1-20 of 119 Search Results for

bet

Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account

Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
×Close Modal
Sort by
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 607–610.
Published: 01 October 2008
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 375–377.
Published: 01 July 2009
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2003) 112 (1): 100–102.
Published: 01 January 2003
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 443–450.
Published: 01 July 2012
... endorsing Conditionalization. Cor- respondingly, she argues that we ought to be persuaded by the DBA for Conditionalization, but not by the DBA for Reflection. The DBA for Reflection involves three bets, two of which are offered at t 0 and one of which is offered at t 1 iff Cr 1(A) ¼ r. The bets...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
..., and Hannes Leitgeb. 2006 . “When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments.” Analysis 66 : 119 –27. Christensen, David. 1991 . “Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.” Philosophical Review 100 : 229 –47. ———. 2007 . “Does Murphy's Law Apply in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 289–306.
Published: 01 April 2013
... and intuitive principle. In the following statement of it, a unit bet on a proposition X is an option O such that V (O ^ X) ¼ 1 and V (O ^ :X) ¼ 0. 291 ARIF AHMED (5) Causal Betting Principle (CBP): If you face a choice between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... outoftheseller’spocketifA is true, and nothing oth- erwise. 2. If Cr violates purported norm N, then the agent’s credences condone entering into a Dutch book—that is, a set of bets which ensure that she suffers a net financial loss. (Inferred from premise 1.) 3. If an...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
.... In sections 3 and 4, I point out some previously unnoticed features of Caie's proposed accuracy criterion. In section 3, I show that in some cases the credences that are rationally required according to Caie's proposed accuracy criterion lead to sure losses on some bets, assuming that the agent bets...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
... in the antecedent. For example: ( Bet ) If I were you, I would bet on that horse. ( Einstein ) If Alyssa were Einstein, she would have aced the test. ( Frege ) If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Frege would need a different example. ( Superman ) If Superman were not Superman, we would all be dead...
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... one of the basic laws of probability for P ( A ∩ B ), either of which would destroy this argument for Regularity . 12 I will formalize the argument thus: Any rational agent evaluates a bet on A at a price equal to [her credence in A times the stakes] as fair to buy or sell, evaluates...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... no difference to those factors in the world that determine your payoff, then A should be pre- ferred to B. For example, if you are offered a choice between two ways of betting on a fair coin, one of which offers the same payout as the other in the case of Heads but a higher payout in the case of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 296–300.
Published: 01 April 2001
... . The Logic of Decision, 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (First edition, 1964.) Maher, Patrick, 1993 . Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McClennen, Edward, 1990 . Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... Encroachment? ” Philosophical Perspectives 19 ( 1 ): 417 – 43 . ———. 2008 . “ Attitudes and Relativism .” Philosophical Perspectives 22 ( 1 ): 527 – 44 . ———. 2011 . “ Defending Interest-Relative Invariantism .” Logos and Episteme 2 ( 4 ): 591 – 609 . ———. 2012 . “ Knowledge, Bets...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2007) 116 (3): 323–360.
Published: 01 July 2007
... must be held in a weak fashion. He also anticipates the thought (later championed by Ramsey) that betting scenarios can serve as good tests for discerning how strongly a subject really holds an attitude. If we fi nd a man who “pronounces his statements (Sätze) with such confi - dent and infl...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 288–290.
Published: 01 April 2005
...- 289 BOOK REVIEWS ments are bizarre. Warnock predicts that human reproductive cloning will never be tried because of the risks (102). But since the world is full of risk-tak- ers, publicity-seekers, and heads of state who aren’t fit to coach soccer teams, I would bet...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 308–310.
Published: 01 April 2002
... thought, it is not to be expected that a bet- ter understanding of medieval and Renaissance philosophy will unlock the hidden meaning of modern texts. Still, the very notion that such authors are somehow modern can be defended only on the basis of a decent understanding of their pre- decessors...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... declarative sentence would carry out when uttered in propria persona. Declarative sentences can be used to establish definitions, legal propositions, or bets only given some initial prepara- tion, such as a statement that the following sentence is a definition or the investiture of legal authority in the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2003) 112 (1): 27–56.
Published: 01 January 2003
... & Littlefield. Jordan, Jeff. 1998 . Pascal's Wager Revisited. Religious Studies 34 : 419 -31. Kemeny, J. 1955 . Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities. Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 : 263 -73. Lewis, David. 1980 . A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance. In Studies in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2006) 115 (4): 449–485.
Published: 01 October 2006
... Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance.” Journal of Philosophy 78 : 305 -30. ____. 1996 . Decision Theory as Philosophy . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kemeny, John G. 1955 . “Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 : 263 -73. Klein, Peter. 1985...