Search Results for behavior
1-20 of 387 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2004) 113 (2): 284–288.
Published: 01 April 2004
...Peter B. M. Vranas John M. Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. x, 272. Cornell University 2004 Darley, J. M., and C. D. Batson. 1973 . “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A study of situational and dispositional variables in...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 108–110.
Published: 01 January 2001
...Louis C. Charland STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDICTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR. By Jon Elster. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. xii, 252. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The PhilosophiculReviau, Vol. 110, No. 1 (January 2001) STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDICTION AND HUMAN...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 469–472.
Published: 01 July 2001
...Muhammad Ali Khalidi DYNAMICS IN ACTION: INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM. By Alicia Juarrero. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. x, 288. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical hinu,Vol. 110, No. 3 uuly 2001) DMVAMICS INACTION: INTENTONAL BEHAWOR AS...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Harold Kincaid MEASURING THE INTENTIONAL WORLD: REALISM, NATURALISM, AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCLENCES. By J. D. Trout. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 287. Cornell University 2000 Cohen, Jacob. 1994 . “The Earth is Round (p < .05).” American Psychologist. 49...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... general ability to identify intentions from the products of communicative behavior and our knowledge of stylistic conventions. This account avoids the difficulties that face rival attempts to analyze depiction in terms of resemblance. It also clarifies and explains the features that distinguish depictive...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
... Millianism and descriptivism . Millians cannot account for the behavior of names in hyperintensional contexts, while descriptivists cannot generate a necessary contrast between intensional and hyperintensional contexts. No other theory can capture the facts pertaining to the existentially bound use of names...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... there are two distinct normative senses of 'ought', which actually exhibit different syntactic behavior, and then going on to argue that the deliberative sense of 'ought' relates agents to actions, rather than to propositions. It closes by drawing lessons for a range of issues in moral theory. © 2011 by...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 1–47.
Published: 01 January 2008
... fundamental generalizations and argue that this account explains the strange truth-conditional behavior of generics. Cornell University 2007 Asher, N., and M. Morreau. 1995 . “What Some Generic Sentences Mean.” In The Generic Book , ed. G. Carlson and F. J. Pelletier, 300 -339. Chicago: Chicago University...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... and not p⌝ and ⌜Not p and might p⌝ are inconsistent? To make sense of this situation, I propose a new theory of epistemic modals that aims to account for their subtle embedding behavior and shed new light on the dynamics of information in natural language. © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 epistemic...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 116–121.
Published: 01 January 2019
... psychological and the structural, or the mechanistic and the teleological, stand in a many-to-many relation. Many different psychological mechanisms could generate the behaviors that fit into a given structure, and many different social structures could arise from a given psychological mechanism. To bridge the...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 541–545.
Published: 01 October 2018
... empirical and normative expectations that are common within relevant reference networks. People tend to change their behavior when they have good reason to believe that others will do so as well, and when they have good reason to believe that others will shift their patterns of praise and blame to accord...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 575–578.
Published: 01 October 2015
... other-regarding behavior: we are accountable to others if we act in ways that violate their legitimate expectations of us. In addition, he claims, the praise and blame of accountability are rewards and sanctions that must be justified as fair or deserved. Attributability, by contrast, is not restricted...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2003) 112 (1): 121–123.
Published: 01 January 2003
... females pursue. On this view, male sexual behavior is predatory, promiscuous, and opportunis- tic, while females are coy and choosy. Thus, males are likely to be more sexually aggressive than females would like, and males will tend to interpret attention from females as sexual interest, while females...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
.... O'Regan, J. K., and A. Noë. 2001 . “A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 : 000 -00. O'Shaughnessy, B. 1992 . “The Diversity and Unity of Action and Perception.” In The Contents of Experience , 216 -66. Ed. T. Crane. Cambridge: Cambridge...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 589–594.
Published: 01 October 2002
... summarizes Humeanism in five theses (7): 1. That causal relations hold between logically independent events. 2. That the laws of nature are behavioral regularities of some kind that could, in principle, be found to exist in any field of inquiry. 3. That the laws of nature are...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... (WRP) and the strong rationalization principle (SRP). If S has a set of doxastic attitudes B, then WRP: B rationalizes some of S’s behavioral dispositions together with S 0s desires.8 SRP: There is no proper subset B 0 , B such that B 0 rationalizes S 0s beha...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2004) 113 (2): 288–292.
Published: 01 April 2004
... 2 As Doris notes, however(180 n. 4), doubts exist about the replicability of Isen and Levin’s result. 3 At least this is so if the counterfactual behavior occurs in situations similar to those that people actually experience; but if the evidence for D1 supports the existence of actu- ally...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 547–551.
Published: 01 October 2017
... behavior in chimps. Is it more parsimonious to assume that chimpanzees are capable of representing the mental states of others (“mind-reading”), or to assume that they base their actions not off of such representations but rather off of beliefs about how others will act (“behavior-reading”)? Both sides...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
... we're talking about differences in what someone reports, or discrimination behavior more generally (and this appears to be what he has in mind), then what differences are relevant? Even very fine-grained features of neural states carry information about the environment and can have a small statistical...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 587–590.
Published: 01 October 2001
... dialogues a significant conflict between what Socrates says that he is doing and what he actually does: Socrates says that he cares for the souls of his fellow Athenians, but, according to Beversluis, he treats them very shab- bily. Beversluis explains Socrates’ apparent bad behavior by attributing to...