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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
... ambiguous between de re * and de dicto * interpretations. This fact is used to account for asymmetric mistaken identity attributions (for example, Biron thinks Katherine is Rosaline, but he doesn't think Rosaline is Katherine ). The variable theory compares favorably with its alternatives, including...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... which properties of the objects of moral choice matter in any given context, and (ii) a specification of how these properties matter. Reason-based representations provide a very general taxonomy of moral theories, as differences among theories can be attributed to differences in their two key parameters...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
...Alexander W. Kocurek A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem nontrivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions...
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Andrew Bacon Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status. “No...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
... attributing any particular meaning to an expression is modally plastic: its truth depends very sensitively on the exact microphysical state of the world. However, such plasticity seems to threaten ordinary counterfactuals whose consequents contain speech reports, since it is hard to see how we could...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
... aside the role of intuition for the nonce to investigate Kant's conception of natural number. Although Kant himself doesn't distinguish between a cardinal and an ordinal conception of number, some of the properties Kant attributes to number can be characterized as cardinal or ordinal. This essay argues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2004) 113 (1): 139–143.
Published: 01 January 2004
... appreciated. The commitments in question are the explanatory and concep- tual barrier between the attributes and the Identity of Indiscernibles. The explanatory and conceptual barrier means that nothing that falls under one attribute can play any part in the explanation or conception of something that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 292–297.
Published: 01 April 2016
... knowledge’” (xv). More generally, given Melamed's emphasis on the priority of infinite substance over infinite modes, the priority principle can be expressed as the priority of the independent (substance and attributes) over the dependent (modes). I am not as sure as Melamed is that this principle is “far...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 515–518.
Published: 01 October 2018
... (i.e., whether it has an essence). At stage 2, she knows that S exists and seeks what its essence is. At stage 3, she knows what S is and seeks whether P belongs to it as one of its demonstrable attributes (i.e., whether it holds of S by necessity, or for the most part, without being part of its...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 575–578.
Published: 01 October 2015
...–35). Clearly he is interested in voluntariness as a causal notion, and so we may attribute to him an interest in responsibility (where ‘responsible’ means simply ‘the cause of’). But is the sort of responsibility Aristotle has in mind moral responsibility? A few decades ago, the debate on...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... subject matter. I use “represents ” to comprise both successful singular reference and successful attributive indication of kinds, properties, or relations. “Represents as such” is more committal. Take the instance, “represents bodies as such.”1 The phrase applies to language or representational...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 642–645.
Published: 01 October 2000
... goes on to explain how Descartes could make the transition from nonpropositional knowledge to propositional knowledge. He relies on the Principles ofPhilosophy (henceforth Principles) 1:52. There, Descartes writes: “if we perceive the presence of some attribute, we can infer that there must...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... understand him, whether qualitative natures are natural or not, Pereboom is committed to saying that when we use an introspective representation to attribute a qualitative nature to a phenomenal property, the attribution is always erroneous. But naturalistic theories of representation normally imply that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2004) 113 (4): 560–566.
Published: 01 October 2004
... for them and that they are capable of means-end reasoning. If the Theory accepts these claims, it cannot avoid the regress problem. If the regress problem cannot be avoided, the Theory is undermined. Given these consequences, we should be reluctant to attribute distinctively rational powers to the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 497–534.
Published: 01 October 2005
... for an interpretation of the concept of correctness along norm-expressivist lines.31 We will defend our choice of expressivism only to the extent of developing a coherent expressivist account of belief-attribution and showing that it explains the relevant phenomena. The phenomena we adduce...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 551–553.
Published: 01 October 2005
... as providing different ways of describing the same quan- titative attribute—like the fullness and emptiness of a bottle (“two-thirds empty” = “one third full,” etc Trivalence would instead seem to imply that we have two quantitative attributes: a person’s degree of overall freedom is one thing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 571–575.
Published: 01 October 2015
... Socrates does after all attribute to the philosophers of book 7 the qualities attributed to those of book 6: hatred of lies, moderation, courage, and all kinds of virtue (535d–36a). Weiss dismisses this as only a belated attribution (77), as if the attribution were made any less damaging for her thesis...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 579–582.
Published: 01 October 2002
... fact, though, Poincaré’s philoso- phy of physics and his philosophy of mathematics turn out to be fundamentally different. Zahar attributes to Poincaré a “structural realist” view of physics and a “quasi-Kantian” constructivist view of mathematics. It’s not entirely clear, though, why the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
Published: 01 April 2002
... independently of one another: contex- tualism about knowledge attributions and the knowledge account of assertion. The positions under discussion are both located in the area of over- lap between epistemology and the philosophy of language, and they have both received a good deal of attention in recent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 532–535.
Published: 01 October 2017
.... It is not clear, however, to what degree this amounts to a criticism of Zalabardo's approach. For he denies that “faithful interpretation of Wittgenstein's thought” is his ultimate goal (9). In keeping with this disavowal, he claims license to develop the arguments he attributes to Wittgenstein “at a...