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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 250–253.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Andrew Dole John Bishop. Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. xii + 250 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS
Aaron V. Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method.
Cambridge: Cambridge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 551–554.
Published: 01 October 2017
... where true beliefs had no benefits, then, in my view, a proposition being true would not count at all in favor of its being believed” (45). There is no plausible story to tell about the connection between knowledge and flourishing that doesn't hinge on the practical benefits of knowing. McCormick...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 339–383.
Published: 01 July 2021
... fruitfully been applied to modulating the way agents or systems make choices over time. This article extends the trade-off to belief. We can be torn between two ways of believing, one of which is expected to be more accurate in light of current evidence, whereas the other is expected to lead to more learning...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Han van Wietmarschen The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Sarah Moss This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Selim Berker When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... the concepts of rational belief and rational degree of belief figure simultaneously. In spite of what is commonly believed, this essay will show that this combination of principles is satisfiable (and indeed nontrivially so) and that the principles are jointly satisfied if and only if rational belief...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Daniel Drucker This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
Published: 01 April 2021
...David James Barnett Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p , but I don't believe that p...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 153–181.
Published: 01 April 2009
... connections between wholly distinct things would be mysterious and inexplicable indicate that there must be some such necessary connections. Thus, in the absence of alternative support, there is no reason to believe the Humean claim. Cornell University 2009 Barnett, David. 2005 . “The Problem...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
...Patrick Todd The most promising way of responding to arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom (in one way or another) invokes a claim about the order of explanation: God knew (or believed) that you would perform a given action because you would, in fact, perform...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
...David James Barnett A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... and discharges some remaining grounds for resistance to these skeptical conclusions, as well as the possibility of defending a weaker version of a normative lottery principle. The conclusion is that we have no reason to believe that where equal claims conflict, we are morally required to hold a lottery...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 207–253.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Seth Yalcin As Quine (1956) observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true, would be of special interest to the authorities: (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy. This is the reading where the quantifier is naturally understood as taking wide scope relative to the attitude verb...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
...Ram Neta Sometimes, there are reasons for which we believe, intend, resent, decide, and so on: these reasons are the “bases” of the latter, and the explanatory relation between these bases and the latter is what I will call “the basing relation.” What kind of explanatory relation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 387–422.
Published: 01 October 2019
...Daniela Dover It is widely believed that we ought not to criticize others for wrongs that we ourselves have committed. The author draws out and challenges some of the background assumptions about the practice of criticism that underlie our attraction to this claim, such as the tendency to think...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Pär Sundström Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... disbelieve such a proposition. I argue that a rational agent should be such that it is indeterminate whether it believes the proposition in question. For rational agents, indeterminacy in the objects of their attitudes will filter up to the attitudes themselves. © 2011 by Cornell University 2012...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
... as incompatibilists believe that we can or should forgo moral blame if determinism is true, their stance may seem out of touch with our emotional reality. This essay examines Strawson's claim that the reactive attitudes are inseparable from ordinary interpersonal relationships. Strawson says surprisingly little...
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