...Hannes Leitgeb This essay develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief; the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief; and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which the...

...Andrew Chignell Cornell University 2007 Belief in Kant Andrew Chignell Cornell University A. Overview Most work in Kant’s epistemology focuses on what happens “upstream” from experience, prior to the...

...Wayne Proudfoot Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell, eds., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xii + 282 pp. Cornell University 2008 xxx pr08-004 June 10, 2008 10:56...

...Andrew Dole John Bishop. Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. xii + 250 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Aaron V. Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method. Cambridge: Cambridge...

...Barry Lam If you are currently a reliable epistemic agent in some domain, you would not want to adopt a rule of belief-revision in that domain that rendered you less reliable. However, you probably would want to adopt a rule that rendered you more reliable in that domain. In the epistemology of...

... Heaps , ed. Beall J. C. , 312 - 30 . New York : Oxford University Press . Belief and Indeterminacy Michael Caie University of Rochester 1. Introduction What attitude should a rational agent have toward a...

... Philosophy of Science 62 : 323 – 42 . ———. 2011b. “ Self-Location Is No Problem for Conditionalization .” Synthese 182 : 393 – 411 . ———. Forthcoming. “ Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time .” In Attitudes “De Se”: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics , ed. Feit A. Capone N...

...Joseph Y. Halpern PROBABILITY AND CONDITIONALS: BELIEF REVISION AND RATIONAL DECISION. Edited by Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. vii, 207 Cornell University 2000 Adams, E. 1966 . “Probability and the Logic of Conditionals.” In Aspects of...

...Scott Stapleford McCormick Miriam Schleifer , Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief . New York: Routledge , 2015 . xiv + 144 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 A spanner in the works: that's how evidentialists will see this new book by Miriam...

...Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij So much for the idea of true belief's eudaimonic value. Of course, epistemologists might at this point be perfectly unperturbed. In contemporary epistemology, claims about the value of true belief are typically framed in terms of the epistemic value of true belief, as...

...Kelly Becker Zalabardo José L. , Scepticism and Reliable Belief . Oxford : Oxford University Press , xi +215 pp. © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 José Zalabardo takes an unusual approach to skepticism in this book. Most epistemologists acknowledge the force of skepticism but...

...Allan Hazlett As Gibbons suggests (8–9), this puzzle has nothing essentially to do with belief. Suppose you're driving to your friends' dinner party and have come to a fork in the road. You've got good reason to think that their house is down the fork on the right, but their house is really down...

... creating a workable formal system. Many philosophers have suggested that a fruitful way to think about belief and uncertainty is through the framework of probability theory. The basic model for this way of thinking, often called “Bayesian,” is that an agent's degrees of belief can be represented by a...

...Jennifer Lackey This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs— inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where...

...Baron Reed Zagzebski Linda , Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2012 . xiii +279 pp . © 2014 by Cornell University 2014 It is an exceptionally rare book that can be both a cutting-edge work on...

...Nishi Shah Cornell University 2003 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 4 (October 2003) How Truth Governs Belief Nishi Shah Introduction Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that...

...Michael G. Titelbaum Can self-locating beliefs be relevant to non-self-locating claims? Traditional Bayesian modeling techniques have trouble answering this question because their updating rule fails when applied to situations involving contextsensitivity. This essay develops a fully general...

...Daniel Greco Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we to have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these...

... causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided by...

..., conciliatory views are false if they are understood entirely in terms of evidential support. Alternative conceptions of evidential support face some serious difficulties. These arguments speak against conciliationism, but the article then goes on to defend a conciliatory view about well-grounded belief: when...