Search Results for bodily

... at the margins but broadly inept. Examples highlighted in this essay include: emotional experience (for example, is it entirely bodily; does joy have a common, distinctive phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the phenomenology of thought (does...

... illumination of the room is not. Or so it seems. Volitionists disagree. They posit special inner mental acts, volitions or willings, which are basic and bring about bodily movements such as those I perform in turning on a light. (Some volitionists identify willings with physical events.) But why...

..., although one is unaware of these things. . . . The fact is that if there were impressions in the body during sleep or during wakefulness by which the soul were not touched or affected at all, there would have to be limits to the union of body and soul, as though bodily impressions needed...

..., and avoids circularity. She rejects definitions based on absent or deficient biological functions, instead defining “disability” as a socially constructed set of bodily conditions: A person, S, is physically disabled in a context, C, if and only if (i) S is in some bodily state x (ii) The rules for making...

... (that is, to judge or believe that one has a particular urge), with exercises of control playing a supporting role in this process. This section provides a preliminary characterization of the theoretical target in contradistinction to psychological phenomena like bodily sensations, emotion, and desire (sec...

..., and Norms , ed. Kenneth R. Westphal, 59 -87. New York: Fordham University Press. Armstrong, David M. 1962 . Bodily Sensations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ____. 1968 . A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Baldwin, Thomas. 1990 . G. E. Moore . London...

...Tim Crane THE PARADOX OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. By José Luis Bermúdez. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998. Pp. xv, 338. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REVEWS the object of the de re intention beyond that it is usually bodily movement. Oddly, Cleveland holds...

...- untary bodily exertion begins with volition, a special sort of conscious men- tal activity-not reducible to intention or desire-that causes the body’s exertion. He makes a clear and forceful case for this thesis, one that is, to my mind, persuasive.’ I don’t agree with everything McCann says...

... of (1)—a Strawsonian personal dual- ism, with a token-dualism of Davidsonian event particulars. He assents to (4) by contending that distinctively mental trying-events bring about bodily behavior. However, he emphatically disavows Cartesian single-chain interactionism and is unwilling to abandon (2...

... suggests that ‘smooth’ is an empirical property of bodily alterations that occur in accordance with our natural constitution and therefore find no resistance inside the body, while ‘rough’ characterises changes that are somehow disruptive of our bodily nature and functions and do...

... they have the same results , where a result is an event caused by an act. On the basis of this account, Hyman rejects the common view that actions are bodily movements: relevant bodily movements are results of acts, not the causings of those results (63). The “leveling of distinctions” challenge...

... for freedom of the will. Free will “cannot be squeezed into the elementary timescale of 150–350 milliseconds; free will is a longer-term phenomenon. . . . Second, the notion of free will does not apply primarily to abstract motor processes or even to bodily movements that make up intentional actions—rather...

... of psychological continuity and those who think it is essentially a matter of bodily (or biological) continuity. But these theorists share a common opponent: the philosopher who thinks personal identity is a “further fact,” over and above facts about psychological and bodily continuity. Parfit (1984) calls...

... is reach out and grab. You are also, at the same time, in an enormously complex physical state that realizes not only your desire for and percep- tion of ice cream, but also your physical ability to move your body in cer- tain ways. Anyone in just that physical state would make the same bodily...

... earlier papers make clearer the import of these remarks: there is a commonality to human experi- ences across cultural differences due to our all being, for example, mortal and embodied and in circumstances of scarcity and competition, so that we all must have attitudes towards our death, our bodily...

... that “an individual must be able to relate events to itself and, in conjunction with that, it must be able to have ideas about itself and its bodily affects” (61). The second section of the book is devoted to an articulation of the ontological status of the mental. I take Renz here to offer a subtle double...

... deftly navigates the trio wisdom- sōphrosunē-enkrateia , the latter picking out something like the ability to resist troublesome bodily desires, while sōphrosunē , according to Moore, is for Xenophon “responsiveness to reasons, laws, or other wise judgments of action-guiding value. This is rational...

... of emotional experience, bodily feeling, perceptions, thoughts, etc., all structured into a broader narrative, articulated from a personal point of view, in terms of which the subject’s responses can be explained. It is this central claim that he fleshes out in detail throughout. In doing so, Goldie...

.... This first activation wave is followed by another, which occurs between 200 and 450 milliseconds (reflecting the refinement of initial affective predictions). The processes in OFC are believed to contribute both to the brain’s gist-level prediction about the object, which initiates internal bodily changes...

... vacuum argument. 48 The attempt to formulate a notion of the real distinction that covers both mental and bodily substances in the same way would certainly be in the spirit of the Synopsis passage, which assumes that bodies-taken-in-general and human minds share the same sort of substantiality...