Search Results for brain

...Sinan Dogramaci; Miriam Schoenfield This article gives a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. The article also attempts to explain what goes...

...Geoffrey Lee Prinz Jesse , The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience . New York : Oxford University Press , 2012 . xiii +397 pp . © 2014 by Cornell University 2015 In his superb book The Conscious Brain , Prinz defends a theory of consciousness: a theory...

...Christopher Evan Franklin Swinburne Richard , Mind, Brain, and Free Will . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2013 . vii + 242 pp . © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 Anyone familiar with his work over the past fifty years knows that ‘Richard Swinburne’ means systematicity...

... intuitively attractive theory. But these “bad ideology” cases do not merely yield intuitive verdicts that favor externalism over internalism. These cases are, moreover, analogous to precisely those canonical cases widely taken to be counterexamples to externalism: cases featuring brains-in-vats, clairvoyants...

...Christopher Tucker The Neo-Moorean Deduction (I have a hand, so I am not a brain-in-a-vat) and the Zebra Deduction (the creature is a zebra, so it isn't a cleverly disguised mule) are notorious. Crispin Wright, Martin Davies, Fred Dretske, and Brian McLaughlin, among others, argue...

... perceivers, objects, and the like, and take that to be the bearer of chromatic properties” (143). She therefore rejects both standard realist views that hold external items have colors as well as brain-based irrealist views that relocate color qualities or qualia “in the brain” (Averill, Block, Lormand...

... duplicate brains each with a red and a blue hemisphere. Each hemisphere contains exactly one thought. Take a content assignment according to which both brains believe p and q , but in brain 1 the blue hemisphere’s thought gets assigned p whereas in brain 2 the red hemisphere’s does. This, YVH say...

... Illusions Influence How We Read But Not How We Grasp An Object.” Experimental Brain Research 111 : 473 -76. Carey, D. 2001 . “Do Action Systems Resist Visual Illusions?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 : 109 -13. Clark, A. 1999 . “Visual Awareness and Visuomotor Action.” Journal...

..., perception, emotion, and so on, and as inextricably interconnected with the brain and the environment. This interconnection is not merely causal, but it is, as we learn from chapters 3 and 4, what constitutes a minded subject. I found chapters 3 and 4 very interesting, because Gallagher offers a credible...

... and 2004; and Rini and Cresswell 2012 . 2. See Olson 1997 . 3. If I am being really careful about my credences, I should probably try to make sure that the sum of my credence that I will be Sili-Brain and my credence that I will be Tele-Product is less than or equal to 1. But doing so...

... neural state tokens and by isomorphic state tokens in artificial brains. More specifically, mental state types are identical with compositional state types—abstract characteristics that “something has solely by virtue of intrinsic features of its parts and relations that those parts have to one another...

... are such that the participating Chinese people function like individual neurons, and the radio links like synapses, so that together the Chinese people duplicate the causal organization of a normal human brain down to a very fi ne-grained level. Does this system undergo experiences and feelings? Block himself holds...

... demonstrative thought using a purely recognitional concept—a phenomenal concept—of the kind “ This reddish experience ( This-R ).” Since phenomenal concepts are purely recognitional (nondescriptive) concepts, they are conceptually isolated from other concepts—for instance, concepts referring to brain states...

... started volunteering as part of turning over a new leaf. A drunk driver slammed into me, completely destroying my legs and torso, and cracking my skull open on the pavement. The impact disconnected the left and right hemispheres of my brain. Luckily, it is the technologically advanced future...

... BOOK REVIEWS itated, by a brain-manipulating “counterfactual intervener.” The fact that in such cases the agent “could not have acted differently” does not dispose us to withhold blame: rather, we blame her for the act because it results from volitional control, and would have withheld...

... when unaware it’s paralyzed, one’s trying involves intending de re of some brain activity that it be arm movement (145). So, instead of having to posit a volition for this case, one only needs a special de re intention regarding some brain activity. But if trying (and action-Cleveland...

.... The first is mental causation. Endorsing moderate emergentism, Jennings argues that slow brain waves are causally efficacious even though they are not reducible to lower-level processes. (The metaphysics and neuroscience are presented accessibly, aided by three appendixes.) Second, Jennings argues...

... examples” gives a distinctive slant to the rest of their account.’ One such example is Assassin: Sam tells Jack of his plan to murder the mayor of their town. Jack worries that Sam might fail to go through with the plan or change his mind, so he has secretly installed a device in Sam’s brain...

... surrounding the relationship between neural networks and classical computation. For instance, a point of contention in this literature has been the claim that neural networks, and thus plausibly the brain, perform “massively parallel” computations—if they do, does this substantively challenge classical...

... Descartes Philosophers , which thought to reason well, Say, Light , and Colour , in the Braine do dwell; That Motion in the Braine doth Light beget, And if no Braine , the World in darknesse Shut. Provided that the Braine hath Eyes to see, So Eyes , and Braine , do make...