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attitudes

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... hypothesis and by arguing that there is no easy way to defeat it—prima facie counterexamples are many, but none of them withstand serious scrutiny. Then the article presents a real counterexample—a hitherto largely neglected reading of quantified attitude-reports where the attitude verb splits the quantifier...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Michael Caie An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Seth Shabo In his seminal essay “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson drew attention to the role of such emotions as resentment, moral indignation, and guilt in our moral and personal lives. According to Strawson, these reactive attitudes are at once constitutive of moral blame and inseparable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 207–253.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Seth Yalcin As Quine (1956) observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true, would be of special interest to the authorities: (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy. This is the reading where the quantifier is naturally understood as taking wide scope relative to the attitude verb...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., and are such that epistemic warrant is preserved across the episodes of fission and often involves quasimemories that are not memories. But what he says about memory does not support the denial that such creatures are possible. Where he thinks de se attitudes are necessary, de se * attitudes, indexed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Tyler Burge A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine constitutive conditions under which accurate (objective) empirical representation of the macrophysical environment is possible. A view that dominated attitudes on this project maintained that an individual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... scope of epistemic modals or attitude verbs. The new view has two interesting philosophical consequences. First, it vindicates a broadly Fregean perspective on referential expressions, essentially refuting the idea that indexicals are rigid designators. Second, it suggests a new picture of the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
..., being variables, refer rigidly in the latter merely intensional contexts, but may vary their reference in hyperintensional contexts. This conforms to the intuition that the content of attitude ascriptions encapsulates referential uncertainty . Furthermore, names in hyperintensional contexts are...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Huw Price In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance.” The present essay aims to motivate this same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism, with...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 433–485.
Published: 01 October 2018
... theory and a dynamic system of contingent identity. I then consider a variant on the initial puzzle that helps us to choose between the two theories. The variant also sheds light on how the phenomenon discussed in this essay relates to Frege's Puzzle about attitude ascriptions. © 2018 by Cornell...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 1–61.
Published: 01 January 2019
... epistemic modality semantics local contexts connectives attitudes conditionals quantifiers Moore (1942) observed that there is something wrong with asserting a sentence like (1): 1 (1) #It's raining but I don't know it's raining. Generally speaking, Moore sentences with the form ⌜p...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 35–82.
Published: 01 January 2016
... expressivism semantics infinitival questions nonpropositional attitudes This paper is about three topics: know-how, metaethical expressivism, and foundational questions in the theory of meaning. Know-how and expressivism are usually regarded as disjoint subjects, belonging to distant provinces of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 589–592.
Published: 01 October 2016
... , not members of the fictitious tribe Homo philosophicus that figures in much of the recent philosophical literature on self-knowledge, namely, in the work of those he calls “Rationalists.” Rationalism embraces the “Transparency Method” (TM) to account for our knowledge of our propositional attitudes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 285–295.
Published: 01 April 2017
... to the nature of holding responsible” (30). The second is the claim that holding responsible ought to be explained in terms of our moral reactive attitudes and practices. Taken together these two claims, McKenna notes, involve a commitment to both an interpersonal and a conative-affective theory (46...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
...” how things are with the world. The second, which we shall call the telic DOF, flows outward from the mind to the world, so that some states of mind (pro-attitudes, or desires, or maybe intentions) “aim at realization” or are such that the world “ought to fit” them. 1 These slogans present an...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 321–326.
Published: 01 April 2011
... which all the atomic sentences—and therefore, all the sentences, period— express a single nonpropositional attitude of approval. Let S be a set of sen- 3 tences with S i in S expressing approval of act type Ai. Suppose we close S under negation, conjunction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 326–329.
Published: 01 April 2011
... which all the atomic sentences—and therefore, all the sentences, period— express a single nonpropositional attitude of approval. Let S be a set of sen- 3 tences with S i in S expressing approval of act type Ai. Suppose we close S under negation, conjunction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 497–534.
Published: 01 October 2005
... p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regard- ing p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 408–413.
Published: 01 July 2018
...” thesis that “it is possible and fruitful to theorize about the structure and function of discourse independently of a specific theory about the mechanisms that languages use to serve those functions” (1). The program is broadly Gricean, explaining the contents of utterances and attitudes independently of...