properties” (143). She therefore rejects both standard realist views that hold external items have colors as well as brain-based irrealist views that relocate color qualities or qualia “in the brain” (Averill, Block, Lormand...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
... Illusions Influence How We Read But Not How We Grasp An Object.” Experimental Brain Research 111 : 473 -76. Carey, D. 2001 . “Do Action Systems Resist Visual Illusions?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 : 109 -13. Clark, A. 1999 . “Visual Awareness and Visuomotor Action.” Journal...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
... many of us to share). The intuitions concern a case in which the brain of a person, Adam, is replaced with a rudimentary, silicon pseudobrain—able to “control the body's vital functions and support a minimal substrate of perceptual experience (think Frankenstein's monster, minus the ability to talk...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2019
..., perception, emotion, and so on, and as inextricably interconnected with the brain and the environment. This interconnection is not merely causal, but it is, as we learn from chapters 3 and 4, what constitutes a minded subject. I found chapters 3 and 4 very interesting, because Gallagher offers a credible...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... neural state tokens and by isomorphic state tokens in artificial brains. More specifically, mental state types are identical with compositional state types—abstract characteristics that “something has solely by virtue of intrinsic features of its parts and relations that those parts have to one another...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... are such that the participating Chinese people function like individual neurons, and the radio links like synapses, so that together the Chinese people duplicate the causal organization of a normal human brain down to a very fi ne-grained level. Does this system undergo experiences and feelings? Block himself holds...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
... started volunteering as part of turning over a new leaf. A drunk driver slammed into me, completely destroying my legs and torso, and cracking my skull open on the pavement. The impact disconnected the left and right hemispheres of my brain. Luckily, it is the technologically advanced future...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 132–135.
Published: 01 January 2000
... BOOK REVIEWS itated, by a brain-manipulating “counterfactual intervener.” The fact that in such cases the agent “could not have acted differently” does not dispose us to withhold blame: rather, we blame her for the act because it results from volitional control, and would have withheld...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 621–624.
Published: 01 October 2000
... when unaware it’s paralyzed, one’s trying involves intending de re of some brain activity that it be arm movement (145). So, instead of having to posit a volition for this case, one only needs a special de re intention regarding some brain activity. But if trying (and action-Cleveland...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 267–270.
Published: 01 April 2000
... examples” gives a distinctive slant to the rest of their account.’ One such example is Assassin: Sam tells Jack of his plan to murder the mayor of their town. Jack worries that Sam might fail to go through with the plan or change his mind, so he has secretly installed a device in Sam’s brain...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 426–431.
Published: 01 July 2018
... surrounding the relationship between neural networks and classical computation. For instance, a point of contention in this literature has been the claim that neural networks, and thus plausibly the brain, perform “massively parallel” computations—if they do, does this substantively challenge classical...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
... Descartes Philosophers , which thought to reason well, Say, Light , and Colour , in the Braine do dwell; That Motion in the Braine doth Light beget, And if no Braine , the World in darknesse Shut. Provided that the Braine hath Eyes to see, So Eyes , and Braine , do make...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 277–284.
Published: 01 April 2012
... . 1974 . “ What Is It Like to Be a Bat? ” Philosophical Review 83 : 435 – 50 . Searle John . 1980 . “ Minds, Brains and Programs .” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 : 417 – 57 . ———. 1997 . The Mystery of Consciousness . New York : New York Review of Books . Tye Michael...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 300–303.
Published: 01 April 2001
... that it calls “naturalistic mysterianism.” The view is naturalistic because it maintains that states of consciousness are reducible to physical properties of the brain. It counts as “mysterian”because it asserts that the physical properties in question are entirely beyond our ken- that they lie...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 586–588.
Published: 01 October 2002
... it C—that is a proper or improper part of O. (Since there is a single cerebral realization of conscious- ness, it’s plausible, to say the least, that there is a single consciousness realized, and a single subject of it, even though there are multiple containers of it: the brain; the head; the whole...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
... , ed. Phillips A. , 364 – 99 . Oxford : Clarendon Press . Fodor J. A. 1987 . Psychosemantics . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press . Franz V. H. 2003 . “ Manual Size Estimation: A Neuropsychological Measure of Perception? ” Experimental Brain Research 151 : 471 – 77...