1-20 of 28 Search Results for

black-and-white Mary

Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account

Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
×Close Modal
Sort by
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
...Hongwoo Kwon There are close parallels between Frank Jackson's case of black-and-white Mary and David Lewis's case of the two omniscient gods. This essay develops and defends what may be called “the ability hypothesis” about the knowledge that the gods lack, by adapting Lewis's ability hypothesis...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 598–602.
Published: 01 October 2002
... (1986) knowledge argument is better situated, dialectically speaking. As Perry sets it out, Mary is raised in a black and white room, where she learns all the physical facts about color, including (1) Subjective character Qr is the subjective character of seeing red. Mary is then released and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 277–283.
Published: 01 April 2009
.... xi + 244 pp. 280 BOOKS RECEIVED Konstan, David. 2008. A Life Worthy of the Gods: The Materialist Psychology of Epicurus. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing. xxii + 167 pp. Kuklick, Bruce. 2008. Black Philosopher, White Academy: The...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 667–673.
Published: 01 October 2007
.... 2007. In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. xv + 189 pp. 668 books received Good, Justin. 2006. Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception. Continuum Studies in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
... passages; one of them is Papineau’s diagnosis of Jackson’s “knowledge argument” ( Jackson 1982, 1986). According to Papineau, Jackson’s Mary can, in her black-and-white room, come to know all facts about color vision, but her lack of relevant experiences prevents her from acquiring phenomenal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 381–384.
Published: 01 July 2010
... thought. However, Stalnaker’s discussion of Jackson’s Mary case indicates that he resists this line of thought. Stalnaker presents an interesting variant of the original Mary puzzle (86). As in the original case, Mary grows up in a black-and-white room and never observes the colors red or green...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 384–391.
Published: 01 July 2010
...-and-white room and never observes the colors red or green. Before being exposed to any colorful object, Mary coins the names ‘Ph-red’ and ‘Ph-green’ for the kind of phenom- enal experience that a normal observer, with similar physical characteristics to those of Mary, would have upon seeing, in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 394–398.
Published: 01 July 2010
... Jackson’s Mary case indicates that he resists this line of thought. Stalnaker presents an interesting variant of the original Mary puzzle (86). As in the original case, Mary grows up in a black-and-white room and never observes the colors red or green. Before being exposed to any colorful object...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 398–401.
Published: 01 July 2010
... thought. However, Stalnaker’s discussion of Jackson’s Mary case indicates that he resists this line of thought. Stalnaker presents an interesting variant of the original Mary puzzle (86). As in the original case, Mary grows up in a black-and-white room and never observes the colors red or green...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 391–394.
Published: 01 July 2010
... thought. However, Stalnaker’s discussion of Jackson’s Mary case indicates that he resists this line of thought. Stalnaker presents an interesting variant of the original Mary puzzle (86). As in the original case, Mary grows up in a black-and-white room and never observes the colors red or green...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 451–457.
Published: 01 July 2012
.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 457–460.
Published: 01 July 2012
... Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown up in a black and white room and has never experienced red. When she leaves the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 461–464.
Published: 01 July 2012
... Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown up in a black and white room and has never experienced red. When she leaves the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 464–467.
Published: 01 July 2012
... Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown up in a black and white room and has never experienced red. When she leaves the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 467–471.
Published: 01 July 2012
... Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown up in a black and white room and has never experienced red. When she leaves the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 472–474.
Published: 01 July 2012
.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 653–661.
Published: 01 October 2000
... Academic, 2000. Pp. 112. On Virtue Ethics. By Rosalind Hursthouse. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. ix, 275. Confucian Moral Self Cultivation. 2d. ed. By Philip J Ivanhoe. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2000. Pp. xvii, 125. The Black Feminist Readm By Joy James and T...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 45–92.
Published: 01 January 2013
... eliminated p as a possibility. If p is not a relevant alternative, then the inquiring agent effectively ignores p and may adopt an answer that is incompatible with p without having eliminated p as a possibility. So to give an example with a familiar ring, consider an agent who sees an equid with black...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... favorite examples, I could perceive that the idea of white disagrees with the idea of black, because the two ideas are distinct (an instance of the first sort of agreement or disagreement), even if there were no white or black things in the world at all. Similarly, I can perceive that the idea of a unicorn...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 98–101.
Published: 01 January 2002
... of bricks could be white and then black, and remain the same. C-unity is not Z-unity. There is also a significant difference between species membership in the Categories and Metaphysics Z. The latter work asserts essentialism, but the former work does not. So, the two features explained by form...