..., the authors draw on an analogy with a similar distinction between types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. This motivates a two-level account of the structure of normativity. The account relies upon a further distinction between normative reasons and authoritatively normative reasons. Only...

... realists would be reluctant to place so much weight on normative role qua practical profile. For them, the key to normativity is not a conventional association with motivation, preference, intention, or the like (pace Wedgwood); the key is a sense of inherent, authoritative guidance or favoring...

.... It’s not clear how the transcendental argument could show that conscience is truly authoritative, as opposed to showing that we must believe it to be. And Darwall’s objection to the teleological argument, that it can’t establish the normativity of proper functioning or give us reason to function...

... not a description of the physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosophical issues such as representation...

... ordinary speech by ordinary speakers under ordinary circumstances constitutes harm in virtue of enacting harmful norms. Mary Kate McGowan starts the book with the following examples to illustrate. An offhand sexist remark about sexual conquests at work oppresses women without the speaker intending...

... thought. In his practical philosophy, Kant maps out strong connections between practical ratio- nality, freedom, and morally permissible action. If these connections can be sustained, they would provide a satisfyingly robust account of the normativity of morality. Such an account would construe...

... authoritative than mere requests, and more distinctively related to X than the mere judgment that Y should ϕ because of what they owe to X, which anyone can make. If Y doesn't ϕ, then all else being equal, Y doesn't merely act wrongly, but wrongs X. For example, in standard circumstances, if you promise to meet...

... of the Phenomenology s epistemological tasks is a lucid and authoritative account of the work s official justificatory strategies, but since it largely recapitulates views laid out in his excellent earlier book, Hegel and Skepticism, I shall discuss it only briefly. This part of the book is a careful reconstruction...

... to the contrary (92-104) .) The class of the passions is the class of the conative; and the conative is essential to our intentional agency. Passions also rule in a second way: they are essential to normative thought and talk. In particular, certain passions are what is expressed by thought and talk...

... should consider those possible con- flicting perspectives on their own, when being used wittingly by other people. Which other people? Those who are “authoritative”—which amounts to having a view of the situation that is “rationally derived according to standards appro- priate to the subject-matter...

... should consider those possible con- flicting perspectives on their own, when being used wittingly by other people. Which other people? Those who are “authoritative”—which amounts to having a view of the situation that is “rationally derived according to standards appro- priate to the subject-matter...

... should consider those possible con- flicting perspectives on their own, when being used wittingly by other people. Which other people? Those who are “authoritative”—which amounts to having a view of the situation that is “rationally derived according to standards appro- priate to the subject-matter...

... used wittingly by other people. Which other people? Those who are “authoritative”—which amounts to having a view of the situation that is “rationally derived according to standards appro- priate to the subject-matter” (130). How would those people individually assess the confused Fred’s claims...

... (and even that actual, enduring consensus plays some role in it), but Hegel places normative constraints on truth-consti- tuting consensus that must be taken into account if his position is to be plausible. (To mention just two: consensus must be reflectively stable, and it must be that of a free...

... who are “authoritative”—which amounts to having a view of the situation that is “rationally derived according to standards appro- priate to the subject-matter” (130). How would those people individually assess the confused Fred’s claims or thoughts (issuing verdicts of Y, N, ?, or Y&N)? If we...

... philosophy misconceives the relation between mind and world and consequently misplaces the source of the authority of reasons. On the naturalist model characteristic of modernity, reason is the active faculty that pro- duces reasons and invests the world with its normativity. By contrast, Larmore insists...

... with its normativity. By contrast, Larmore insists that “the world contains a normative dimension to which our reason is responsive” (9). Reasons are irreducible normative relations that obtain inde- pendently of the contribution of the mind and to which the mind is responsive insofar as it is rational...

... with its normativity. By contrast, Larmore insists that “the world contains a normative dimension to which our reason is responsive” (9). Reasons are irreducible normative relations that obtain inde- pendently of the contribution of the mind and to which the mind is responsive insofar as it is rational...

... with its normativity. By contrast, Larmore insists that “the world contains a normative dimension to which our reason is responsive” (9). Reasons are irreducible normative relations that obtain inde- pendently of the contribution of the mind and to which the mind is responsive insofar as it is rational...

... with its normativity. By contrast, Larmore insists that “the world contains a normative dimension to which our reason is responsive” (9). Reasons are irreducible normative relations that obtain inde- pendently of the contribution of the mind and to which the mind is responsive insofar as it is rational...