...Igor Douven Cornell University 2006 Adler, Jonathan. 2002 . Belief's Own Ethics . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Appiah, K. Anthony. 1985 . Assertion and Conditionals . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ____. 1987 . “`If' Again.” Analysis 47 : 193 -99. Austin, John L...

...Keith DeRose Cornell University 2002 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2 (April 2002) Assertion, Knowledge, and Context Keith DeRose This paper brings together two positions that for the most part have been developed and defended...

...John Turri In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place...

... discussion. It argues that to mislead is to disrupt the pursuit of the goal of inquiry—that is, to discover how things are. Lying is seen as a special case requiring assertion of disbelieved information, where assertion is characterized as a mode of contributing information to a discourse that is sensitive...

...John Mackay A person of average height would assert a truth by the conditional ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be taller than I am,’ in which an indicative clause ‘I am’ is embedded in a subjunctive conditional. By contrast, no one would assert a truth by ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be...

...Agustín Rayo This essay is a study of ontological commitment, focused on the special case of arithmetical discourse. It tries to get clear about what would be involved in a defense of the claim that arithmetical assertions are ontologically innocent and about why ontological innocence matters. The...

...Matthew Weiner Cornell University 2005 DeRose, Keith. 1995 . Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 : 1 -52. ____. 1996 . Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 : 568 -80. ____. 1998 . Simple `Might's, Indicative...

... standard of taste possessed by the speaker of c at the time of c . Here it is assumed that propositions receive a truth value relative to a possible world. According to this view, when I say, “Chili is tasty,” I assert the proposition that chili is tasty according to my present standard of taste; when...

... right now. Call the proposition that Cup A and Cup B are pretty far apart at t , which we just asserted, PrettyFar. PrettyFar belongs to a large class of similar propositions about Cups A and B, which differ as regards how far apart they have to be at t for them to be true. Since there are continuum...

... realize that not all assertions need be descriptive. Some assertions are evaluative assertions distinct from descriptive assertions. As assertions, they express beliefs, but not representational beliefs. Those who are skeptical about the coherence of the idea of nondescriptive assertions may...

... solution. Perhaps it is also impossible to know whether L is true or not, or futile to wonder or try to find out which it is, or perhaps it's always a bad idea to go about asserting L . If true, each of these things also deserve some kind of explanation too. The impossibility of this project...

...-entirely-asserted thesis is that Locke actually is a materialist, this in spite of Locke's multiple assertions that Cartesian dualism is the more likely hypothesis than thinking matter. According to Jolley, Locke “arguably leaves it to the reader to infer that materialism is the most reasonable of the...

... follows. Assume that assertion is a proposal to add the content of the sentence uttered to the common ground and that felicitous assertion requires that the presuppositions of the sentence be already common ground. Also, assume that to assert a conjunction is to assert its conjuncts sequentially. Then...

... a judgment must be reality, Bradley concludes that singular categorical judgments must attribute their contents to reality indi- rectly or conditionally if they are to be true; for, they cannot assert anything as being true of reality directly, but only given certain other assumptions about...

... what he calls “the logical prejudice.” This “prej- udice” is the view that the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ apply paradigmatically to that which can be expressed in a declarative sentence (so, for example, to prop- ositions, judgments, and assertions). In Heidegger’s words, this is the view that...

..., nonrelativist, irrealist, nondescriptivist, and cognitivist. The list may seem incoherent so as to risk identifylng contextualism with a form of error theory, but Timmons thinks this is an illusion resulting from a failure to realize that not all assertions need be descriptive. Some assertions are...

... Jackson and Michael Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stalnaker, Robert. 2001 . On Considering a Possible World as Actual. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , supp. vol. 75 : 141 -56. ____. 2004 . Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics...

... used to assert propositions and be interpreted as such. In those cases, the speaker's intentions determine a perspective with respect to which the relevant possibility is to be considered, that is, the required perspective is filled in pragmatically but not semantically. This feature, according to Bach...

... faith cohere. That can be an enormously effective pedagogical strategy. It is not what one expects, however, from a scholarly monograph. Westphal begins the book by quoting Kierkegaard's own assertion in The Point of View that he is, from first to last, “a religious author,” that his whole...

... TORBJORNTANNSJO. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998. Pp. vi, 185. This is a wide-ranging defense of a distinctive version of hedonistic act utilitarianism. It is plainly written, forthright, and stimulating. Also, it is replete with disputable assertions and arguments. I shall...