...David James Barnett Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p , but I don't believe that p...

..., parentheticalism opens the door to altogether eliminating the act-type of assertion from linguistic theorizing. © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 knowledge representation assertion, Moore's paradox parenthetical verbs use-conditional meaning References Adler, Jonathan. 2002. Belief's Own Ethics...

..., and Rational Credibility 5. The Knowledge Version of Moore’s Paradox Everyone agrees that assertions of the schematic form ϕ, but I do not know ϕ (9) are somehow odd. What accounts for this oddness? Surely it cannot be that they are inconsistent, for they are not: substituting for ϕ any truth I...

... the paradox as involving an agent who asserts a conjunction of the form, ‘A and I do not believe that A’. I am interested in agents who believe pairs of propositions of the form ‘A’ and ‘I do not believe that A’. Moore intends to make a point about the distinction between what a speaker says and what he...

... be tempting to align a commitment to objectivity in ethics with a commitment to intrinsic value. G. E. Moore thought that a hankering after objectivity was really a hankering after intrinsic value, and he envis- aged an entailment in one direction at any rate: “from the proposition that a particular...

...Andrew Chignell A. W. Moore, Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Variations in Kant's Moral and Religious Philosophy . New York: Routledge, 2003. xx + 249 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge...

... language on the con- temporary notion of a language of thought, or the relation between medi- eval and contemporary treatments of the semantic paradoxes. Likewise, Klima does not relate medieval theories of universals to recent work, even though the revival of interest in this topic, largely thanks...

... and contemporary treatments of the semantic paradoxes. Likewise, Klima does not relate medieval theories of universals to recent work, even though the revival of interest in this topic, largely thanks to the work of D. M. Armstrong, was inspired by medieval theories. I mention these two chapters simply...

... and contemporary treatments of the semantic paradoxes. Likewise, Klima does not relate medieval theories of universals to recent work, even though the revival of interest in this topic, largely thanks to the work of D. M. Armstrong, was inspired by medieval theories. I mention these two chapters simply...

... and contemporary treatments of the semantic paradoxes. Likewise, Klima does not relate medieval theories of universals to recent work, even though the revival of interest in this topic, largely thanks to the work of D. M. Armstrong, was inspired by medieval theories. I mention these two chapters simply...

... language on the con- temporary notion of a language of thought, or the relation between medi- eval and contemporary treatments of the semantic paradoxes. Likewise, Klima does not relate medieval theories of universals to recent work, even though the revival of interest in this topic, largely thanks...

..., or the relation between medi- eval and contemporary treatments of the semantic paradoxes. Likewise, Klima does not relate medieval theories of universals to recent work, even though the revival of interest in this topic, largely thanks to the work of D. M. Armstrong, was inspired by medieval theories. I...

... language on the con- temporary notion of a language of thought, or the relation between medi- eval and contemporary treatments of the semantic paradoxes. Likewise, Klima does not relate medieval theories of universals to recent work, even though the revival of interest in this topic, largely thanks...

... and contemporary treatments of the semantic paradoxes. Likewise, Klima does not relate medieval theories of universals to recent work, even though the revival of interest in this topic, largely thanks to the work of D. M. Armstrong, was inspired by medieval theories. I mention these two chapters simply...

..., and it is not secondarily improper since she knows that her assertion is very probably true.8 Sentences of the form “p, but I don’t know that p,” which I shall call Moorean sentences, generally seem paradoxical, and this also lends sup- port to the knowledge account. Moore (1962, 277) observed that it seems odd...

... point out what to my thinking is one of the most important recommenda- tions of the account: that it provides a nice handling of the knowledge version of Moore’s paradox and other troubling conjunctions. Famously, Moore noted the oddity of assertions of the form “P, but I...

... that when Moore urged that fundamental ethical propositions are incapable of proof, he meant to assert merely that they can- not be shown to be true by defi nition. I doubt that Moore would have denied that although the proposition P1 Enjoyment of beautiful artworks is intrinsically good...

... that when Moore urged that fundamental ethical propositions are incapable of proof, he meant to assert merely that they can- not be shown to be true by defi nition. I doubt that Moore would have denied that although the proposition P1 Enjoyment of beautiful artworks is intrinsically good...

... that when Moore urged that fundamental ethical propositions are incapable of proof, he meant to assert merely that they can- not be shown to be true by defi nition. I doubt that Moore would have denied that although the proposition P1 Enjoyment of beautiful artworks is intrinsically good...

... that when Moore urged that fundamental ethical propositions are incapable of proof, he meant to assert merely that they can- not be shown to be true by defi nition. I doubt that Moore would have denied that although the proposition P1 Enjoyment of beautiful artworks is intrinsically good...