...Hongwoo Kwon There are close parallels between Frank Jackson's case of black-and-white Mary and David Lewis's case of the two omniscient gods. This essay develops and defends what may be called “the ability hypothesis” about the knowledge that the gods lack, by adapting Lewis's ability hypothesis...

...” ( Jackson 1982, 1986). According to Papineau, Jackson’s Mary can, in her black-and-white room, come to know all facts about color vision, but her lack of relevant experiences prevents her from acquiring phenomenal concepts of these facts. By stressing that Mary lacks a range of concepts, Papineau...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

.../00318108-1574472 Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. xiv þ 229 pp. The problem of Mary and the black and white room is well known. Mary is a neuroscientist and knows all the physical facts about color vision. She has grown...

... is better situated, dialectically speaking. As Perry sets it out, Mary is raised in a black and white room, where she learns all the physical facts about color, including (1) Subjective character Qr is the subjective character of seeing red. Mary is then released and encounters something she...

.... Stalnaker presents an interesting variant of the original Mary puzzle (86). As in the original case, Mary grows up in a black-and-white room and never observes the colors red or green. Before being exposed to any colorful object, Mary coins the names ‘Ph-red’ and ‘Ph-green’ for the kind of phenom- enal...

.... Stalnaker presents an interesting variant of the original Mary puzzle (86). As in the original case, Mary grows up in a black-and-white room and never observes the colors red or green. Before being exposed to any colorful object, Mary coins the names ‘Ph-red’ and ‘Ph-green’ for the kind of phenom- enal...

... of thought. Stalnaker presents an interesting variant of the original Mary puzzle (86). As in the original case, Mary grows up in a black-and-white room and never observes the colors red or green. Before being exposed to any colorful object, Mary coins the names ‘Ph-red’ and ‘Ph-green’ for the kind...

.... Stalnaker presents an interesting variant of the original Mary puzzle (86). As in the original case, Mary grows up in a black-and-white room and never observes the colors red or green. Before being exposed to any colorful object, Mary coins the names ‘Ph-red’ and ‘Ph-green’ for the kind of phenom- enal...

.... Stalnaker presents an interesting variant of the original Mary puzzle (86). As in the original case, Mary grows up in a black-and-white room and never observes the colors red or green. Before being exposed to any colorful object, Mary coins the names ‘Ph-red’ and ‘Ph-green’ for the kind of phenom- enal...

... of zombies, and why Mary can’t deduce what it’s like to see red from her physical knowledge while in her black-and-white room. Phenomenal consciousness just is globally broadcast nonconceptual content. There’s no gap in nature. Just a gap in understanding. And as long as there’s no gap in nature...

... is not exact. Consider the notion of unity. In Z Aristotle contrasts unities with heaps, a house and a pile of bricks, but in the Categories the contrast is between a house and a color, and it pertains to substance as a subject of attributes. Both a house and a pile of bricks could be white and then black...

.... xi + 244 pp. 280 BOOKS RECEIVED Konstan, David. 2008. A Life Worthy of the Gods: The Materialist Psychology of Epicurus. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing. xxii + 167 pp. Kuklick, Bruce. 2008. Black Philosopher, White Academy...

.... On Virtue Ethics. By Rosalind Hursthouse. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. ix, 275. Confucian Moral Self Cultivation. 2d. ed. By Philip J Ivanhoe. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2000. Pp. xvii, 125. The Black Feminist Readm By Joy James and T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, eds...

... of the surface of such a cloud of fundamental particles.” Similarly, Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument would have been better expressed as a puzzle about color—when Mary leaves her black and white room, what Mary learns is not primarily what an experience of red is like but rather what red is like...

.... In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. xv + 189 pp. 668 books received Good, Justin. 2006. Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception. Continuum Studies in British...