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blameworthiness

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 481–527.
Published: 01 October 2017
... and less controversial case for response-dependence about the funny. In part 2, it shows the tight analogy between anger and amusement in developing the harder and more controversial case for response-dependence about a kind of blameworthiness (and so response-dependence about a kind of responsibility...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... will conditionalize on veridical evidence. In response to the second question, the essay argues that contrary to a common misconception, not all Dutch books dramatize incoherence—some dramatize a less blameworthy sort of epistemic frailty that the essay calls “self-doubt.” The distinction between Dutch books...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... of the “Triple Theory,” which allies Rule Consequentialism with Kantian and Scanlonian Contractualism against Act Consequentialism as a theory of moral right. This critical notice argues that what underlies this change is a view of the deontic concept of moral rightness that ties it closely to blameworthiness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 587–591.
Published: 01 October 2011
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 591–594.
Published: 01 October 2011
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 594–598.
Published: 01 October 2011
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The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 598–602.
Published: 01 October 2011
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 603–607.
Published: 01 October 2011
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 607–609.
Published: 01 October 2011
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 132–135.
Published: 01 January 2000
... of both substance and prom- ise. Ishtiyaque Haji’s main project is to determine sufficient conditions for moral appraisability: that is, for the propriety of holding an agent praise- worthy or blameworthy for an action. Identifymg three primary condi- tions-control, autonomy, and epistemic-he...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
... significantly. References Blum Alex . 2000 . “ The Kantian versus Frankfurt .” Analysis 60 : 287 - 88 . Copp David . 1997 . “ Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility .” Noûs 31 : 441 - 56 . ———. 2003 . “ 'Ought' Implies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 285–295.
Published: 01 April 2017
... that blameworthiness is prior to blaming. Against these metaphysical accounts, the Strawsonian view claims that any such facts about responsibility depend on our practices and are not prior to, or independent of, them. In order to understand responsible agency, we must first have in place a set of norms that structure...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
... of his larger defense of “hard incom- patibilism,” according to which we do not meet the conditions for moral blameworthiness whether or not determinism is true. Qua hard incom- patibilist, Pereboom concludes that the reactive attitudes are morally and rationally untenable, implying as they do...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 381–384.
Published: 01 July 2010
.... The deontic argument says, roughly, that an agent is blameworthy for an action only if the action is wrong and that an action is wrong only if it is avoidable. Therefore, blameworthy actions are avoidable. Combined with the view that determinism precludes alternatives, we may conclude that determin- ism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 384–391.
Published: 01 July 2010
... and difficult to follow. The deontic argument says, roughly, that an agent is blameworthy for an action only if the action is wrong and that an action is wrong only if it is avoidable. Therefore, blameworthy actions are avoidable. Combined with the view that determinism precludes alternatives, we may...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 391–394.
Published: 01 July 2010
.... The deontic argument says, roughly, that an agent is blameworthy for an action only if the action is wrong and that an action is wrong only if it is avoidable. Therefore, blameworthy actions are avoidable. Combined with the view that determinism precludes alternatives, we may conclude that determin- ism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 394–398.
Published: 01 July 2010
.... The deontic argument says, roughly, that an agent is blameworthy for an action only if the action is wrong and that an action is wrong only if it is avoidable. Therefore, blameworthy actions are avoidable. Combined with the view that determinism precludes alternatives, we may conclude that determin- ism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 398–401.
Published: 01 July 2010
.... The deontic argument says, roughly, that an agent is blameworthy for an action only if the action is wrong and that an action is wrong only if it is avoidable. Therefore, blameworthy actions are avoidable. Combined with the view that determinism precludes alternatives, we may conclude that determin- ism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 41–71.
Published: 01 January 2018
... and blame is not reasonable under the over-specific interpretation of W as deceptiveness in pursuit of self-interest , since on that interpretation Sally wouldn't have excluded the act as blameworthy in some other way. The interpretation of W as wrongness, however, does make sense of this second aspect...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 395–431.
Published: 01 July 2020
... the phenomenon of false consciousness as a debunking explanation of the Master’s testimony: if he were in a position to explain away the Master’s testimony, rather than simply dismiss it. Perhaps we might even think that Charles is somewhat blameworthy, epistemically speaking, for his act of dogmatism. And yet...