Search Results for belief
1-20 of 597 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
...Hannes Leitgeb This essay develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief; the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief; and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2007) 116 (3): 323–360.
Published: 01 July 2007
...Andrew Chignell Cornell University 2007 Belief in Kant Andrew Chignell Cornell University A. Overview Most work in Kant’s epistemology focuses on what happens “upstream” from experience, prior to the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 465–468.
Published: 01 July 2008
...Wayne Proudfoot Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell, eds., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xii + 282 pp. Cornell University 2008 xxx pr08-004 June 10, 2008 10:56...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 250–253.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Andrew Dole John Bishop. Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. xii + 250 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Aaron V. Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method. Cambridge: Cambridge...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Barry Lam If you are currently a reliable epistemic agent in some domain, you would not want to adopt a rule of belief-revision in that domain that rendered you less reliable. However, you probably would want to adopt a rule that rendered you more reliable in that domain. In the epistemology of...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... Heaps , ed. Beall J. C. , 312 - 30 . New York : Oxford University Press . Belief and Indeterminacy Michael Caie University of Rochester 1. Introduction What attitude should a rational agent have toward a...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 149–177.
Published: 01 April 2012
... Philosophy of Science 62 : 323 – 42 . ———. 2011b. “ Self-Location Is No Problem for Conditionalization .” Synthese 182 : 393 – 411 . ———. Forthcoming. “ Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time .” In Attitudes “De Se”: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics , ed. Feit A. Capone N...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
...Joseph Y. Halpern PROBABILITY AND CONDITIONALS: BELIEF REVISION AND RATIONAL DECISION. Edited by Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. vii, 207 Cornell University 2000 Adams, E. 1966 . “Probability and the Logic of Conditionals.” In Aspects of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 551–554.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Scott Stapleford McCormick Miriam Schleifer , Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief . New York: Routledge , 2015 . xiv + 144 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 A spanner in the works: that's how evidentialists will see this new book by Miriam...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 237–240.
Published: 01 April 2018
...Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij So much for the idea of true belief's eudaimonic value. Of course, epistemologists might at this point be perfectly unperturbed. In contemporary epistemology, claims about the value of true belief are typically framed in terms of the epistemic value of true belief, as...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 241–244.
Published: 01 April 2014
...Kelly Becker Zalabardo José L. , Scepticism and Reliable Belief . Oxford : Oxford University Press , xi +215 pp. © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 José Zalabardo takes an unusual approach to skepticism in this book. Most epistemologists acknowledge the force of skepticism but...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 272–275.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Allan Hazlett As Gibbons suggests (8–9), this puzzle has nothing essentially to do with belief. Suppose you're driving to your friends' dinner party and have come to a fork in the road. You've got good reason to think that their house is down the fork on the right, but their house is really down...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 143–148.
Published: 01 January 2016
... creating a workable formal system. Many philosophers have suggested that a fruitful way to think about belief and uncertainty is through the framework of probability theory. The basic model for this way of thinking, often called “Bayesian,” is that an agent's degrees of belief can be represented by a...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jennifer Lackey This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs— inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 159–162.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Baron Reed Zagzebski Linda , Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2012 . xiii +279 pp . © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 It is an exceptionally rare book that can be both a cutting-edge work on...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2003) 112 (4): 447–482.
Published: 01 October 2003
...Nishi Shah Cornell University 2003 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 4 (October 2003) How Truth Governs Belief Nishi Shah Introduction Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
...Michael G. Titelbaum Can self-locating beliefs be relevant to non-self-locating claims? Traditional Bayesian modeling techniques have trouble answering this question because their updating rule fails when applied to situations involving contextsensitivity. This essay develops a fully general...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Daniel Greco Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we to have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided by...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
..., conciliatory views are false if they are understood entirely in terms of evidential support. Alternative conceptions of evidential support face some serious difficulties. These arguments speak against conciliationism, but the article then goes on to defend a conciliatory view about well-grounded belief: when...