... to be persuaded by the DBA for Conditionalization, but not by the DBA for Reflection. The DBA for Reflection involves three bets, two of which are offered at t 0 and one of which is offered at t 1 iff Cr 1(A) ¼ r. The bets are designed so that all the bets offered will be considered fair by an agent...

.... 2006 . “When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments.” Analysis 66 : 119 –27. Christensen, David. 1991 . “Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.” Philosophical Review 100 : 229 –47. ———. 2007 . “Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt...

..., then the agent’s credences condone entering into a Dutch book—that is, a set of bets which ensure that she suffers a net financial loss. (Inferred from premise 1.) 3. If an agent’s credences condone entering into a Dutch book, then his or her credence function...

... bet on a proposition X is an option O such that V (O ^ X) ¼ 1 and V (O ^ :X) ¼ 0. 291 ARIF AHMED (5) Causal Betting Principle (CBP): If you face a choice between a unit bet on P and a unit bet on :P, and if you...

... is a counterfactual with an identity statement embedded in the antecedent. For example: ( Bet ) If I were you, I would bet on that horse. ( Einstein ) If Alyssa were Einstein, she would have aced the test. ( Frege ) If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Frege would need a different example. ( Superman ) If Superman...

... gives a third argument for Regularity that is not shared by Lewis. 13 This argument extends the basic “Dutch book” argument for probabilism. The basic argument shows that if an agent's degrees of belief fail to satisfy the probability axioms, then she is vulnerable to a “Dutch book”—a set of bets...

... a set of bets that guarantee a loss of money. Dutch Book If an agent is probabilistically incoherent, then the agent will value as fair a set of bets that will guarantee her a loss of money. Converse Dutch Book An agent will value as fair a set of bets that will guarantee her a loss...

... previously unnoticed. As Caie mentions in his essay, due to sentences like # , sometimes an agent will always value as fair a set of bets that guarantee a loss of money. He says that in such situations Dutch book considerations should require an agent to minimize her losses. However, I show...

.... But intuitively, propositions about the future are paradigm cases of nontrivial uncertainty. Practices: Peirceanism distorts apparent facts about some future-directed practices. Suppose I bet that it will rain. Suppose that a bet on p is a bet on the proposition that p is true...

... are offered a choice between two ways of betting on a fair coin, one of which offers the same payout as the other in the case of Heads but a higher payout in the case of Tails, then that’s the one you should choose. (That choice dominates the other choice, as decision theorists say.) Similarly...

.... Details first. On any reasonable account of credences, it’s possible to have a given credence in p and not be certain of which credence in p you have. You can (for instance) be genuinely disposed to treat a bet on p as fair if and only if the bet is at 2:1 odds (i.e., to have credence ⅓ in p...

...? ” Philosophical Perspectives 19 ( 1 ): 417 – 43 . ———. 2008 . “ Attitudes and Relativism .” Philosophical Perspectives 22 ( 1 ): 527 – 44 . ———. 2011 . “ Defending Interest-Relative Invariantism .” Logos and Episteme 2 ( 4 ): 591 – 609 . ———. 2012 . “ Knowledge, Bets, and Interests...

...) (~OS, ~SS) KNOWLEDGE (Wissen ) MERE CONVICTION (OS, SS) (OS, ~SS) Figure 1 Opinions must be held in a weak fashion. He also anticipates the thought (later championed by Ramsey) that betting scenarios can serve as good tests for discerning how strongly a subject...

... carry out when uttered in propria persona. Declarative sentences can be used to establish definitions, legal propositions, or bets only given some initial prepara- tion, such as a statement that the following sentence is a definition or the investiture of legal authority in the speaker. They do...

... . The Logic of Decision, 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (First edition, 1964.) Maher, Patrick, 1993 . Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McClennen, Edward, 1990 . Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge University...

... & Littlefield. Jordan, Jeff. 1998 . Pascal's Wager Revisited. Religious Studies 34 : 419 -31. Kemeny, J. 1955 . Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities. Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 : 263 -73. Lewis, David. 1980 . A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance. In Studies in Inductive Logic...