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Journal Article

Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion

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John Greco
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 349–353.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10317645
Published: 01 April 2023
... of assertion, in terms of assertion’s etiological function of transmitting knowledge. Second, is FFAA supposed to give a full account or a partial account of the epistemic goodness of assertion? If it is supposed to give a full account, then FFAA is implausible. That is because assertions plausibly have...
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Journal Article

Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility

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Igor Douven
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 449–485.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-010
Published: 01 October 2006
...Igor Douven Cornell University 2006 Adler, Jonathan. 2002 . Belief's Own Ethics . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Appiah, K. Anthony. 1985 . Assertion and Conditionals . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ____. 1987 . “`If' Again.” Analysis 47 : 193 -99. Austin, John L...
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Journal Article

Assertion, Evidence, and the Future

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Dilip Ninan
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 405–451.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10136817
Published: 01 October 2022
...Dilip Ninan This essay uses a puzzle about assertion and time to explore the pragmatics, semantics, and epistemology of future discourse. The puzzle concerns cases in which a subject is in a position to say, at an initial time t , that it will be that ϕ , but is not in a position to say, at a later...
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Journal Article

Assertion, Knowledge, and Context

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Keith DeRose
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 167–203.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-2-167
Published: 01 April 2002
...Keith DeRose Cornell University 2002 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2 (April 2002) Assertion, Knowledge, and Context Keith DeRose This paper brings together two positions that for the most part have been developed and defended...
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Journal Article

Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism

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John Turri
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 77–95.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2009-026
Published: 01 January 2010
...John Turri In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place...
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Journal Article

Representing Knowledge

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Peter van Elswyk
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 97–143.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8699695
Published: 01 January 2021
... as knowing because their use of a declarative in a context tokens the act-type of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what's asserted. In this article, a semantic explanation is proposed according to which declaratives covertly host a know -parenthetical. A speaker is thereby represented...
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Journal Article

Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox

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David James Barnett
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8809906
Published: 01 April 2021
...David James Barnett Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form &lt; p , but I don't believe that p...
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Journal Article

Lying and Misleading in Discourse

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Andreas Stokke
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 83–134.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3321731
Published: 01 January 2016
... discussion. It argues that to mislead is to disrupt the pursuit of the goal of inquiry—that is, to discover how things are. Lying is seen as a special case requiring assertion of disbelieved information, where assertion is characterized as a mode of contributing information to a discourse that is sensitive...
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Journal Article

Quantifying Over Possibilities

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John Mackay
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2315297
Published: 01 October 2013
...John Mackay A person of average height would assert a truth by the conditional ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be taller than I am,’ in which an indicative clause ‘I am’ is embedded in a subjunctive conditional. By contrast, no one would assert a truth by ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would...
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Journal Article

Inferential Deflationism

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Luca Incurvati, Julian J. Schlöder
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (4): 529–578.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10697531
Published: 01 October 2023
...Luca Incurvati; Julian J. Schlöder Deflationists about truth hold that the function of the truth predicate is to enable us to make certain assertions we could not otherwise make. Pragmatists claim that the utility of negation lies in its role in registering incompatibility. The pragmatist insight...
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Journal Article

On Specifying Truth-Conditions

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Agustín Rayo
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 385–443.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-003
Published: 01 July 2008
...Agustín Rayo This essay is a study of ontological commitment, focused on the special case of arithmetical discourse. It tries to get clear about what would be involved in a defense of the claim that arithmetical assertions are ontologically innocent and about why ontological innocence matters...
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Journal Article

Full Belief and Loose Speech

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Sarah Moss
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-7537270
Published: 01 July 2019
... defended in the literature. In addition, my account complements fruitful probabilistic theories of assertion and knowledge. © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 belief credence context probabilism preface paradox pragmatic encroachment This paper defends an account of the attitude of belief...
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Journal Article

What Is Provisional Right?

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Martin Jay Stone, Rafeeq Hasan
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (1): 51–98.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-9415141
Published: 01 January 2022
... it seems to assert a natural right to property alongside a commitment to property’s conventionality. We resolve this apparent contradiction. Provisional right is not a special kind of right. Instead, it marks the imperfection of an action (that of acquiring ordinary rights) where public authorization...
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Journal Article

Must We Know What We Say?

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Matthew Weiner
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-2-227
Published: 01 April 2005
...Matthew Weiner Cornell University 2005 DeRose, Keith. 1995 . Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 : 1 -52. ____. 1996 . Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 : 568 -80. ____. 1998 . Simple `Might's, Indicative...
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Journal Article

Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications

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Dilip Ninan
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 439–447.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3517041
Published: 01 July 2016
... of c at the time of c . Here it is assumed that propositions receive a truth value relative to a possible world. According to this view, when I say, “Chili is tasty,” I assert the proposition that chili is tasty according to my present standard of taste; when you utter the negation of that sentence...
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Journal Article

Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context

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Dorit Ganson
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 504–507.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10469564
Published: 01 July 2023
... framework, Mona Simion’s engaging and wide-ranging work ensures that both the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) and Classical Invariantism (CI) can be part of a viable and productive research program. (KNA): One’s assertion is epistemically permissible iff one knows that p . (CI...
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Journal Article

Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports

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Cian Dorr, John Hawthorne
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2683531
Published: 01 July 2014
... that we often assert multiple things in making a single utterance has recently been defended by Soames (2002) , Cappelen and Lepore (2005) , and Cappelen (2008) . These authors do not, however, commit themselves to the number's ever being infinite, or to the claim that when one asserts a proposition...
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Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes?

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Andrew Bacon
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2895327
Published: 01 July 2015
... impossible to know whether L is true or not, or futile to wonder or try to find out which it is, or perhaps it's always a bad idea to go about asserting L . If true, each of these things also deserve some kind of explanation too. A standard strategy for answering such questions is to identify a class...
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Journal Article

Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism

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Mark Van Roojen
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 283–286.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-283
Published: 01 April 2001
... to realize that not all assertions need be descriptive. Some assertions are evaluative assertions distinct from descriptive assertions. As assertions, they express beliefs, but not representational beliefs. Those who are skeptical about the coherence of the idea of nondescriptive assertions may...
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Journal Article

The Modal Future

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David Boylan
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 320–325.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10317567
Published: 01 April 2023
... of Semantics 31 , no. 3 : 443 – 55 . Ninan Dilip . 2022 . “ Evidence, Assertion and the Future .” The Philosophical Review 131 , no. 4 : 405 – 51 . Roberts C. 1989 . “ Modal subordination and Pronominal Anaphora in Discourse .” Linguistics and Philosophy 12 , no. 6...
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