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bedrock

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 515–566.
Published: 01 October 2011
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 462–465.
Published: 01 July 2002
.... The book consists of five separate essays—one each on identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth—loosely united by the general theme that these “logical properties” are real and irreducible. “These concepts,” McGinn says, “form a conceptual bedrock; they stand, as it were, underneath...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 459–462.
Published: 01 July 2002
.... “These concepts,” McGinn says, “form a conceptual bedrock; they stand, as it were, underneath all our other concepts. They have no analysis” (104–5). Three of the chapters—on identity, existence, and necessity—are largely devoted to polemics against quantificational analyses of these concepts. (A...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 447–450.
Published: 01 July 2016
... assumptions we take for granted . . . are true? How can we defend ourselves from skeptical attack? Surely the only way is to attempt what Plato recommends in the Republic —to go back as far as we can, i.e. to bedrock principles. . . . The quest for precision is not to be characterized as an intellectually...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 427–431.
Published: 01 July 2004
... counterintuitive that such justification could be conferred without experi- ence, merely by reliably arriving at true utterances (or thoughts) and reliably succeeding in actions. Reliabilism about this kind of justification is dismissed at the outset for disrespecting the bedrock intuition that, without...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 465–470.
Published: 01 July 2002
... of interest in McGinn’s book, and its lively style and provocative proposals will no doubt stim- ulate further work on our “conceptual bedrock.” JOHN MACFARLANE University of California, Berkeley Notes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2005) 114 (3): 327–358.
Published: 01 July 2005
... accepting transitivity. First, transitivity is intuitive. As Hall points out: “That causation is, nec- essarily, a transitive relation on events seems to many a bedrock datum, one of the few indisputable a priori insights we have into the workings of the concept” (2000, 198). The transitive inference...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2006) 115 (3): 317–354.
Published: 01 July 2006
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2007) 116 (1): 1–50.
Published: 01 January 2007
... reasons or bedrock disagreement?16 The essential point is that with respect to the Simple Case it remains an open empirical question whether liberty will really increase the number of Christians; hence this cannot explain the easy confi dence with which most modern consequentialists support...