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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
...Ram Neta Sometimes, there are reasons for which we believe, intend, resent, decide, and so on: these reasons are the “bases” of the latter, and the explanatory relation between these bases and the latter is what I will call “the basing relation.” What kind of explanatory relation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... by analogy to what we naively wish to say about testimony, or which instead attempt to extend to testimony the epistemically preservative role of memory. © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 memory testimony internalism externalism extended mind basing relation rational explanation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... to causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
...-based resemblance relation to another. In section 5,
185
CATHARINE ABELL
I build on this epistemic story to provide an exact specification of the
resemblance relation such that one object’s bearing it to another is both
necessary...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
... qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in certain ways. By analyzing modesty in this way, we can best explain the distinct features of modesty, keep much of what is intuitive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
.... The basing relation, like the in-virtue-of relation, is
another important but poorly understood relation. For the sake of this
essay, I will endorse the following relatively uncontroversial characteriza-
tion. The basing relation is supposed to capture what it is for a mental
state M (or perhaps...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2000
... rational insight are
likely to be true, this fact is general and cannot be directly justified by
experience. The basing relation is controversial. But if, as seems plausible,
it involves a counterfactual dependence of the belief on the insight, then
the fact that such a relation obtains...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
... how to precisely characterize the well-groundedness or basing relation (see Korcz 1997 for an overview), but the important point for my purposes is that Well-Groundedness imposes a necessary condition on justified belief that is not captured by ES or by other standards of evidential support...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
..., then we would need to revise conditions (i) and (ii) to make sure that an epistemizer including a false justified belief would count as mediate. 5. Here I set aside worries about whether a purely psychological-basing relation would be sufficient to gain knowledge from factors that position one...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (3): 223–263.
Published: 01 July 2024
... A . Strictly speaking, there is no function—and, thus, no surjection—from any nonempty set to the empty set. 9. While the above notation for the surjection-based relations is standard in the literature, I am not aware of any previous defense of the claim that the surjective account constitutes...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... things. First, the conditions for reason-based representability with a transitive weighing relation are more demanding than those for reason-based representability simpliciter . Second, the conditions for reason-based representability with a reflexive weighing relation are the same as those for reason...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 140–146.
Published: 01 January 2017
... demands on all parties involved seem to be about as high as in the intentional model. Further, it is still an open question if such a highly demanding deliberative process does not run the risk of entrenching ideological barriers. The major alternative to deliberative models is a democratic process based...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 635–638.
Published: 01 October 2001
... at issue need not (likely would not) accept the needed presupposition.
Unless Brewer thinks that all reference is fundamentally perceptual or that
all beliefs are perceptually based, we cannot conclude that every basic empirical
belief has its content only in virtue of its relations to perceptual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
... consists of the following two claims (where ‘NI’ abbreviates ‘nature-based interpretation’): (NI-Dep) x depends on y if and only if (1) there is some relation R such that x R y , and (2) x R y by x 's nature but not by y 's nature. 72 (NI-Sub) x is a substance if and only...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 159–210.
Published: 01 April 2020
... like consent or choices that may be based on them. It turns out that the very characterization of adaptive preferences needs some work. In particular, we need to distinguish adaptive preferences from other closely related phenomena. With a picture of adaptive preferences at hand, I proceed to discuss...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
... of arithmetical cognition and inclusion in his conception of number. I argued that on the best possible reconstruction of his views, Kant's conception of number includes a conception of number in general based on the sizes of collections whose ordering is grounded in part-whole relations, and includes principles...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
... of Inductive Logic, ed. J. Hintikka and P. Suppes. Amsterdam: North Holland. ____. 1975 . The Logic of Conditionals. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Bacchus, F., A. J. Grove, J. Y Halpern, and D. Koller. 1996 . “From Statistical Knowledge Bases to Degrees of Belief.” Artificial Intelligence 87 : 75 -143...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2018
... perceivers, objects, and the like, and take that to be the bearer of chromatic properties” (143). She therefore rejects both standard realist views that hold external items have colors as well as brain-based irrealist views that relocate color qualities or qualia “in the brain” (Averill, Block, Lormand...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
... are they merely nonnormative explanatory reasons. 31 The fact that this or that consideration is a chess-based reason, or an etiquette-based reason, or an epistemic reason does not seem to be expressible without loss in nonnormative terms. For instance, Kelly (2003) argues that the epistemic support relation...
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