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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Geoffrey Lee References Block N. 2007 . “ Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience .” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 , no. 5–6 : 481 – 99 . Chalmers D. J. 1998 . “ On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
... rests on the putative failure of materialist accounts to provide adequate conditions for synchronic and diachronic identity. As far as I can tell, there is no significant difference between this and earlier presentations of his argument and so I skip over it. Swinburne Richard , Mind, Brain...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
... intuitively attractive theory. But these “bad ideology” cases do not merely yield intuitive verdicts that favor externalism over internalism. These cases are, moreover, analogous to precisely those canonical cases widely taken to be counterexamples to externalism: cases featuring brains-in-vats, clairvoyants...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Christopher Tucker The Neo-Moorean Deduction (I have a hand, so I am not a brain-in-a-vat) and the Zebra Deduction (the creature is a zebra, so it isn't a cleverly disguised mule) are notorious. Crispin Wright, Martin Davies, Fred Dretske, and Brian McLaughlin, among others, argue...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2018
... perceivers, objects, and the like, and take that to be the bearer of chromatic properties” (143). She therefore rejects both standard realist views that hold external items have colors as well as brain-based irrealist views that relocate color qualities or qualia “in the brain” (Averill, Block, Lormand...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 475–480.
Published: 01 July 2021
... narrowness to QAPs? The answer comes on page 48, in the form of a case purportedly pulling apart narrowness from coarse narrowness. They ask us to imagine two duplicate brains each with a red and a blue hemisphere. Each hemisphere contains exactly one thought. Take a content assignment according to which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
... Illusions Influence How We Read But Not How We Grasp An Object.” Experimental Brain Research 111 : 473 -76. Carey, D. 2001 . “Do Action Systems Resist Visual Illusions?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 : 109 -13. Clark, A. 1999 . “Visual Awareness and Visuomotor Action.” Journal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
... and 2004; and Rini and Cresswell 2012 . 2. See Olson 1997 . 3. If I am being really careful about my credences, I should probably try to make sure that the sum of my credence that I will be Sili-Brain and my credence that I will be Tele-Product is less than or equal to 1. But doing so...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2019
..., perception, emotion, and so on, and as inextricably interconnected with the brain and the environment. This interconnection is not merely causal, but it is, as we learn from chapters 3 and 4, what constitutes a minded subject. I found chapters 3 and 4 very interesting, because Gallagher offers a credible...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Christopher S. Hill 3. I discuss this paradox in Hill 2012 . According to the resolution I endorse there, while phenomenal awareness is tightly correlated with brain states, the objects of such awareness are extracranial. 2. For an extended discussion of the differences between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... are such that the participating Chinese people function like individual neurons, and the radio links like synapses, so that together the Chinese people duplicate the causal organization of a normal human brain down to a very fi ne-grained level. Does this system undergo experiences and feelings? Block himself holds...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 619–623.
Published: 01 October 2021
...; Persaud et al. 2011). Adding to this relative lack of unambiguous evidence is the fact that global workspace theory threatens to collapse under the weight of Carruthers’s own theoretical construction. Consider a humble bee. Its brain is the size of a sesame seed. This doesn’t leave much room...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
... concern for Carol than she should have for future Angela? I do not think so. Consider a pair of cases, again assuming in each case that, owing to sufficient redundancies in your brain, if you lost one cerebral hemisphere, you would continue existing exactly as you would if you retained both hemispheres...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 390–393.
Published: 01 July 2022
... memory (not mentioned here). That said, no extant survey is more complete. Chapter 3 begins with the empirical claim that attention is regulated by slow brainwaves, and then takes up two issues. The first is mental causation. Endorsing moderate emergentism, Jennings argues that slow brain waves...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 132–135.
Published: 01 January 2000
... BOOK REVIEWS itated, by a brain-manipulating “counterfactual intervener.” The fact that in such cases the agent “could not have acted differently” does not dispose us to withhold blame: rather, we blame her for the act because it results from volitional control, and would have withheld...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 621–624.
Published: 01 October 2000
... when unaware it’s paralyzed, one’s trying involves intending de re of some brain activity that it be arm movement (145). So, instead of having to posit a volition for this case, one only needs a special de re intention regarding some brain activity. But if trying (and action-Cleveland...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 267–270.
Published: 01 April 2000
... examples” gives a distinctive slant to the rest of their account.’ One such example is Assassin: Sam tells Jack of his plan to murder the mayor of their town. Jack worries that Sam might fail to go through with the plan or change his mind, so he has secretly installed a device in Sam’s brain...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 426–431.
Published: 01 July 2018
... surrounding the relationship between neural networks and classical computation. For instance, a point of contention in this literature has been the claim that neural networks, and thus plausibly the brain, perform “massively parallel” computations—if they do, does this substantively challenge classical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
..., Say, Light , and Colour , in the Braine do dwell; That Motion in the Braine doth Light beget, And if no Braine , the World in darknesse Shut. Provided that the Braine hath Eyes to see, So Eyes , and Braine , do make the Light to bee. If so, poore Donne was out, when he did...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 277–284.
Published: 01 April 2012
... . 1974 . “ What Is It Like to Be a Bat? ” Philosophical Review 83 : 435 – 50 . Searle John . 1980 . “ Minds, Brains and Programs .” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 : 417 – 57 . ———. 1997 . The Mystery of Consciousness . New York : New York Review of Books . Tye Michael...