...Peter B. M. Vranas John M. Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. x, 272. Cornell University 2004 Darley, J. M., and C. D. Batson. 1973 . “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A study of situational and dispositional...

...Muhammad Ali Khalidi DYNAMICS IN ACTION: INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM. By Alicia Juarrero. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. x, 288. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical hinu,Vol. 110, No. 3 uuly 2001...

...Louis C. Charland STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDICTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR. By Jon Elster. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. xii, 252. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The PhilosophiculReviau, Vol. 110, No. 1 (January 2001) STRONG FEELINGS...

...Harold Kincaid MEASURING THE INTENTIONAL WORLD: REALISM, NATURALISM, AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCLENCES. By J. D. Trout. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 287. Cornell University 2000 Cohen, Jacob. 1994 . “The Earth is Round (p < .05).” American...

... fundamental generalizations and argue that this account explains the strange truth-conditional behavior of generics. Generics: Cognition and Acquisition Sarah-Jane Leslie Princeton Introduction: The Puzzle of the Generic Philosophers...

... ability to identify intentions from the products of communicative behavior and our knowledge of stylistic conventions. This account avoids the difficulties that face rival attempts to analyze depiction in terms of resemblance. It also clarifies and explains the features that distinguish depictive from...

... that there are two distinct normative senses of 'ought', which actually exhibit different syntactic behavior, and then going on to argue that the deliberative sense of 'ought' relates agents to actions, rather than to propositions. It closes by drawing lessons for a range of issues in moral theory. © 2011...

... and not p⌝ and ⌜Not p and might p⌝ are inconsistent? To make sense of this situation, I propose a new theory of epistemic modals that aims to account for their subtle embedding behavior and shed new light on the dynamics of information in natural language. © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 epistemic...

... of criticism either as a social sanction or as a didactic intervention. The author goes on to offer a taxonomy of cases in which the moral legitimacy of criticism is challenged on the grounds that the critic him- or herself engages in the behavior that he or she criticizes in others. The author argues...

... that that C caused (didn’t cause) E once one has removed an inessential variable from M . The article suggests that, if this theory is true, then one should understand a cause as something which transmits deviant or noninertial behavior to its effect. © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 causal models...

... Millianism and descriptivism . Millians cannot account for the behavior of names in hyperintensional contexts, while descriptivists cannot generate a necessary contrast between intensional and hyperintensional contexts. No other theory can capture the facts pertaining to the existentially bound use of names...

..., such as the psychological and the structural, or the mechanistic and the teleological, stand in a many-to-many relation. Many different psychological mechanisms could generate the behaviors that fit into a given structure, and many different social structures could arise from a given psychological mechanism. To bridge...

... to other-regarding behavior: we are accountable to others if we act in ways that violate their legitimate expectations of us. In addition, he claims, the praise and blame of accountability are rewards and sanctions that must be justified as fair or deserved. Attributability, by contrast, is not restricted...

... and normative expectations that are common within relevant reference networks. People tend to change their behavior when they have good reason to believe that others will do so as well, and when they have good reason to believe that others will shift their patterns of praise and blame to accord with a new norm...

...) and the strong rationalization principle (SRP). If S has a set of doxastic attitudes B, then WRP: B rationalizes some of S’s behavioral dispositions together with S 0s desires.8 SRP: There is no proper subset B 0 , B such that B 0 rationalizes S 0s beha- vioral...

... as an alternative to Humeanism” (7). Ellis summarizes Humeanism in five theses (7): 1. That causal relations hold between logically independent events. 2. That the laws of nature are behavioral regularities of some kind that could, in principle, be found to exist in any field of inquiry...

... to a set of theoretically underdetermined taxonomic choices” (98, emphasis added). In light of the first of these principles, behaviors that are not controlled and attentive are, by definition, not guided by beliefs and perforce not evidence of racist beliefs. When they are “relatively automatic...

... in other contexts. But notice that on the dispositionalist view, fragments arise if and only if one’s behavior is at odds with other parts of behavior, given background beliefs and desires. We can of course ask when behavior comes to be at odds in this way, and perhaps the answer might appeal to contexts...

... of the reactive attitudes. 97 SETH SHABO As will be seen, Pereboom’s challenge focuses on the interpersonal role of the reactive attitudes, the kinds of communications and other socially significant behaviors they prompt. To my mind, however...

... evidence for common ancestry (something cladistic parsimony denies) depends on the details of the evolutionary model deployed (178). Sober turns in the next chapter (“Parsimony in Psychology—Chimpanzee Mind-Reading”) to debates over how to interpret particular kinds of behavior in chimps. Is it more...