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attitudes

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Daniel Drucker This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Seth Shabo In his seminal essay “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson drew attention to the role of such emotions as resentment, moral indignation, and guilt in our moral and personal lives. According to Strawson, these reactive attitudes are at once constitutive of moral blame and inseparable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 207–253.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Seth Yalcin As Quine (1956) observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true, would be of special interest to the authorities: (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy. This is the reading where the quantifier is naturally understood as taking wide scope relative to the attitude verb...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Michael Caie An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... the hypothesis and by arguing that there is no easy way to defeat it—prima facie counterexamples are many, but none of them withstand serious scrutiny. Then the article presents a real counterexample—a hitherto largely neglected reading of quantified attitude-reports where the attitude verb splits the quantifier...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., and are such that epistemic warrant is preserved across the episodes of fission and often involves quasimemories that are not memories. But what he says about memory does not support the denial that such creatures are possible. Where he thinks de se attitudes are necessary, de se * attitudes, indexed to quareers instead...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Tyler Burge A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine constitutive conditions under which accurate (objective) empirical representation of the macrophysical environment is possible. A view that dominated attitudes on this project maintained that an individual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Huw Price In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance.” The present essay aims to motivate this same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... they are in the scope of epistemic modals or attitude verbs. The new view has two interesting philosophical consequences. First, it vindicates a broadly Fregean perspective on referential expressions, essentially refuting the idea that indexicals are rigid designators. Second, it suggests a new picture...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... theory and a dynamic system of contingent identity. I then consider a variant on the initial puzzle that helps us to choose between the two theories. The variant also sheds light on how the phenomenon discussed in this essay relates to Frege's Puzzle about attitude ascriptions. I don't see how...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 481–531.
Published: 01 October 2021
... defending a new Attitudinal-Representational Theory of perceptual valence, according to which perceptual valence is constituted by first-order conative attitudes directed toward the representational objects of experiences. Case D—Sudden Dramatic Valence Shift: D1. Dinna loves cocoa. One morning...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
..., being variables, refer rigidly in the latter merely intensional contexts, but may vary their reference in hyperintensional contexts. This conforms to the intuition that the content of attitude ascriptions encapsulates referential uncertainty . Furthermore, names in hyperintensional contexts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... modality semantics local contexts connectives attitudes conditionals quantifiers Moore (1942) observed that there is something wrong with asserting a sentence like (1): 1 (1) #It's raining but I don't know it's raining. Generally speaking, Moore sentences with the form ⌜p, but I...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
... of the relevant normativity must adhere, rather than offering a substantive explanation of the relevant normativity, given that our understanding of these higher-order telic attitudes comes only from the role those attitudes are supposed to play in the relevant theory. 14. Setiya (2007, 49) makes...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 497–534.
Published: 01 October 2005
... that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regard- ing p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 285–295.
Published: 01 April 2017
... to the nature of holding responsible” (30). The second is the claim that holding responsible ought to be explained in terms of our moral reactive attitudes and practices. Taken together these two claims, McKenna notes, involve a commitment to both an interpersonal and a conative-affective theory (46). The third...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 321–326.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., all the sentences, period— express a single nonpropositional attitude of approval. Let S be a set of sen- 3 tences with S i in S expressing approval of act type Ai. Suppose we close S under negation, conjunction, and disjunction. Act types are properties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 326–329.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., all the sentences, period— express a single nonpropositional attitude of approval. Let S be a set of sen- 3 tences with S i in S expressing approval of act type Ai. Suppose we close S under negation, conjunction, and disjunction. Act types are properties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 589–592.
Published: 01 October 2016
... , not members of the fictitious tribe Homo philosophicus that figures in much of the recent philosophical literature on self-knowledge, namely, in the work of those he calls “Rationalists.” Rationalism embraces the “Transparency Method” (TM) to account for our knowledge of our propositional attitudes. He...