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The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
...Ram Neta Sometimes, there are reasons for which we believe, intend, resent, decide, and so on: these reasons are the “bases” of the latter, and the explanatory relation between these bases and the latter is what I will call “the basing relation.” What kind of explanatory relation...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... and the reasons that the belief is based on the basing relation. 31 Although it is plausible that the basing relation is a species of causal relation and that rational explanations are correspondingly a species of causal explanations, it is a familiar point that not all causal explanations of one belief...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... to causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
...-based resemblance relation to another. In section 5, 185 CATHARINE ABELL I build on this epistemic story to provide an exact specification of the resemblance relation such that one object’s bearing it to another is both necessary...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
... qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in certain ways. By analyzing modesty in this way, we can best explain the distinct features of modesty, keep much of what is intuitive...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
.... The basing relation, like the in-virtue-of relation, is another important but poorly understood relation. For the sake of this essay, I will endorse the following relatively uncontroversial characteriza- tion. The basing relation is supposed to capture what it is for a mental state M (or perhaps...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2000
... rational insight are likely to be true, this fact is general and cannot be directly justified by experience. The basing relation is controversial. But if, as seems plausible, it involves a counterfactual dependence of the belief on the insight, then the fact that such a relation obtains...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
... of more detailed and complete analyses of the well-groundedness relation. I think this kind of requirement could be built into a variety of different kinds of conceptions of the well-groundedness or basing relation (for an overview, see Korcz 1997 ). 21. One may worry that this view severs...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
... that this “taking advantage” is in each case some manner of psychological-basing relation. 5 Depending on the character of the epistemizer, the basing relation takes different shapes. If the subject's epistemizer for p is the subject's knowing that q and that r, the appropriate basing involves these propositions...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... is indispensable for any reason-based representation of the rightness function here, is menu-related, not agent-related. One might try to respond by accepting even further properties as admissible candidates for normatively relevant properties in a consequentialist theory. Generally, one might ask: What kinds...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 140–146.
Published: 01 January 2017
... question of political philosophy that Philip Pettit sets about to answer in his On the People's Terms ( OTPT ). In this book, the author presents a theory of republican democracy based on freedom as nondomination (FND) as a core standard of legitimacy. In doing so, Pettit's book joins a movement...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
... consists of the following two claims (where ‘NI’ abbreviates ‘nature-based interpretation’): (NI-Dep) x depends on y if and only if (1) there is some relation R such that x R y , and (2) x R y by x 's nature but not by y 's nature. 72 (NI-Sub) x is a substance if and only...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 635–638.
Published: 01 October 2001
... at issue need not (likely would not) accept the needed presupposition. Unless Brewer thinks that all reference is fundamentally perceptual or that all beliefs are perceptually based, we cannot conclude that every basic empirical belief has its content only in virtue of its relations to perceptual...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 159–210.
Published: 01 April 2020
...—and in an initial way, the political ones as well—of proclaiming a preference, or consent based on it, nonautonomous in this way. Elsewhere I distinguish between two closely related values that are often associated with the word “autonomy”—that of nonalienation and that of sovereignty (see Enoch 2017a ). You're...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
... a representation of a linear ordering that is not based on the representation of the part-whole relations of collections. This nonderivative representation of a linear ordering is a hallmark of an ordinal conception of number. 16 Nevertheless—and this is crucial to understanding and assessing Kant's views...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
... of Inductive Logic, ed. J. Hintikka and P. Suppes. Amsterdam: North Holland. ____. 1975 . The Logic of Conditionals. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Bacchus, F., A. J. Grove, J. Y Halpern, and D. Koller. 1996 . “From Statistical Knowledge Bases to Degrees of Belief.” Artificial Intelligence 87 : 75 -143...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2018
... perceivers, objects, and the like, and take that to be the bearer of chromatic properties” (143). She therefore rejects both standard realist views that hold external items have colors as well as brain-based irrealist views that relocate color qualities or qualia “in the brain” (Averill, Block, Lormand...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
... are they merely nonnormative explanatory reasons. 31 The fact that this or that consideration is a chess-based reason, or an etiquette-based reason, or an epistemic reason does not seem to be expressible without loss in nonnormative terms. For instance, Kelly (2003) argues that the epistemic support relation...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 472–474.
Published: 01 July 2012
.... This book develops a normative theory of analogical argumentation— “The Articulation Model” (24)—which is based on two main principles. The ﬁrst is “The Requirement of Prior Association: The description of the source domain must include an explicitly stated vertical relation which the analogy is supposed...