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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
..., which is to deny that worlds play the role described in (i) and (ii). Instead, the reply continues, we can introduce a new set of entities that are defined in terms of worlds and that behave the way worlds do on the haecceitist position. That allows the antihaecceitist to formulate antihaecceitist...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 284–288.
Published: 01 April 2004
... which people possess “robust” character traits (which help their possessors withstand situational pressures) and thus typically behave consistently across situations, and (ii) situationism, according to which people lack robust charac- ter traits and thus typically behave inconsistently across...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 288–292.
Published: 01 April 2004
... behave in a given situation only if we already know how the person does behave in similar situations (117–18). But to argue that a person’s compassion-relevant behavior is inconsistent across situations it is not necessary to predict how the person would behave in any given situation: it suffices to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 589–594.
Published: 01 October 2002
... occur- rent, and that therefore act in the same ways in all possible worlds. These include the causal powers of the most fundamental kinds of things, so that things of these same kinds, existing in any other world, would be disposed to behave in just the same ways...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 241–261.
Published: 01 April 2001
... anticipated and responded to this criticism in Sher (1996a). Hanson is aware of this response, but appears to have not fully understood it. 249 GILA SHER such a term behaves in that model. Thus it is possible that a logical term will...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 567–570.
Published: 01 October 2003
... Barnes). Now we may ask what kind of right belief is possessed by the man who behaves incon- tinently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strange—so Socrates thought—if when knowledge was in a man some- thing else could master...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 541–545.
Published: 01 October 2018
... excels. Using tools from philosophy, game theory, and psychology, she provides a rigorous account of how social norms behave in the wild; and more importantly, she uses case studies, as well as formal models and empirical tools, to explain how we can successfully change social norms that are deeply...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 617–621.
Published: 01 October 2000
... extensive transworld depravity4 God regrettably sees that: If he were to strongly actualize Tp, the instantiations of the members of Sp at Wp would freely behave so badly that Wp would not result but rather a world which is on balance morally worse than Ws. Indeed, God sees...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2002
... and time. This predicts that a complex demonstrative will not behave like a rigid designator in modal evaluation, when the speaker has only a descriptive inten- tion. As a result, King can provide a smooth account of NDNS uses of complex demonstratives. In the third chapter, King considers the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 341–371.
Published: 01 July 2002
... propositional attitude behave in the same way. For example, (8a) Jody heard that first-order logic is undecidable. (8b) Jody heard the proposition that first-order logic is undecid- able. (9a) Jody fears that first-order logic is undecidable. (9b) Jody fears the proposition that first...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 81–122.
Published: 01 January 2017
... be assigned a particular extension, but this extension is not shared through all well-behaved expansions of the language. In the face of questions about the once-and-for-all final meaning of ‘all sets’ or ‘all ordinals’ or ‘all cardinals’, the quantifier deflationist's approach is simply to note that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 85–87.
Published: 01 January 2001
... about the world that go beyond the empirical evidence, as for example assumptions about simplicity. These assumptions about simplicity must be about the way the world is-at the very least that it behaves as if it is simple-because if they are merely, say, demands we make on theories for con...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 108–110.
Published: 01 January 2001
... right, then drug addicts and individuals subject to powerful emotions choose to engage in the behaviors typical of those conditions, even though their capacity for choice is compromised by those very conditions. However, he also says there can be compulsive drug taking or emotive behav- ior...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 260–264.
Published: 01 April 2018
... have spoken a language where number-terms behave syntactically just like proper names. In this case they would be in the business of referring. And it is natural to think that we would still find the inferences to be quantified, apparently compelling loaded statements. (Few would want to say that we...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 127–129.
Published: 01 January 2004
... be reasonable. Without addressing these kinds of explanation it is presumptuous to assume that it is unfeasible to demand of some fundamentalists that they behave more reasonably. A final, related, complaint is that Galston sometimes depends on the vague- ness of a position to give it...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 51–77.
Published: 01 January 2006
... my impending absence but the general idea is clear. It is often harm- ful to others for them to have false expectations about how I am going to behave, and so I have some obligation to ensure that this does not hap- pen by making only well-grounded predictions about my future behavior and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 293–296.
Published: 01 April 2008
... expressive behav- ior, similar in certain ways to bits of behavior that naturally express subjects’ states” (227). Bar-On distinguishes expressing as act and as product. Express- ing a state is not reporting that state; it is more like expressing enthusiasm. For that very reason, it has no more epistemic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 589–592.
Published: 01 October 2000
... to do one of the things that rights do: serve as some sort of a barrier against arbitrary power. If rights are simply needs, they no longer behave as rights do. This is closely related to another, and deeper, problem which, as I see it, emerges at the end of the book, when he turns to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 126–132.
Published: 01 January 2017
... evidence = knowledge —or, as suits the semantic character of PEC, that ‘evidence’ = ‘knowledge’. Finally, the notion of (pragmatic) presupposition is borrowed from Stalnaker's work on linguistic communication: x pragmatically presupposes p in C ↔  x is disposed to behave, in her use of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 422–426.
Published: 01 July 2018
... behavior one expects? When, exactly, does a text describe the “world's network of causes”? After all, many causal explanatory texts describe how the system behaves in the absence (omission or prevention) of causes. Lange does less than we would like to specify the boundary between causal and noncausal...