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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 1-27.
Published: 01 January 2009
... time. It proposes that the puzzle can be resolved by a view according to which for an agent to watch an object throughout a period of time is for that agent to maintain visual awareness of that object with the aim of perceptually knowing what that object is doing. The essay goes on to make some further...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 435-437.
Published: 01 July 2004
... heart of their disagreement: the question whether justification requires the subject to be aware of what her belief has going for it. BonJour says yes and Sosa says no. Both recognize that there are difficulties to be faced on either side of the debate. The great value of this book lies in the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 264-268.
Published: 01 April 2018
... those views. In this section of the book, Hill delivers an impressive array of considerations in support of the view that our awareness of qualitative states is representational (chaps. 9 and 10 focus on pain, chaps. 11 and 12 on vision). He also argues that a representational theory of awareness can...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 511-518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... argument, and the Cartesian modal argument. As can be seen from the foregoing formulation, the hypothesis rests on the doctrine that awareness of phenomenal properties is always representational in character: when one is aware of a phenomenal property, one's state of awareness is partially constituted...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 141-144.
Published: 01 January 2000
... argumentative part of the book, then, consists mainly in meeting, either by rebuttal or by accommodation, claims about the contribution of aware- ness of large-scale form to musical understanding that might plausibly be made by an architectonicist. These claims are that “conscious awareness of or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 341-348.
Published: 01 July 2019
... “‘assumption’ that an auditory and visual stimulus belong to a unified environmental source” (68). (Reasons of space require me to omit summaries of chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 is discussed at the end.) Chapters 7 and 8 argue that perceptual awareness is richly rather than minimally multimodal. The...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 432-434.
Published: 01 July 2003
... BOOK REVIEWS ming) that renders the activity rewarding (say, pleasurable). (3) Audi wants to leave it open that there may be things of intrinsic value other than experience. The important point is that an intrinsic desire for a thing cannot be rational unless it is based on an awareness of its...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 606-608.
Published: 01 October 2001
...—freedom as the absence of obstacles—we can’t assume that even thoughtful modern people will be aware of having an aspiration to radical self-determination. Franco mentions some of Charles Taylor’s work on this subject (187), but he doesn’t explain its relevance in any detail. So his account of why...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 134-138.
Published: 01 January 2019
... doing philosophy, a sense that there are puzzles we have ignored and that if we just follow along we might find our way to solutions. These essays fall roughly into three categories. They concern the metaphysics of the self, the epistemology of self-awareness, and the sense in which a life is (or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 307-310.
Published: 01 April 2013
... denying that he finds a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct from the experience as a whole, but there is a sense in which the subject is an “explicit object” (87) of his attention. What he does not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 310-314.
Published: 01 April 2013
... mistaken. In saying “I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception,” Hume is not denying that he finds a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 314-317.
Published: 01 April 2013
... denying that he finds a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct from the experience as a whole, but there is a sense in which the subject is an “explicit object” (87) of his attention. What he does not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 318-322.
Published: 01 April 2013
... denying that he finds a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct from the experience as a whole, but there is a sense in which the subject is an “explicit object” (87) of his attention. What he does not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 322-325.
Published: 01 April 2013
... denying that he finds a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct from the experience as a whole, but there is a sense in which the subject is an “explicit object” (87) of his attention. What he does not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 325-327.
Published: 01 April 2013
... denying that he finds a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct from the experience as a whole, but there is a sense in which the subject is an “explicit object” (87) of his attention. What he does not...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 302-306.
Published: 01 April 2016
... a cognate), one is aware of one's self, one's noumenal self, not just an appearance of it. This claim is consistent with (A) because such reference yields a “bare consciousness of self that is far from being knowledge of it” (B158). Wuerth argues for this distinction repeatedly—but he does not avail...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 531-563.
Published: 01 October 2010
... which our awareness of ourselves is inadequate. Self-knowledge is an especially valuable good for Spinoza. These remarks both make the point that self-knowledge is not simply available to introspection and also show why self-knowledge is so valuable: where it is not supplemented by self-knowledge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 121-125.
Published: 01 January 2018
... attempt is made at relating these notions to either current philosophy of mind or cognitive science. The reader should also be aware that this work presupposes some familiarity with Allison's previous writings on the first Critique . Allison continues to maintain that Kant's view that knowledge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 642-645.
Published: 01 October 2000
... solutions and sees better answers in Des- cartes’s epistemology. In chapter 1, Vinci argues that Cartesian epistemology provides an an- swer to contemporary critics of foundationalism, who argue that it is im- possible to transform the awareness of nonpropositional items into knowl- edge of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 281-284.
Published: 01 April 2002
... will be much that is unquestioned, immune to criticism in practice for the simple reason that we have found no reason to doubt it, the mistake as Sellars calls it, the Myth of the Given is to think that some elements or aspects of our awareness are unquestionable, immune to rational reflective...