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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
... are ambiguous between de re * and de dicto * interpretations. This fact is used to account for asymmetric mistaken identity attributions (for example, Biron thinks Katherine is Rosaline, but he doesn't think Rosaline is Katherine ). The variable theory compares favorably with its alternatives, including...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... of which properties of the objects of moral choice matter in any given context, and (ii) a specification of how these properties matter. Reason-based representations provide a very general taxonomy of moral theories, as differences among theories can be attributed to differences in their two key parameters...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
... attributing any particular meaning to an expression is modally plastic: its truth depends very sensitively on the exact microphysical state of the world. However, such plasticity seems to threaten ordinary counterfactuals whose consequents contain speech reports, since it is hard to see how we could...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
... aside the role of intuition for the nonce to investigate Kant's conception of natural number. Although Kant himself doesn't distinguish between a cardinal and an ordinal conception of number, some of the properties Kant attributes to number can be characterized as cardinal or ordinal. This essay argues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
...Alexander W. Kocurek A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem nontrivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions...
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
... experience requires that bodies are sensuously colored, and (iii) the attribution of sensuous colors to bodies provides the best explanation of color constancy. Although some passages might suggest that Cavendish endorses a reductive account of sensuous color, according to which sensuous color reduces...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Andrew Bacon Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 139–143.
Published: 01 January 2004
.... The commitments in question are the explanatory and concep- tual barrier between the attributes and the Identity of Indiscernibles. The explanatory and conceptual barrier means that nothing that falls under one attribute can play any part in the explanation or conception of something that falls under another...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 292–297.
Published: 01 April 2016
... as the priority of the independent (substance and attributes) over the dependent (modes). I am not as sure as Melamed is that this principle is “far less recognized in the existing literature” (xv) than is the PSR. Nonetheless, Melamed is certainly right that Spinoza embraces the priority principle...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 515–518.
Published: 01 October 2018
... knows what S is and seeks whether P belongs to it as one of its demonstrable attributes (i.e., whether it holds of S by necessity, or for the most part, without being part of its essence). At stage 4, she knows that P belongs to S as a demonstrable attribute and seeks why it belongs (the cause being...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 180–185.
Published: 01 January 2021
... bacteria. Many critics regard this consequence as implausible, because one can satisfactorily explain magnetotaxis without any attribution of representational content ( Burge 2010 : 300). Shea avoids attributing representational content to magnetotactic bacteria by imposing a robustness constraint...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 373–378.
Published: 01 July 2022
... themselves have begun to reckon with the world of nonlinguistic signs (Schlenker 2019). For Kulvicki, there are a variety of communicative uses for pictures, each with its own semantic mechanisms and types of meaning. In their central attributive use , the subject of chapters 1 and 2, pictures express...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 664–669.
Published: 01 October 2020
... the concept of God to be the concept of the greatest possible being. (2) It supposes that the meaning of the word “God” has some intimate connection to the description “the greatest possible being”. (3) It maintains that the divine attributes—the properties of God—can be derived from the concept of God...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... both successful singular reference and successful attributive indication of kinds, properties, or relations. “Represents as such” is more committal. Take the instance, “represents bodies as such.”1 The phrase applies to language or representational content that represents bodies as being bodies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 575–578.
Published: 01 October 2015
...). Clearly he is interested in voluntariness as a causal notion, and so we may attribute to him an interest in responsibility (where ‘responsible’ means simply ‘the cause of’). But is the sort of responsibility Aristotle has in mind moral responsibility? A few decades ago, the debate on this question...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 497–534.
Published: 01 October 2005
...-attribution and showing that it explains the relevant phenomena. The phenomena we adduce will include cases in which the question whether a truth-regu- lated acceptance should be classified as a belief appears to be under- determined by the facts, just as it would be if classifying such an accep- tance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 469–473.
Published: 01 July 2020
...) and a participation in the way in which God knows himself. The book’s third section contains three chapters on Spinoza’s attributes: a study of Spinoza’s and Locke’s critical responses to the Cartesian arguments against the possibility of things which are both extended and thinking (chap. 8), a substantial...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... or not, Pereboom is committed to saying that when we use an introspective representation to attribute a qualitative nature to a phenomenal property, the attribution is always erroneous. But naturalistic theories of representation normally imply that representation involves a relationship of covariance between...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 560–566.
Published: 01 October 2004
... reasoning. If the Theory accepts these claims, it cannot avoid the regress problem. If the regress problem cannot be avoided, the Theory is undermined. Given these consequences, we should be reluctant to attribute distinctively rational powers to the lower soul-parts, unless there is decisive evidence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 642–645.
Published: 01 October 2000
... on to explain how Descartes could make the transition from nonpropositional knowledge to propositional knowledge. He relies on the Principles ofPhilosophy (henceforth Principles) 1:52. There, Descartes writes: “if we perceive the presence of some attribute, we can infer that there must also be present...