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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
...: that there is no exhaustive classification of sentences into “good” and “bad” such that the T-schema holds when restricted to the “good” sentences unless it is also possible to prove some “bad” sentences. The foundations for an alternative classical nonlinguistic approach is outlined that is not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
...) and (ii) are inconsistent with the popular belief that, other things being equal, when people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they ought to be punished for this—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. Insofar as we cannot deny (i), we are either...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 251–256.
Published: 01 April 2018
... “disability.” But the movement thus identified has revised any such intuitive understanding of disability, developing rules that go well beyond the intuition, rather than circling back to it. Chapter 2 introduces and defends that idea that disability, so defined, is, in itself, a mere, rather than a bad...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 411–422.
Published: 01 July 2000
... value to promise keeping per se have analogues that argue equally well that break- ing a promise is not intrinsically morally bad. Smith takes up four likely bases for attributing moral value to promise keeping. She points out that they rely on contingent ef- fects rather than something...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 120–122.
Published: 01 January 2001
...) of one or anoth- er of the evils highlighted in part 3. Significant moral freedom, for example, is possible only if we are genuinely able to choose between good and bad. But (says Swinburne) that ability is present only where our desires incline us toward doing what our reason tells us is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 138–142.
Published: 01 January 2016
... significant in common—only a “disjunction”—to perceptual experiences in good and bad cases. Pritchard is neutral on this view, defending only the epistemic thesis above. Pritchard does not discuss why his view is called “disjunctivism”—no disjunctions are emphasized. Most of Pritchard's energy in this...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 288–290.
Published: 01 April 2005
... are allowed to reject applicants on nonclinical grounds—on grounds of “social or moral suitability for treatment”—then they may come to reject applicants for very bad reasons, such as their race (51). But why would the trend be toward ever greater restrictions, especially if this would be bad for...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
... know of no very convincing general proposals about just how risk averse you can be on a person's behalf, without being unreasonable. We may all agree that it is unreasonable to be perfectly risk averse on a person's behalf, to care only about minimizing the badness of the worst thing that can happen to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 434–436.
Published: 01 July 2001
...) indicating in what respect punishment of the innocent is bad or how bad it is relative to the badness of impairing the systemic values. Hence, I am inclined to doubt that Hurd has fully shown that the most promising consequentialist theory favors a strict application of weak retributivism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 417–428.
Published: 01 July 2002
... different mental states. Since a person in a “good” normal situation of veridical percep- tion knows things that are not known by a person who is internally a duplicate but externally in a “bad” skeptical situation like being a brain- in-a-vat or being perfectly deceived by an evil demon, the person in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2005) 114 (3): 414–416.
Published: 01 July 2005
... lives and that this in fact counts as the sort of bad luck that even Aristotle would have to agree could interfere with flourishing without necessarily destroying virtue, eudaimonism itself must recognize this by doing without thesis (E). A more sophisticated form of eudaimonism can connect virtue...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2007) 116 (1): 93–114.
Published: 01 January 2007
... that she has the lesion, and therefore is evidence that she is likely to get cancer, as a rea- son not to smoke. Causal decision theory tells her to smoke, roughly, because it does not treat this sort of common-cause-based evidential connection between an action and a bad outcome as a reason not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 647–650.
Published: 01 October 2007
..., chapter 2, “Death and Deprivation,” teases apart two arguments often found together in Epi- curean sources.1 According to the first, death is nothing to us because death ends all perception, and what is not perceived is nothing to us (alternatively, because every good or bad resides in perception...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 650–653.
Published: 01 October 2007
... apart two arguments often found together in Epi- curean sources.1 According to the first, death is nothing to us because death ends all perception, and what is not perceived is nothing to us (alternatively, because every good or bad resides in perception).2 Against this, it may be argued that at...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 654–656.
Published: 01 October 2007
... and Deprivation,” teases apart two arguments often found together in Epi- curean sources.1 According to the first, death is nothing to us because death ends all perception, and what is not perceived is nothing to us (alternatively, because every good or bad resides in perception).2 Against this...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 657–663.
Published: 01 October 2007
... because death ends all perception, and what is not perceived is nothing to us (alternatively, because every good or bad resides in perception).2 Against this, it may be argued that at least some evils do not need to be perceived in order to be bad for someone; evils may be relational or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 663–666.
Published: 01 October 2007
... often found together in Epi- curean sources.1 According to the first, death is nothing to us because death ends all perception, and what is not perceived is nothing to us (alternatively, because every good or bad resides in perception).2 Against this, it may be argued that at least some evils do...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
... is good about modesty and what is bad about immodesty. Other Accounts: Ignorance and Accuracy 1. Modesty as Ignorance The bulk of the contemporary philosophical literature on modesty is made up of various responses to Julia Driver’s account. For Driver, mod- esty is a paradigm case of what...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2004) 113 (4): 560–566.
Published: 01 October 2004
... (henceforth the Thesis). This is the claim that all goods other than virtue are “dependent goods,” which is to say that they are good for people who possess virtue, but bad for the unvirtuous. The dependent goods conspicuously include such things as health, wealth, political influence, and the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 422–426.
Published: 01 July 2018
... the ossified consensus. Rather, we are continuing a line of scrutiny that started with Hempel: we are asking what noncausal explanations are, how they work, and what norms distinguish the good from the bad. The possibility of noncausal explanation is exciting, but whether these examples buck the...